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SUMMARY 
Decentralisation is the process through which Central Government transfers 
authority and functions to sub-national units of the Government and it traces its 
origin in Uganda from the “ bush” period (1981 – 1986) when Resistance 
Committees were established by the NRM/A in the Luwero triangle. 
 
The Mamdani Commission Report of 1987 on the Local Government system in 
Uganda recommended devolution of powers. Subsequently, decentralisation was 
launched in 1992, constitutionalised by the 1995 Constitution, and operationalised 
by the Local Governments Act (LGA) in 1997. Among the services devolved were 
education and health, which this study used as case studies to illustrate whether 
decentralisation has enhanced development in Uganda during the period 1993 – 
2006. 
 
The study used both primary and secondary data in analysing the linkage between 
decentralisation and development in the two selected districts in Uganda, namely 
Masindi and Sembabule. Primary data was collected through interviews, 
questionnaires and focus group discussions while secondary data was gathered 
through a literature survey of relevant textbooks, newspapers, reports, legislation 
and journals. 
 
The findings of the study established that if decentralisation is properly planned 
and implemented it can make a meaningful contribution to enhancing 
development. However, since decentralisation is a process and not a once-off 
project, it evolves from one stage to another and, as it does so, it also unfolds new 
challenges and contradictions that need to be effectively addressed.  These 
challenges include aspects relating to the legal framework, as well as political, 
  
xvii
fiscal and administrative decentralisation. The study recommended mitigation 
measures to enhance the efficiency, effectiveness, accountability, transparency, 
and subsequently the quality of services delivered (development) under 
decentralised local governance in Uganda. 
 
KEY WORDS 
 
Decentralisation, development, democracy, local government, districts, service 
delivery, health, education. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 1.0 Background to the study 
 
This study attempts to analyse the performance of the decentralisation policy in 
Uganda since the 1990s to the present date. An effort will be made to analyse the 
policy design, its implementation, monitoring and evaluation concerns and how 
these relate to development. Specific emphasis in the study will be placed on 
whether power has actually been devolved by the Central Government to the Local 
Governments and to what extent this has had a positive impact on the delivery and 
management of education and health services at district level thereby leading to 
development. 
 
The study intends to evaluate how the decentralisation policy is operationalised by 
analysing political, administrative and fiscal decentralisation and how these 
interface with development in Uganda. The study is fundamentally based on an 
analysis of primary and secondary data as it relates to the theoretical and practical 
implications of decentralisation in Uganda, especially in the Masindi and 
Sembabule districts.  
 
1.1. Case study in Uganda 
 
This study is undertaken in Uganda, Africa. Uganda is one of the East African 
countries. It is a multi-ethnic country, which was formerly a British Protectorate 
from 1894 to 1962 when she attained her independence.  
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Uganda is bordered by the Republic of Kenya to the East, Tanzania to the South, 
Rwanda to the South West, the Democratic Republic of Congo to the West, and 
Sudan to the North. At the time of this study Uganda comprised ninety-one 
districts. 
 
 Among the countries in Africa, Uganda is considered particularly valuable for 
research on decentralisation, since it has been pursuing one of the most systematic 
decentralisation policies in Africa. Although Uganda’s conditions of living are 
generally more problematic due to civil strife than other African countries, some of 
the leading districts like Masindi attract frequent visits from donors and policy 
makers of other African countries (Dawa, 2001:17). 
 
Secondly, despite Uganda being still heavily dependent on foreign assistance for 
government activities, the series of decentralisation reforms are not imposed by 
external aid agencies, as is the case with other African countries (Smoke, 2001:20). 
Therefore, lessons from Ugandan experiences could be valuable for academics, 
policy makers, and practitioners who are involved in decentralisation.  
 
According to the Human Right Watch (2003:44), Uganda’s political system can be 
described as being “semi-authoritarian”. This type of policy usually displays some 
procedural democracy including constitutional separation of powers, contested 
presidential and parliamentary elections, as well as providing some degree of 
political freedom to their citizens. 
 
Golooba-Mutebi (1999:23) argues that after the enactment of the Local 
Governments Act in 1997, a new accountability relationship between political 
leaders and constituencies was established, making the decentralisation policy in 
  
3
                                                
Uganda unique. Since these events have significantly altered the policy 
environment, it is essential to reinvestigate whether the current situation makes any 
contribution to the policy objectives, including the attainment of democratic 
participation and reduction of pervasive poverty, hence development. This scenario 
presents a unique opportunity for this research.    
 
1.2 Historical context of decentralisation in Uganda  
 
In order to critically evaluate the performance of the decentralisation policy in 
Uganda with a view of determining whether it enhances development, it is 
pertinent to analyse the historical context of decentralisation in Uganda. In this 
regard, the emphasis will be put on the pre-colonial era of governance in Uganda, 
the colonial era of governance, and the independence period up to the current 
decentralisation policy. This historical overview of local governance in Uganda 
will logically lead to the formulation of the problem and the subsequent objectives 
of the study. 
 
1.2.1 Pre-colonial era of governance in Uganda 
 
The concept of governance has been around in both political and academic 
discourse for a long time and refers, in a generic sense, to the task of running 
society (government) (Hyden, 1992:5). Therefore, it can aptly be asserted that 
governance of society is as old as the human race except that it has always 
manifested itself differently depending on the generation, environment, and what 
society considers to be good governance1. According to Rosenau (1992:4), 
 
1 The World Bank view, 1989, is that good governance must guarantee human rights, check corruption, and promote 
democratization, as well as accountability. 
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governance is a system of rule that works only if it is accepted by the majority or at 
least by the most powerful of those it affects.  
 
In Uganda, like it was in the rest of Africa, governance of communities depended 
on the nature of stratification in the communities. Pre-colonial Ugandan 
communities manifested themselves in either centralised or 
decentralised/segmented communities. Centralised communities/tribes had a 
unitary system of governance with a well-defined institution like the Kingship and 
a personality who enjoyed inherited authority. The communities in Uganda that 
cherished such a system were the traditional kingdom areas of Ankole, Bunyoro, 
Toro and Buganda. The Baganda had the Kabaka, the Banyankole had the 
Omugabe, and the Banyoro and Batoro had the Omukama. These were leaders by 
birth and they wielded a lot of authority and as a result all citizens had to bear 
allegiance to them.  
 
On the other hand, under the decentralised or segmented system, authority was 
diffused since the communities did not have paramount chiefs and, as a result, 
operations rotated around clan heads. Such communities included the Iteso, 
Sabiny, Langi, Acholi, Bagwere, and Banyole among others. In these communities, 
if an issue was beyond the clan, clan heads converged to form consensus, hence, 
there was law and order. Each clan head had a council of elders whose decisions 
were respected by all clan members; this was indeed a form of government. It 
must, however, be noted that regardless of the system of governance, both 
centralised and decentralised communities aimed at creating harmony, self 
defence, expansion of territory, and delivery of services and therefore to enhance 
development (Semakula, 1971:97). 
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In Buganda, for instance, the pre-colonial kingdom had a highly centralised and 
institutionalised political system with the Kabaka (king) at the apex of the political 
hierarchy. The Kabaka wielded a lot of authority in that: 
• All land belonged to him. 
• He appointed the Prime Minister (Katikiiro). 
• He appointed the cabinet (Bakungu). 
• He appointed the legislative council (Lukiiko) whose role was advisory. 
• He had a judicial system that made him the ultimate court of appeal. 
• He also appointed the minor chiefs at the county (Saza), sub-county 
(Gombolola), parish (Muluka), and village (Bataka). 
 
This system ensured that the Kabaka’s presence was felt at every level of 
governance. Most centralised communities in Uganda had a replica of the above 
political system although the designation of different offices differed from one 
society to another (Nsibambi, 1998:7).  
 
The last quarter of the nineteenth century ushered in the epoch of colonialism in 
Africa, Uganda inclusive. Uganda was in 1890 declared by the Heligoland Treaty2 
as a British sphere of influence and it was later in 1894 declared a British 
Protectorate. 
 
1.2.2 Colonial period of governance in Uganda  
 
European colonial rule in Uganda was occasioned by the entrance of explorers like 
Speke, Grant, Burton, and the Bakers, who were followed by the missionaries in 
 
2 The Heligoland Treaty was the second Anglo-German Agreement. The first one had been concluded in 1886 by 
which the Germans occupied Tanganyika (Tanzania) and the British occupied Kenya.  
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1877 and 1879 for the Protestants and Catholics respectively, then came the 
European traders under the Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEA) led by 
Lugard and finally British Commissioners like Sir Harry Johnstone.         
 
What has to be noted, however, is that British colonialism was received with mixed 
feelings depending on the mood of the community and its leadership. For instance, 
whereas Mutesa I, the king of Buganda between 1856 and 1884 welcomed HM 
Stanley and later led to the coming of missionaries, his son Mwanga (1884-97) 
resisted the colonial masters, just as Kabalega the Omukama of Bunyoro did. 
Generally, British colonialism in Uganda was resisted by the indigenous 
aristocracy in Bunyoro, Ankole and Buganda who saw their traditional privileges 
being abolished and their authority eroded, (Karugire, 1980:33). 
 
This partly explains why the British had to use the divide and conquer policy as the 
Baganda were used to constitute colonial armies by which the Batoro and Banyoro 
were conquered and subjugated. Indeed, in 1899 Kabalega and Mwanga were 
arrested using Baganda commanders like Semei Kakungulu. However, after the 
Baganda forces had been used and achieved the colonial goal of farthering British 
hegemony, they too were colonised. In 1894, Uganda was declared a British 
Protectorate; therefore, from then Uganda including the kingdom areas lost its 
independence until 1962.  
Since the British lacked traditional or acquired legitimacy as they did not have 
inherited authority nor were they elected respectively, they had to adopt the 
indirect rule system by which indigenous leaders were used to serve as colonial 
junior functionaries who translated colonial policies into practical terms. The 
indirect rule system was British in essence and African in burden because the 
British formulated the policies while the African leaders implemented them. This 
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exposed African leaders to a lot of risk in the event of resistance against colonial 
policies. This indeed happened to Miti, a Muganda colonial agent to Bunyoro 
during the Nyangire rebellion of 1906 (Karugire, 1980:66). 
 
To make the conquest and effective occupation of Uganda cost effective the British 
adopted the Kiganda3 model of local administration already described under the 
pre-colonial period. This model was adopted by the British and transplanted to 
other parts of Uganda using Baganda chiefs who served as collaborators. Such 
chiefs included James Miti, who was sent to Bunyoro and Semei Kakungulu who 
conquered Busoga, Bukedi, Bugisu, Sebei and Teso areas. This in the history of 
Uganda is referred to as the sub-Baganda imperialism.  
 
What is worth noting is that during this period, the British practised a highly 
centralised political system because although they had Baganda colonial agents 
who established Local Governments where they were deployed, they had no 
discretionary power. Therefore, it can be argued that centralisation of power in 
Uganda was a colonial legacy. This situation continued until 1962 when Uganda 
attained independence (Kisakye, 1996: 36). 
 
However, the centrally placed kingdom of Buganda enjoyed a reasonable degree of 
autonomy, which is traceable to the 1900 Buganda Agreement. This Agreement, 
which was signed between the regents4 of Buganda and Sir Harry John stone the 
British Commissioner, recognised the kingdom of Buganda, its legislative council 
(Lukiiko) and established a freehold system known as Mailo land. This land tenure 
system allocated land to the British Crown (Crown land) and the rest was given to 
 
3 Buganda is the territory, Baganda is the tribe and Kiganda is the form hence, Kiganda model of administration.   
4 In 1897 Mwanga was deposed by the British Protectorate government and his son Daudi Chwa who was just one 
year old was enthroned. This led to the regency of Zakaria Kisingiri, Stanslus Mugwanya and Apollo Kaggwa   
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the Buganda royalty and the peasantry (Mailo land). Agreements were also 
concluded with the kingdoms of Ankole, Bunyoro and Toro, while the non-
kingdom areas were controlled by District Commissioners. By the time Uganda 
attained its independence, Buganda was treated like a state within the state of 
Uganda (Semakula, 1973:19). 
 
As the British controlled the whole of Uganda, it became cheaper and more 
convenient to apply the system of indirect rule that gave some autonomy to 
kingdom areas (Apter, 1959:13; Burke, 1964:11). This colonial legacy of giving 
differential systems of autonomy to different areas of Uganda was inherited in the 
Independence Constitution of 1962.  
 
1.2.3 Independence period up to 1966 
 
Under the 1962 Constitution, federal status was given to the kingdoms of Buganda, 
Ankole, Toro, Bunyoro and Busoga, while the other districts like Acholi, Bugisu, 
Bukedi, Teso, Karamoja, Kigezi, Lango, Madi, Sebei, and West Nile were 
centrally controlled. This arrangement was resented by the ten latter districts and 
this led to the crisis of the 1960s. 
 
In reality, however, it was only the kingdom of Buganda that enjoyed meaningful 
financial and personnel powers and these were enshrined under schedules 7 and 9 
of the Independence Constitution. Therefore, Buganda’s power sprang from two 
major sources – political and financial. Buganda’s political cohesiveness under its 
Kabaka and a militant Lukiiko, made it possible to dominate the politics of 
Uganda.  
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This was more evident because before independence, the Buganda government 
organised a political movement called Kabaka Yekka (KY) that was so powerful 
locally that the Uganda Peoples Congress (UPC)5 under Milton Obote, could not 
form a national government without allying with it. It was so powerful that, if at 
that time the Kabaka resolved to ally with the Democratic Party (DP) under the 
leadership of Benedicto Kiwanuka, UPC would have never ascended to power on 1 
May 1962 (Kanyeihamba, 1975:93).       
 
The Western Kingdoms and Busoga Act of 1963, which never applied to Buganda 
greatly reduced the power of federal kingdoms of Ankole, Bunyoro, Toro and the 
territory of Busoga. According to this Act, before a bill was introduced before the 
assembly of a federal state, it had to get prior approval of the Minister in charge of 
Local Government. This meant that changes in the bill had to obtain consent of the 
Central Government Minister. In reality therefore, the Act made federalism apply 
only to Buganda. 
 
However, between 1962 and 1965 a number of factors facilitated the devolution of 
powers. During this time, UPC, the party in power did not have overall majority, it 
therefore had to appease the Buganda kingdom including granting it autonomy. 
There are also economic reasons that justified devolution of powers.  
 
It is argued by Allen (1982:49) that it was cheaper to employ local people rather 
than civil servants from the centre who would have needed allowances for 
transport and accommodation. This is generally true in that proximity to the local 
environment and conditions enables local people to plan more realistically for the 
 
5 At the time of independence, three political parties namely the Democratic Party, Uganda Peoples Congress and 
Kabaka Yekka (King only) participated in the elections during which UPC and KY formed a coalition.   
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needs of their areas than bureaucrats from the centre who tend to behave like 
“tourists” when they occasionally visit local areas. Decentralisation enhances 
participation of the local people who become committed to local implementation of 
the policy, making the policy more sustainable.  
 
From 1964, however, politicians started defecting from Kabaka Yekka and the 
Democratic Party to the Uganda Peoples Congress and this gave Obote and his 
UPC ruling party the majority needed in parliament. It ought to be noted that some 
politicians joined UPC with the hope of overthrowing Obote from within through a 
constitutional coup. Realising that, Obote suspended the Independence 
Constitution in 1966, which was eventually replaced with the 1967 Republican 
Constitution (Obote,1968:47; Kanyeihamba, 1975:101). These constitutional 
manoeuvres led to highly centralised political governance in Uganda. 
 
1.2.4 The era of political centralisation 
 
This era was perpetuated by a number of regimes, namely, the first Obote regime, 
which extended up to 1971, the military regimes of Amin and UNLF (1971-79), 
and the second Obote regime of 1980-85. During this era, there were no elected 
Local Councils and Local Government management was controlled from the centre 
through the Minister in charge of Local and Provincial Administration. 
  
(a) The period 1967 - 1971 
The military confrontation of May 1966 between the Central Government and the 
Buganda (Mengo)6 establishment led to the defeat of Buganda and availed Obote 
the opportunity to recentralise power. Obote and his UPC party had the majority in 
 
6 Mengo was the seat of the Buganda kingdom where the Kabaka resided.  
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parliament and therefore Buganda could no longer pose a threat to the Central 
Government. Besides, Obote as Commander in Chief had replaced Brigadier 
Shaban Opolot7 with Amin Dada as Army Commander who was to execute the 
UPC plans.  
 
The parliament went ahead to pass the Local Administration Act of 1967, which 
“streamlined” Local Administration. Accordingly, the word “Government” was 
abolished and circulars were sent out to all civil servants warning them not to refer 
to Local Administration as “government”. This was psychologically intended to 
eradicate the view that local administrations possessed authority (Government) 
which could have made them autonomous, legitimate and command the loyalty of 
the citizens.  
 
These changes implied that Local Administrations owed their existence not to the 
Constitution but to the wishes and power of the only legitimate Central 
Government. This probably explains why Obote always chanted the slogan of One 
Government, One Parliament, One Nation. Local Governments were only 
supposed to deliver services to the people in a manner prescribed by the Central 
Government. Ochola, the then Minister in charge of Local Government, while 
introducing the Local Administration Bill to Parliament in 1967, said: 
“The suggested changes will remove all vestiges of separatism and 
federalism and will lead to the creation of unitary system of 
administration with strong centralised powers. Mr. Speaker, the Bill is 
designed as an instrument for national unity… The Bill is further 
designed to enable all people of Uganda to have to think in terms of their 
own sub-groups, but also in terms of the common problems confronting 
 
7 Shaban Opolot was the first African Army Commander after attainment of Independence.  
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different parts and different tribes in Uganda, so that eventually, it 
should not be difficult for the people of Uganda to comprehend problems 
confronting the nation as a whole” (Uganda Parliamentary Debate, 21 
September 1967: 2032). 
 
As a result of these changes, services like provision of water, forestry, veterinary 
services, courts, fishing among others were recentralised while Local 
Administrations retained education, medical and health services, maintenance of 
water supplies, roads, prison services, control of vermin,, trading centres, the 
registration of births and deaths, plus any function which the Central Government 
Minister may by order prescribe. 
 
This centralisation of power was facilitated by a number of factors, which included 
the fact that other parts of Uganda resented the seemingly special position of 
Buganda. Therefore when Obote confronted Buganda militarily he was supported 
by the other parts of Uganda. Low (1971:230-231) states that Buganda’s special 
position generated profound ambivalence towards the kingdom, which in the end 
came to express itself more particularly in envy. This resentment was orchestrated 
by some impolitic decisions and statements of some leading Baganda, like when 
the Lukiiko passed a resolution proposed by Kaggwa that Obote’s “illegal” 
government should be removed from Buganda’s soil (Kampala).8 
 
This was indeed an imprudent resolution that the Baganda could not enforce, 
instead, it gave Obote the opportunity he had waited for over time to encircle 
Buganda and subjugate it with the approval of the rest of Uganda. Kanyeihamba 
 
8 Kampala the capital city and seat of the Central Government is in the Buganda Region yet Obote and the UPC 
party that was in power was dominated by leaders from other regions.  
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(1975:89) remarked thus: “Obote suspended the Independence Constitution not 
that he loved it less but because he loved Uganda more”. This was in approval of 
Obote’s actions, which gave credence to the centralisation of power. It was 
asserted by parliament in 1967 that centralisation would enable the hitherto defiant 
kingdoms realise that power lies at the centre (Uganda Parliamentary Debates, 
1967:2053).  
 
The other reason for centralisation, but which politicians are reluctant to accept, 
was the lack of political legitimacy. According to the Independence Constitution, 
general elections were to be held every five years but in 1966/67 this Constitution 
was abrogated and hence elections were not held. Therefore, when Obote 
forcefully abrogated the Independence Constitution, he lost the right to rule 
(political legitimacy). Hence, he could not have shared stolen power with local 
authorities and to secure his personal survival, he had to centralise power (Tardoff, 
1984: 73). Yet there was the need to centralise national resources in order to 
redistribute them so that regional imbalances could be avoided.  
 
Article 104 of the 1967 Constitution substantially limited the powers of Local 
Administrations because it transferred loyalty from the local/electorate to the 
centre, which greatly undermined responsiveness to service beneficiaries and 
accountability to local leadership. Indeed, according to the 1967 Local 
Administration Act, the Minister of Local Government had to appoint Local 
Councils, approve their byelaws and even revoke them at will and approve Local 
Councils’ budgets on behalf of the Central Government.  
 
Accountability for transferred resources was made to the Minister of Local 
Government and not to the local people to whom leaders are accountable under 
  
14
devolution (decentralisation). The Minister had power to dissolve and terminate the 
mandate of Local Councils. All local council employees, including office 
messengers had to be appointed by the President (Nsibambi, 1998:47). This 
situation remained the same until the military regime by Amin that was ushered in 
by a military coup in 1971. 
 
(b) Military regimes  
 
On 25 January 1971, there was a turning point in the history of Uganda when the 
Uganda Army under its Commander Idi Amin overthrew the first Obote regime. 
This was the beginning of a series of military coups that were to follow and write 
the history of a nation once described by Churchill as the Pearl of Africa. Amin’s 
regime prevailed until the 11 April 1979 when it was overthrown following a 
military coercion between the Uganda Army and the Ugandan exiles who were 
assisted by the Tanzania Peoples Defence Forces.  
 
During Amin’s rule, the appointed Local Councils were abolished altogether and in 
their stead, local and regional administration was placed in the hands of District 
Commissioners and Provincial Governors respectively, who were presidential 
appointees and in most cases military people. These leaders operated without 
councils, more often than not using decrees that were issued from time to time 
from the head of state. They were therefore accountable to the president and not 
the people they were to serve. This regime was characterised by tyranny, which 
forced many Ugandans into exile. It was these asylum seekers who were helped by 
Julius Nyerere to form the Uganda National Liberation Front/Army (UNLF/A) in 
Moshi (Tanzania) in 1979. It was the UNLF that formed the next government of 
Uganda under Prof Yusuf Lule.         
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The fall of Amin saw the emergence of the Uganda National Liberation 
Front/Army which was more of a transition leadership characterised by political 
intrigue. It was indeed this intrigue that explains why there were three regimes in 
less than two years. During this period, Prof Yusuf Lule, Godfrey Binaisa and Paul 
Muwanga’s military commission ruled Uganda between 1979 and 1980. The 
UNLF government did not have elected or appointed Local Councils in a real 
sense, instead, a system similar to Local Government known as Mayumba Kumi9 
was established (Nsibambi, 2000:11).  
 
According to this system, every ten homesteads elected a chairperson who presided 
over local conflicts. Since the economy had been run down during Amin’s 
economic war during which foreign investors especially of British origin were 
expelled, basic necessities like sugar, soap, salt were in acute shortage and had to 
be rationed although at a price. The Mayumba Kumi was responsible for this 
besides being in charge of security. Part of the security roles of this system was to 
identify from among the communities those who had served with Amin especially 
under the State Research Bureau. By and large, the Mayumba Kumi system was 
more of a security arrangement than a form of Local Government. 
 
Paul Muwanga’s Military Commission Regime organised elections, which were 
held in December 1980 and were “won” by UPC, ushering in the second Obote 
Regime of 1980-85 during which Paul Muwanga was the Vice President. This 
second Obote regime ruled the country until July 1985 when it was overthrown by 
the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) under the command of General 
Tito Okello Lutwa.  
 
9 Mayumba Kumi is derived from the Swahili words mayumba meaning houses and kumi meaning ten, hence, 
mayumba kumi referring to the ten house cell system.  
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The 1980-85 regime was a replica of the first Obote regime between 1967 and 
1971 because Local Councils were just appointed by the Central Government 
through the Minister of Local Government and local council budgets, bye-laws and 
lifespan were determined by the centre. Appointments of Local Administration 
staff were all made by the President through a centralised Public Service 
Commission (Nsibambi 2000:14). 
 
During the December 1980 elections, four political parties namely the Uganda 
Peoples’ Congress (UPC), the Democratic Party (DP), the Uganda Patriotic 
Movement (UPM), and the Conservative Party (CP), participated. A lot of 
malpractices were cited like gerrymandering10, potential competitors were held at 
roadblocks and only set free after 5 o’clock the official closing hour for 
nominations, there were arbitrary arrests of opponents, election officials were 
partisan and these among others made the other parties complain about the fairness 
of the election. Yoweri Museveni, the presidential candidate for UPM promised 
that if elections were rigged, he would go to the bush, which he did on 6 February 
1981 when he launched a guerilla war that lasted five years under the banner of the 
National Resistance Movement/Army. 
 
(c) The National Resistance Movement and the evolution of the current 
decentralisation system  
 
Following the 1980 elections that were allegedly rigged, the National Resistance 
Movement/Army (NRM/A) waged a protracted peoples’ war between 6 February 
 
10 Gerrymandering – the practice of changing the size and borders of an area for election purposes, to deliberately 
give one group or party an unfair advantage over the others.    
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1981 and 26 January 1986 when they overthrew the military regime that had seized 
power from Obote in July 198511. The NRM/A waged war at the time when most 
Ugandans, especially from the Buganda region (which, being central, is very 
strategic) were disgruntled with the Obote leadership. In 1966, when Obote 
invaded Mengo the seat of the Kabaka of Buganda, Mutesa II who was the 
President fled the country and eventually died in London in 1969 under very 
suspicious circumstances.  
 
In 1967, Obote had abolished kingdoms including Buganda, which the Baganda 
resented. Yet the “brutal” leadership of Amin exacted a lot of suffering on them. 
Therefore, when Museveni and NRM/A decided to wage war against the Obote 
regime, the Baganda had the opportunity they had been waiting for. Therefore, the 
success of the NRM/A revolution in Uganda was mostly due to the goodwill of the 
ordinary population that was yearning for change.  
 
During the “bush”12 war, the NRM/A mobilised and politicised the masses about 
their democratic rights. This movement managed to transform itself into a mass 
organisation, which captured people’s sympathy. To create coherence amongst the 
population in the war zone (Luwero triangle), NRM/A introduced a form of local 
government through elected people’s councils, which were based in villages called 
the Resistance Councils/Committees in all the areas they conquered.  
 
These Resistance Committees mobilised the masses to support the revolution, 
mobilised resources especially food, recruited soldiers into the NRA, and also 
 
11 On 27 July 1985, the Commander of UNLA overthrew the second Obote regime. This was the second time Obote 
had been overthrown by the army following that of Amin in 1971.   
12 “Bush” war is the term generally used to refer to the five years’ war waged internally by NRM/A during the 
period 1981-85 which ushered in the Museveni regime.    
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acted as arbitrators/courts in the case of conflicts. These Committees laid the 
foundation of the current local government system, which the NRM government 
extended to the whole of the country after gaining power in 1986 (Kisakye, 
1996:37).  
 
While in the “bush”, the NRM formulated the Ten Point Programme, which 
articulated the vision and mission of the revolution. One of the central issues was 
the “establishment of popular democracy” and it can therefore be asserted that the 
roots of the current decentralisation system can be traced back to the bush struggle.  
 
Since decentralisation is a process and not a project,13 it undergoes a 
metamorphosis depending on changes in the political and economic environment, 
including changes in government. The current decentralisation policy was 
occasioned by the appointment in August 1986 of the Mamdani Commission, 
which carried out an inquiry into the Ugandan Local Government system with a 
view of devolving power from the centre to the periphery (Mamdani Commission 
Report, 1987). 
 
In order to legitimise the Resistance Committees formed during the “bush” period, 
the 1987 Resistance Councils’ Statute was enacted by the National Resistance 
Council (NRC), which was the parliament of the day formed by historical senior 
members of the NRM revolution. The recommendations of the Mamdani 
Commission were crystallised in the decentralisation policy that was launched by 
YK Museveni (President) on 2 October 1992. Subsequently, in November 1993 the 
 
13 A process is continuous and dynamic as it manifests itself in different forms depending on circumstances; a 
project has limited time frame and resources.    
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Local Government (Resistance Councils Statute) was passed by the NRC 
(Decentralisation Secretariat, 1994:13).  
 
Decentralisation was further strengthened by the promulgation of the 1995 
Constitution and the subsequent laws that operationalised the policy. Chapter One 
of the 1995 Constitution provides that power belongs to the people and Chapter 
Eleven of the same Constitution states that decentralisation shall be the form of 
government applicable to all levels of Local Governments. The same Chapter 
provides that the details in this respect were to be elaborated on by parliament, 
which was indeed done in 1997 when the Local Governments Act (LGA) was 
enacted with its subsequent amendments in 2001 and 2005.  
 
Financial management issues were also streamlined by the enactment of the Local 
Governments Financial and Accounting Regulations, 1998. From then, functions 
that were previously undertaken by the centre like human resource management, 
land management, financial management, procurement, provision of services like 
health, education, technical services and community based services were devolved 
to the Local Governments at the district and sub-county levels.  
 
Following the devolution of the functions and resources, Local Governments 
assumed legislative, judicial and administrative roles. Local Councils exercise 
legislative functions by formulating policies that the administrative officials 
implement. Councils also make bye-laws and ordinances as long as they do not 
contravene existing laws like the Constitution.  
 
Lower Local Councils also exercise judicial powers through village, parish and 
sub-county courts whose verdicts are respected by the mainstream judicial system. 
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Administrative roles involve the management of administrative officials by 
recommending the structure, recruitment, promotions, discipline, and retiring of 
human resources through the “Separate Human Resource Management System”14. 
Local Councils do this through the District Service Commissions (DSCs) 
established in every district. 
 
Development planning has also been devolved as it was deemed that 
decentralisation in Uganda would lead to effective governance and thus 
development. The decentralisation policy in Uganda is established in terms of a 
five-tier system which facilitates bottom-up development planning from local 
council one (LC I) to local council five (LC V) which are the village and 
district/city councils respectively (Lubanga, 1998:73). 
 
What this investigation will attempt to establish is whether this decentralisation 
enhances development and, if not, to assess what the bottlenecks are. The Local 
Governments Act, 1997, operationalises the decentralisation policy by outlining 
the services that have been decentralised to the districts, urban authorities, and sub-
counties. Education and health are among these decentralised services.  
 
1.2.5 The evolution of Education and Health services in Uganda 
 
Prior to the coming of colonialism, indigenous communities in Uganda had 
developed a system of education and African medicine. During this period, every 
ethnic group had values that they cherished and hoped to transmit to the next 
generation. Societal values constituted the norms that formed the curriculum.  
 
14 The Separate Human Resource Management System involves decentralisation of personnel management through 
the District Service Commissions.  
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Different sexes had different roles and as a result education for the girl child was 
different from that given to the boys. Whereas girls were given lessons like 
cooking, baby tendering and other family related roles, the boys were given 
arbitration, leadership, hunting and defence related skills. Therefore, indigenous 
education taught the youth the culture, good behaviour, ethics, and language of the 
society in which they lived (Sekamwa, 2000: 18). 
 
In the same way, African indigenous communities had developed medicinal 
science. Although some of the beliefs involved witchcraft, especially when spirits 
like the “Lubales” in Buganda were consulted, the rich natural environment helped 
in providing herbal and animal medicine. Different herbs were used to treat 
different ailments, for instance, the leaves of a local herb called “Omululuza” were 
taken orally as a treatment for malaria.  
 
Traditional birth attendants provided maternity services to expectant mothers and 
very tiny fish literally known as “enkeje” were and still are regarded as a treatment 
for measles. African medicine in some societies like the Karamojong still plays a 
significant role to date, as they prefer the indigenous treatment to the modern 
medication offered in health centres.  
 
With the coming of colonialism, most African practices were branded primitive, 
barbaric and therefore were discarded. Western civilisation was introduced under 
the guise of liberating Africans from the bondage of backwardness. To undertake 
the civilising mission were the missionaries who hoped to use education and health 
as a means of “humanising” and “pacifying” Africans, this explains why the 
missionaries were the champions of education and health services in Uganda and 
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indeed the whole of Africa. These institutions were used as conversion centres, the 
schools helped to produce a literate population who would be able to read the bible 
and eventually serve as junior functionaries in the colonial establishment 
(Sekamwa, 2001:22).  
 
In Uganda, the earliest schools were Budo (1906) for the sons of the chiefs and 
Gayaza (1905) for the daughters (girls) who would be nurtured to become wives of 
the said sons. Other missionary schools included Namilyango (1902), Namagunga, 
Nabingo, Nabumali, and Tororo College among others. 
 
The first hospital, Mengo Hospital, was established by Sir Albert Cook in 1896. 
Since not all missionaries belonged to the same group, there was competition 
especially between the White Fathers who were Catholics and the Church 
Missionary Society officials who were Protestants. It is important to note that 
competition was healthy as it led to the growth of the education and health sectors.  
 
By 1923, when the Phelps-Stokes Commission on education in Uganda was 
established, both Anglican and Catholic missions had boards, which were charged 
with the responsibility of advising, construction, training and appointment of 
Inspectors. In each case, the bishop was the chairman of the board. However, it 
was found necessary to unify the management of education because missionary 
societies had limitations. The Phelps-Stokes Commission had this to say on 
inspection by missionaries: 
“By a mere enumeration of the missionaries at work and the work they 
have to do, it has been proved without a shadow of doubt that 
missionaries are not undertaking and cannot undertake the work of the 
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inspection of schools in any way approaching adequacy” (Sekamwa, 
2001: 43). 
 
The reason for this state of affairs is not difficult to pinpoint. The priests, the rural 
deans, simply had no time for the proper inspection and administration of the 
schools under them. Their main interest when they visited the schools was to see 
whether or not the preparation for Christian baptism or for confirmation was well 
conducted.  
 
It was therefore recommended that the Protectorate Government set up a 
Department of Education because missionary societies had not related their 
educational activities (curriculum) to the community needs of the people. The 
Commission considered that the omission of instruction on issues such as 
Agriculture, Health Science and Hygiene was a very serious indication of the 
weakness of missionary education. 
 
As a result of the above, from 1925, the Government started exercising control 
over education by establishing a Directorate of Education. This limited capacity of 
the missionaries also affected the health sector. After the attainment of 
independence in 1962, the Education and Health sectors continued to be controlled 
from the centre (Sekamwa, 2001:46). 
 
Despite the Independence Constitution decentralising local administration, these 
services continued to be provided as deferred services through administrative 
officers appointed by the Central Government (deconcentration). The situation did 
not change much until 1993 when the current decentralisation policy was 
operationalised. Currently, under decentralisation, Education and Health services 
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are provided by the Local Governments including the recruitment of staff like the 
District Education Officer (DEO), the District Director of Health Services 
(DDHS), and the subordinate staff.  
 
1.3 Statement of the problem 
 
The designers of the decentralisation policy in Uganda hoped that when 
implemented properly, it would reduce the workload at the centre, create political 
and administrative accountability, promote responsiveness, and in the long run 
develop organisational structures tailored to local circumstances in which the 
payment of taxes could be linked to the provision of services. In this way, it was 
intended that decentralisation would contribute to democratisation, more effective 
development, and good governance.     
 
The problem, however, is that despite these well intentioned goals, the theory is 
contrary to the practice since decentralisation in Uganda is characterised by several 
contradictions in the way of challenges related to human resource management, 
procurement, financial management, and the commercialisation of the elections 
process which involves the use of money to bribe voters and thereby greatly 
undermines the ideals of individual merit.  
 
As a result, democracy in Uganda has not necessarily produced the best leaders. 
These contradictions have negative implications for development and this study 
seeks to investigate why decentralisation has not necessarily led to development in 
the Ugandan context drawing case studies from the two districts of Masindi and 
Sembabule and the service sectors of Education and Health. 
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 1.4 Objectives of the study 
 
Generally, the study intends to analyse the performance of the decentralisation 
policy in terms of effectiveness in the delivery of services with specific reference 
to Health and Education in the two selected districts of Uganda. The study hopes to 
highlight inadequacies, which could be addressed to improve performance and lead 
to development.  
 
More specifically, the study aims at:  
• Examining the legal and institutional framework of decentralisation in 
Uganda. 
• Analysing the effectiveness of decentralised human resource and 
procurement management. 
• Examining the role of elected leaders in development under decentralised 
governance. 
• Analysing fiscal decentralisation in relation to service delivery 
(development).  
 
These objectives have been critically identified to cover the four pillars of 
decentralisation namely, the legal framework, as well as fiscal, administrative and 
political decentralisation. To achieve these objectives, the study will analyse the 
performance of decentralisation in the districts of Masindi and Sembabule using 
the service sectors of Health and Education due to the importance that the 
population attaches to them.  
 
 
  
26
                                                
1.5 Study hypothesis 
 
This study is conceived and built on a number of hypotheses. Firstly, the study 
argues that if decentralisation as a policy is properly implemented it can facilitate 
the democratisation of society through regular, free and fair elections. Secondly, 
the decentralisation policy can lead to sustainable development because, through 
participatory management, the grassroots citizens develop a sense of ownership of 
the resultant development programmes. Thirdly, the lack of integrity of 
decentralisation practitioners like the elected officials and administrative staff, is 
the greatest challenge to effective implementation of decentralisation due to lack of 
accountability and transparency. Due to the problems related to integrity, fiscal 
decentralisation does not necessarily lead to development. Lastly, decentralisation 
of human resource management and procurement may not necessarily improve 
service delivery as the appointment of the boards that manage these functions is 
manipulated by politicians, therefore, incompetent15 people are appointed which 
breeds corruption, nepotism and shoddy work.  
 
1.6 Significance of the study 
 
Decentralisation as a process of transferring authority and functions from the 
centre to the periphery governments is intended to result in good governance. The 
quest for good governance in both developed and developing countries has taken 
centre stage. Governments design policies, which are intended to improve people’s 
welfare and subsequently lead to development.  
 
 
15 Boards are appointed by council on the recommendation of the executive committee which committee is also 
appointed by the chairperson. So, more often than not, the chairperson appoints his former campaign agents who 
may not necessarily be competent.  
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The decentralisation policy in Uganda is one of such policies, which intends to 
encourage popular participation, accountability, and therefore enhance good 
governance and development. It is assumed that once organisations are 
decentralised formally and legally, the intended results are attained. However, 
there have been few tests to critically compare the assumptions and the subsequent 
results associated with decentralisation.  
 
This study intends to fill the gap by relating the theory of decentralisation to the 
practice in the two Ugandan districts using the two service areas. The two districts 
have been carefully selected because whereas Masindi is one of the largest, oldest 
districts where the decentralisation policy was piloted in 1993 and is relatively 
successful, Sembabule is one of the more recently established districts having been 
part of the Masaka district until 1997. It is a tiny district comprising only seven 
sub-counties as compared to Masindi’s fourteen. Therefore, the two districts are on 
contrasting ends of the continuum.  
 
Education and health have been selected because the poor at the grassroots level 
consider them to be the most essential community priorities. In addition, the 
education and health sectors consume the largest proportion of the public 
expenditure. Poor health and lack of education are major facets of poverty. The 
World Health Organisation in 2000 considered health and education as important 
components of the International Poverty Reduction Strategy.  
 
According to the Uganda Poverty Participatory Assessment Project organised by 
the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MoFPED, 
2000:14), communities in Uganda consider poor health and illiteracy as the most 
significant causes and consequences of poverty. This is why the government of 
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Uganda accords priority to education and health by voting more resources to them 
as reflected in the Medium Term Expenditure Framework for the financial years 
2005/2006-2006/2007 (see page 357).  
 
From the Medium Term Expenditure Framework for the Financial Years 2003/04 – 
2006/07, security expected to use Uganda shillings 385.07 billion and 399.64 
billion in the period, 2005/06 – 2006/07. While roads and works expected Uganda 
shillings 439.20 billion and 504.38 billion, agriculture utilised 129.57 billion and 
136.16 billion, education 611.57 billion and 631.28 billion, health 391.11 billion 
and 414.07 billion, water 88.55 billion and 88.19 billion, and justice, law and order 
165.01 billion and 168.72 billion. 
 
The above projections indicate that education was the most expensive social 
service to the government of Uganda and health is only surpassed by roads and 
works. Therefore, Education and Health put together were expected to utilise 
1,002.68 billion in the financial year 2005/06 and 1,045.35 billion in 2006/07 
financial year. Due to the priority attached to Education and Health by both the 
citizens and the government, this study intends to focus on these service sectors to 
analyse whether decentralised governance actually enhances development.  
 
1.7 Scope of the study 
 
This study is approached from the perspective of policy effectiveness on the basis 
of objectives and popular participation. It analyses whether the implementation of 
the decentralisation policy has achieved its intended goals and how this leads to 
development.  
 
  
29
Secondary data will be collected and analysed by means of a literature study which 
makes use of various sources related to the Ugandan setting, including books, 
journal articles, and legislation. Primary data will be generated in the two districts 
of Uganda using a case study approach to: analyse how decentralisation relates to 
development; highlight challenges (contradictions) experienced; and propose 
mitigation measures to enhance the effectiveness of decentralisation. Due to the 
rich data available on decentralisation in both the secondary and primary sources, 
the research findings can aptly be used for the purposes of generalisation.    
 
1.8 Study plan 
 
The objectives of this study will be achieved by focusing attention on various 
issues.  Chapter One includes the historical background to decentralisation in 
Uganda, a statement of the problem, an indication of the objectives and hypotheses 
of the study, as well as the significance of the study and its scope. 
 
Chapter Two will provide an overview of the literature study whereby 
decentralisation and development will be conceptualised, a theoretical framework 
for the study will be provided, and the rationale for decentralisation will be 
presented, followed by a critique of decentralisation.  
 
Chapter Three will present the institutional and legal framework of the current 
decentralisation arrangements in Uganda. The aim is to describe this policy in 
theory before the practice is analysed through an investigation of the actual 
realities pertaining to policy implementation in the two selected districts.  
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Chapter Four will provide an overview of the research methods that the study 
employed in arriving at scientifically authentic findings, while Chapter Five will 
analyse the performance of decentralisation in the two selected districts as revealed 
by primary data collected and analysed using the methods described in Chapter 
Four. 
 
Chapter Six will focus specifically on analysing the effectiveness of decentralised 
human resource and procurement management.  Chapter Seven will present an 
exposition of the findings on the role of elected leaders in development under 
decentralised governance while Chapter Eight will aim to analyse the findings 
pertaining to decentralised Education and Health service delivery in Masindi and 
Sembabule.  
 
Finally, Chapter Nine will serve to provide a conclusion for the study whereby the 
pertinent findings are summarised, challenges and contradictions relating to 
decentralisation are highlighted, and recommendations or mitigating measures to 
address these challenges are indicated.  
Having justified the need for the study by analysing the historical background to 
decentralisation, its rationale as a system of local governance, the next chapter will 
analyse the literature pertaining to decentralisation with a view identifying the 
linkages between decentralisation and development. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF DECENTRALISATION 
AND DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.0  Introduction    
 
In undertaking this study, a variety of literature will be reviewed in this chapter 
with the aim of analysing the relationship between decentralisation and 
development. The sources of literature analysed include research reports, books, 
newspapers, journals, electronic material, and workshop presentations, among 
others.  
 
In light of the topic and objectives of the study, the literature review is presented to 
include, firstly, a conceptual framework of development and decentralisation with 
specific reference to an explanation of the various forms associated with these 
concepts. Secondly, the relationship between decentralisation and development 
will be analysed in the Ugandan context. Thirdly, the rationale for decentralisation 
will be assessed with a view to testing the assumption that decentralisation results 
in development, particularly as this relates to the Ugandan context. 
 
This literature review aims at ascertaining what other authors and scholars have 
discovered in respect of similar research problems, in addition to identifying 
possible theoretical gaps that need to be addressed. The literature review will also 
provide a theoretical backdrop against which the results of the research study can 
be interpreted.  
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2.1 Conceptualising development and decentralisation   
 
In conceptualising development and decentralisation, an effort is made to define 
the two terms and illustrate how they are related using a conceptual framework 
derived from Joint Annual Review of Decentralisation (JARD)2004 
 
2.1.1. Development conceptualised 
 
Defining development, Rodney (1972:13) looks at development in human society 
as being a multi-faceted process. At the level of an individual, it implies increased 
skill and capacity, greater freedom, creativity, self-discipline, responsibility and 
material well-being. At the societal level, development implies an increasing 
capacity to regulate both internal and external relations. It involves fighting for 
survival against natural hazards and against real and imagined human enemies. 
 
More often than not, the term development is used in an exclusive economic sense; 
the justification being that the type of economy is itself an index of other social 
features. Mamdani (1984:104) quotes the communist school by asserting that it is 
the economic sub-structure that determines the ideological super-structure. 
Economic development at societal level then implies that the members’ capacity to 
deal with the environment has jointly increased. 
 
2.1.2. Development and growth 
 
The question that arises then is “does economic development mean the same as 
economic growth?” Generally speaking, economic development refers to the 
problems of underdeveloped countries and economic growth to those of developed 
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countries. Maddison (1957:4) makes this distinction by asserting that: “The raising 
of income levels is generally called economic growth in rich countries and in poor 
ones it is called economic development.”  
 
According to Friedmann (1972:7), economic growth is related to a quantitative 
sustained increase in the country’s per capita output or income accompanied by 
expansion in its labour force, consumption, capital and volume of trade. On the 
other hand, economic development is taken to mean growth plus change, hence it 
is related to qualitative changes in economic wants, goods, incentives, institutions, 
productivity and knowledge or the upward movement of the entire social system. 
 
Subsequently, he argues that an economy can grow but it may not develop because 
poverty, unemployment and inequalities may continue to persist due to the absence 
of technological and structural changes. However, it is difficult to imagine 
development without economic growth in the absence of an increase in output per 
capita, particularly when the population is growing rapidly.  
 
In the contemporary world, development refers to the production of goods and 
services and how these lead to poverty reduction amongst members of society. 
Underdevelopment then is not an absence of development, because every 
person/society has developed in one way or another and to a greater or lesser 
extent. Therefore, underdevelopment makes sense only as a means of comparison 
of levels of development. It is tied to the fact that human social development has 
been uneven and from a strictly economic viewpoint some human groups have 
advanced further by producing more and becoming wealthier. Just as Raanan 
(1986:66) asserts: 
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“While humanity shares one planet, it is a planet on which there 
are two Worlds, the World of the rich and the World of the poor.”     
 
The United Nations Development Programme (Human Development Report, 
1995:37) also articulates this income inequality when it reports that: 
“More than three-fourths of the World’s people live in developing 
countries, but they enjoy only 16% of the World’s income – while 
the richest 20% have 85% of the global income”.  
 
In strictly economic terms, development has traditionally been used to mean the 
capacity of a national economy, whose initial economic condition has been more or 
less static for a long time, to generate and sustain an annual increase in its Gross 
National Product (GNP).16 
 
Economic development can also be viewed in terms of the planned alteration of the 
structure of production and employment so that agriculture’s share of the economy 
declines and that of manufacturing and service industries increases. In this case, 
development strategies place more emphasis on rapid industrialisation at the 
expense of agriculture and rural development. 
 
Rural development is not measured in terms of industrialisation but non-economic 
social indicators like health, education, food, water supply, sanitation, and housing 
among others (Todaro and Smith, 2003:16). Dudley (1969:3) is quoted by Todaro 
and Smith (2003:16) as defining development by posing three basic questions:  
 
 
16 GNP – is the total domestic and foreign output claimed by residents of a country. It comprises Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) plus factor incomes accruing to residents from abroad, less the income earned in the domestic 
economy accruing to persons abroad.  
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• What has been happening to poverty? 
• What has been happening to unemployment? 
• What has been happening to inequality? 
 
If all three of these have declined from high levels, then beyond doubt this has 
been a period of development for the country concerned. If one or two of these 
central problems have been growing worse, especially if all three have, it would be 
strange to call the result “development” even if per capita income doubled. 
 
The World Bank in its effort to champion economic growth asserts thus: 
“The challenge of development … is to improve the quality of life. 
Especially in the World’s poor countries, a better quality of life 
generally calls for higher incomes but it involves much more. It 
encompasses as ends in themselves better education, higher 
standards of health and nutrition, less poverty, a cleaner 
environment, more quality of opportunity, greater individual 
freedom and richer cultural life”. (World Bank, World 
Development Report 1991:4) 
 
Therefore, development is both a physical reality as well as a state of the mind in 
which society has, through some combination of social, economic and institutional 
processes, secured the means of obtaining a better life17. 
 
 
 
 
17 Better life involves increasing the availability and widening the distribution of basic life-sustaining goods and 
services like food, shelter, health and protection. In addition to high incomes, more jobs, better education and an 
expanded range of economic and social choices are available to individuals and nations.  
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2.1.3. People–centered rural development 
 
Since Uganda, where this study is undertaken is largely rural, it is safer to view 
development in terms of rural setting. Cornwell (1986:219) considers that the 
concept rural development has no firm, precise and generally agreed upon 
meaning; it can be used arbitrarily to indicate a number of policies or programmes. 
Indeed Smith (1979:58) agrees with Cornwell when he asserts that community 
development still stands: 
“In an Alice in Wonderland World where words still mean what 
you want them to mean” 
 
Dasgupta, quoted in Brokansha and Hodge (1949:40-49) argues that rural 
development is to bring back life in all its completeness, making the villagers self-
reliant and self-respectful, acquainted with the cultural tradition of their own 
country, and competent to make efficient use of modern resources for the fullest 
development of their physical, social, economic and intellectual conditions. This is 
supported by Gandhi (1931:41) who adds that rural development should include 
the use of local resources and an integrated approach towards development in order 
to realise self-sufficiency.  
 
If decentralisation is to stimulate rural development and therefore lead to 
sustainable development, which is the central issue in this investigation, the 
decentralisation policy needs to enhance grassroots participation. Gran (1983:327) 
underlines the centrality of participatory development by defining the concept as: 
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“… the self sustaining process18 to engage free men and women in 
activities that meet their basic needs and beyond that, realise 
individually defined human potential within defined limits”. 
 
Korten (1990:67) views rural development as being people-centred or 
empowerment strategy. He cites the components of the people-centred approach 
as: 
• Population participation in development. 
• The need for sustainable development. 
• The support and advocacy of the people’s role in development by the 
bureaucracy, NGOs and voluntary organisations.  
 
From the above, Korten (1990:67) analyses the people’s role in the empowerment 
strategy as being:  
“…a process by which the members of a society increase their 
potential and institutionalise capacities to mobilise and manage 
resources to produce sustainable and justify distributed 
improvements in their quality of life consistent with their own 
aspirations”. 
Therefore, in the people-centred or empowerment strategy, development is in the 
hands of the community. This is indeed what the decentralisation policy in Uganda 
emphasises when it aims at empowering the grassroots citizens with legislative, 
administrative and judicial powers. Moser (1983:3) regards a people-centred or 
empowerment strategy as aiming at capacity building, thus, participation is not a 
means but an end in itself.  
 
18 A self-sustaining process refers to one that is controlled by the community as a key factor in participatory 
development. The phrase “to engage” signifies involvement. 
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The above strategy then leads to the fundamental question “who controls 
development?” Obviously, those affected (beneficiaries) are to be the major 
players and decision-makers. Yet Government has been and for a long time may 
be, responsible for providing material and other support for developing rural 
communities. 
 
In terms of the empowerment paradigm, the major issue regarding outside 
assistance is the question of control and decision-making. This in effect implies 
that decentralisation of the decision-making process should not be a mere replica 
of the present centralised systems. According to Korten (1984:301): 
“…decision-making must truly be returned to the people, who have 
the capacity and the might to inject into the process of richness 
including the subjectivity of their values and needs. Decision 
processes should be fully informed by whatever analysis available 
experts can provide, but only as one of several data inputs 
available to the many participants”.     
 
In Uganda, under the decentralisation policy, the education requirement is only 
attached to the office of the district chairperson and his/her deputy; otherwise 
anyone can be elected as a councillor regardless of education level. The argument 
is that one does not need any academic qualification to articulate the demands of 
the local people like the need for a school or a health centre in a locality. The 
views of the people are expressed there after the administrative officials, who are 
technocrats, translate them into development plans with a timeframe and costs. 
 
In this way, decentralised decision-making is empowerment in collective action. 
Slingsby (1986:68) states: 
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“Community based support programmes can help communities 
identify their problems and priorities, increase their awareness of 
what can be done and help them select from a range of 
components. The programme can therefore act as a facilitator of 
community needs and as an implementor or pre-conceived 
proposal”. 
 
If collective action is to amount to empowerment, it ought to be action at the 
grassroots level, which can be achieved primarily through decentralised 
governance. Empowerment in this sense releases people from the poverty trap. 
Release comes about not through conformation, but through transformation, 
especially by encouraging people-centred rural development. 
 
The economic argument in favour of decentralisation is proximity and avoidance 
of “red tape” that is expected to enhance efficiency and effectiveness in the 
delivery of services. This is supported by Sady (1992:38) who emphasises the 
important role Local Governments play in rural development. He identifies the 
following important tasks for Local Government:  
• “Decongesting” government at the centre by freeing it from local 
responsibilities. 
• Increasing the people’s understanding and support of local development 
activities. 
• Giving the local people an opportunity to contribute to their own 
development. 
• Ensuring that local programmes for development are more realistic. 
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Gorvine (1965:225-231) agrees with the views above and adds that development 
should be institutionalised at the local level and that Local Governments should 
develop local political responsibility. Ackoff (1984:195) also explains the 
importance of decentralised development as follows:  
“Development is a product of learning not of production, learning 
how to use ones environment to better meet one’s needs and those 
of others. Because the development process is essentially a 
learning process, one person cannot develop another… Now, how 
can we plan development understood in this way? The answer 
…lies in who does the planning because the principal benefit of 
planning is not derived from community consuming its 
products…but from participating in the planning process… 
Therefore, effective development planning cannot be done for some 
by others. The learning process and participatory planning are 
therefore tied together”. 
 
This link is emphasised by Swanepoel (1992:3) when he asserts that: 
“Only if they participate can they learn to improve on their own 
action, gain in self-sufficiency and self-reliance, and move towards 
self-help, be that participation full of flaws and very tentative at 
first”. 
 
The above quotations imply that lack of experience and competence should not be 
used as reason enough not to decentralise, for one does not learn to swim unless 
he/she dares to enter the waters. Therefore, decentralised participation is the key to 
sustainable development. If planning is a participatory learning process, so is 
implementation. Planning, when decentralised should therefore be accompanied by 
  
41
implementation and evaluation. This is because the planning cycle ties the three 
together. Policy implementation becomes more rational if it involves people who 
participated in designing the resultant projects/programmes and the same applies to 
policy evaluation (Swanepoel & De Beer, 1996:51). 
 
2.1.4. Sustainable development 
 
When discussing sustainable development, there is a danger of misconstruing it to 
be synonymous to modernisation. The two are different because modernisation 
focuses more on growth in production and expansion of the market economy. This 
is not capable of promoting sustainable development. Sustainable development 
refers to improvement in livelihoods which does not undermine the livelihoods of 
future generations (environmental sustainability), and which can be sustained over 
time (institutional sustainability) (Shepherd 1984:4).  
 
From this definition, it is clear that livelihoods refer to more than just income and 
wealth to include quality of life and of society, security and dignity. In this way, 
the modernisation paradigm has not been inclusive and, as a result, the very poor 
and the occupationally, ethnically, racially, religiously, or geographically marginal 
have remained marginal. The intangibles of development like autonomy, freedom, 
dignity, and peace are thereby omitted (Demery, 1994:36). 
 
In 1987, the World Commission on Environment and Development (Brundtland 
Commission) introduced a new concept of “sustainable development”. It defined 
the term as “meeting the needs of the present generation without compromising the 
needs of the future generation”. Economic development must be sustainable which 
means that it should “keep going”. This definition emphasises the creation of 
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sustainable improvements in the quality of life of all people through increases in 
real income per capita, improvements in education, health, the general quality of 
life, as well as improvements in the quality of natural environmental resources. 
Thus, sustainable development is closely linked to, but not limited to, economic 
development. As pointed out by Pearce and Warford (1990:87), sustainable 
development is development that is everlasting and contributes to the quality of life 
through improvements in natural environments. Natural environments, in turn, 
supply utility to individuals, inputs to the economic process, and services that 
support life. 
 
Sustainable development aims at maximising the net benefits of economic 
development, subject to maintaining the stock of all environmental and natural 
resource assets (physical, human and natural) over time. It therefore aims at 
accelerating economic development in order to conserve the present and enhance 
future generations.  
 
For sustainable rural development in Africa to have meaning, it has to be agro-
based because, in developing countries like Uganda, over 80 per cent of the 
population lives in rural areas and their livelihood depends on agriculture. 
Sustainable rural agriculture creates employment, ensures food security, good 
health, and protection of the environment. For sustainable rural agriculture to 
enhance rural development, it should have low external inputs, integrate 
conservation, and address income inequality (Michaud, 1995:52). 
 
Food and Agriculture Organisation FAO (1991:6) quotes chapter 14 of Agenda 21, 
which asserts that Sustainable Agricultural Rural Development will depend on the 
following measures:  
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• The development of a coherent national policy framework taking account 
of structural adjustments, subsidies and taxes, laws and other factors which 
impinge on agriculture. 
• Building institutional and human capacities and devolving more decision-
making authority and responsibility to the rural people while providing 
resource management skills. 
• Development of farming techniques such as green manuring, crop rotation, 
and integrated plant nutrition to reduce use of agricultural chemicals.  
• Improving infrastructures (credit, processing, rural services) along with 
cottage industries and other employment, including off-farm livelihood 
opportunities. 
• Conservation and use of land, water and animal and plant genetic 
resources (these in turn combat desertification and loss of bio-diversity). 
 
Agenda 21 also recognises that the success of the above depends on the 
participation of rural people, including women, devolution of responsibilities to 
local levels (decentralisation), better resource allocation policies, access to land, 
strengthened public agricultural research which should cater for traditional 
knowledge and techniques.  
 
The UNDP (1992:2) drew up a conceptual and operational approach to sustainable 
agriculture and rural development by enumerating the following considerations:  
• Farmers’ involvement in technology generation.  
• A participatory and gender sensitive approach in every phase of the 
programme. 
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• The decentralisation of research from the centre to the grassroots to cater 
for farmers’ needs. 
• High genetic diversity of crops. 
• Breeding for high yields with modest nutrient levels. 
• More imaginative use of a variety of basic agricultural technologies (water 
and soil conservation, irrigations, agro-forestry, nutrients recycling, 
livestock-crop mixtures etc). 
• Participatory rural appraisal. 
• Deconcentrate, devolve, delegate and privatise. 
 
From the above exposition, it can be logically asserted that decentralisation 
enhances sustainable development because it provides an opportunity for people to 
participate in determining their needs, planning for programmes and projects that 
will meet these needs, and implementing, monitoring and evaluating these 
programmes and projects. This in turn builds the capacity of the local people who 
are able to use the available scarce resources in a sustainable manner. 
 
2.2. Forms of decentralisation  
 
Generally, the term decentralisation can be described as the transfer of authority to 
plan, make decisions or manage functions from the national level to any 
organisation or agency at the sub-national level. It is therefore a gradual process 
that evolves within an appropriate legal framework (Mills, 1990:89).  
 
Mills (1990:89) further defines decentralisation by categorising it as political, 
administrative and fiscal decentralisation. Accordingly, he relates political 
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decentralisation to the transfer of authority or functions from the central levels of 
government to local institutions that are governed by local political representatives. 
Administrative decentralisation is conceptualised as the delinking of local 
authority staff from their respective central ministries and bringing them under the 
control of the local authority, including procedures for the establishment of a local 
payroll. While fiscal decentralisation relates to the transfer of functions or 
authority from the central levels of government to local institutions regarding local 
decision-making on the allocation of financial resources, including powers to levy 
local taxes. Mills’ conceptualisation of decentralisation is in line with that of the 
Decentralisation Secretariat of the Ministry of Local Government in Uganda, 
which considers political, administrative and fiscal aspects as the pillars of 
decentralisation in Uganda.  
 
Lubanga (1996, pp69)19, quoting from Rondinnelli, defines decentralisation as the 
transfer of planning, decision-making and administrative authority from the 
Central Government to Local Governments. The World Bank (1989:154) defines 
fiscal decentralisation as the spreading of government spending away from an 
omnipotent central finance ministry to different ministries and to especially lower 
levels of government. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
(1993:66) also defines decentralisation as the programme for dispersing power 
among government institutions at the same level (horizontal decentralisation) as 
well as state power being spread to lower levels of government (vertical 
decentralisation).  
 
                                                 
19 Lubanga (now the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Education) was the Director of the Decentralisation 
Secretariat at the Ministry of Local Government at the time when the decentralisation policy was launched in 
Uganda.   
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Makara (1996:33) also asserts that decentralisation may be used to mean the 
transfer of legal, administrative and political authority to make decisions and 
manage public functions from the Central Government to field organisations of 
those agencies, subordinate units of government, semi-autonomous public 
corporations, area-wide development authorities, functional authorities, 
autonomous Local Governments, or non-governmental organisations.  
 
The degree of political and legal power that is transferred or delegated20 may be 
one way of differentiating the forms of decentralisation, while the forms adopted 
will generally be a function of the motive for which decentralisation was 
introduced. Decentralisation may be used to refer to territorial or to functional 
phenomena. Territorial decentralisation refers to the transferring of 
authority/responsibility for public functions to organisations within well- defined 
sub-national, spatial or political boundaries, such as a province, district and 
municipality among others. Usually the transfer of authority is to an institution that 
may legally perform those functions only within specified geographical or political 
boundaries. Functional decentralisation is used to refer to the transfer of 
authority to perform specific tasks to specialised organisations that operate 
nationally or at least across local jurisdictions – power supply, health care and 
others are some of the popular forms of functional decentralisation. (Rondinelli, 
Nellis & Cheema, 1984: 58). 
 
According to the Decentralisation Secretariat (1994: 8), the transfer of power is 
manifested in the forms of deconcentration, delegation, devolution and 
privatisation. Deconcentration involves only a minimum power transfer by 
shifting responsibility and workload from the Central Government to staff located 
 
20 The amount of power that the Central Government “gives up” to subordinate or autonomous institutions.   
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outside the national capital. Under this system, the field administration is under 
government officers who, although they work within local jurisdictions, remain 
employees of the centre under whose direction and control they remain. In Uganda, 
this was the system during the period 1966 up to 1986 because decentralisation 
was only through deferred services that were provided by administrative staff 
appointed, deployed, promoted and disciplined by the Central Government. 
Therefore, such officials were accountable to the Central Government and not to 
the service beneficiaries.              
 
Smith (1985: 26) categorises deconcentration into three models of field 
administration. The functional model in which the chief agents of central 
administration work in the provinces and districts as part of separate functional 
hierarchies responsible for district aspects of governmental activities like 
education, health, water supply or public works. Administration of these services 
in the field is not integrated with the central administration since each one operates 
independently. The line of command runs directly from departmental headquarters 
to the local field unit. 
 
The second type is the “Integrated Prefectural” model, most closely identified 
with the French system of administration. Smith asserts that this is prefectural 
because the principal agent of Central Government in the field exercises control 
over all other field officers as well as supervising locally elected authorities and 
thus becomes part of the chain of command between central headquarters and the 
field for all government services. The generalist administrator embodies the 
authority of each ministry and government in general. 
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The third is the “un-integrated prefectural” model. As the name suggests, this 
system is a hybrid of the functional and the integrated prefectual systems, under 
which the prefect is the central figure in the field but by no means as powerful as in 
the French integrated prefectural system. Under this system, the prefecture is only 
one channel of communication among others and each specialist functionary in the 
field maintains independent links with his or her departmental headquarters. 
Although there is contact between the prefect and the field officers, the prefect has 
no overriding authority over their operations nor does he/she occupy the position 
of chief executive in the Local Government system; he/she is only a supervisor. 
This system was common with the British colonial masters. 
 
In Uganda, under the current decentralisation policy, this hybrid type seems to be 
the one applied because although power, resources and functions have been 
decentralised through devolution, the financing and setting of standards is still 
undertaken by the Central Government through fiscal decentralisation and 
supervision by Resident District Commissioners (RDCs)21 and representatives of 
the Auditor General. 
 
Devolution involves the legal conferment of power upon formally constituted local 
authorities to discharge specified or residual functions. It entails the transfer of 
power to geographical units of Local Government outside the command structure 
of the Central Government. Devolution manifests certain characteristics. Firstly, 
there should be serious intent on the part of Central Government about granting 
autonomy and independence, as well as having the local units outside the Central 
Government’s direct control. Secondly, the local units ought to have clear and 
 
21 The RDC is the representative of the President and Central Government in a district in Uganda. He/she is a senior 
public servant appointed by the President to monitor government programmes in the district.  
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legally recognised geographical boundaries over which they exercise authority and 
within which they perform public functions. Thirdly, the local units have to be 
given corporate status and the power to raise sufficient resources to carry out 
specific functions. Fourthly, it implies the need to “develop Local Governments as 
autonomous institutions” perceived by the people as belonging to them, in the 
sense that the Local Governments provide services that satisfy their needs and 
remain subject to the people’s control, direction and influence. Finally, devolution 
does not imply a federation, since the local units remain linked to the Central 
Government and with each other unit in the political system through arrangements 
of mutual support and reciprocity. Authority originates from and is granted by the 
centre (UNDP, 1993: 67).  
 
Devolution tends to be seen as a form of decentralisation in which Local 
Government units are given responsibility for some functions, but in which the 
Central Government often retains some supervisory powers and may fulfill a 
significant role in financing. Very few developing countries have a system of 
formal devolution, although some national constitutions devolve specific functions 
and responsibilities to Local Governments or give them residual powers that are 
not claimed by the Central Government. What ensures effectiveness under 
devolution is not the legal status as independent units, but rather the “strength” in 
skill and professionalism of local officials, their sources of funding, and the 
effectiveness with which they carry out their responsibilities.  
 
Important to note is the fact that devolution and deconcentration are not mutually 
exclusive, it is therefore desirable that, when implementing decentralisation, a 
balance of the two is sought. Thus, while it is analytically convenient to distinguish 
devolution from deconcentration, in real life it is probably more practical to 
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consider the two together. For instance, administrative devolution, which in reality 
amounts to deconcentration, is where discretionary powers are vested in appointed 
bodies, as was the case in Uganda between 1962 and when the current 
decentralisation was implemented (1993). Even political devolution is not absolute 
because, whereas it empowers Local Councils to make bye-laws, these laws must 
not contravene the existing national laws like the Constitution, as is the case in 
Papua New Guinea and Uganda (Ghai & Regan, 1992: 227). 
 
Delegation is regarded as falling between deconcentration and devolution. This is 
when responsibility for planning and implementation of decisions relating to 
specific activities is vested in particular organisations technically competent to 
perform them. It may involve agencies outside the normal administrative structures 
of the government like parastatal bodies, which are not part of the public service 
and therefore have a certain degree of autonomy. Under delegated powers, the 
Central Government retains the right to overturn local decisions and delegated 
powers can be withdrawn by the centre. The Central Government makes policy and 
local leaders only have execution and administration powers.  
 
It is, however, debatable whether delegation should be regarded as a form of 
decentralisation or as a method used for the transfer of particular powers, which 
might well be used in either deconcentration or devolved systems. That explains 
why some decentralists prefer the hybrid (mixed) form of decentralisation, which 
was used in a number of countries in Africa and Asia. The hybrid is a concoction 
of deconcentration and devolution. In Uganda, for instance, a district commissioner 
was appointed by the Central Government and therefore was answerable to the 
centre, but could share some powers with Local Government councils, which were 
either elected or appointed. This adoption of the hybrid system achieved 
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decentralised governance, which actually was a result of the realisation of the 
admitted failure of centralised governance (Wunsch, 1991: 87; Mawhood, 1983: 
91; Mathur, 1983: 75).  
 
Privatisation is the giving up by government of certain functions and services to 
various sections of the private sector namely business, community groups, 
cooperatives and non-governmental organisations primarily for reasons of 
efficiency (Apthorpe and Conyers, 1982: 34; Cheema and Rondinelli, 1983: 8; 
Smith, 1985: 299). In the Ugandan context, the Local Governments Act, 1997 only 
allows Local Governments to procure directly goods and/or services whose value 
do not exceed five hundred thousand Uganda shillings. This implies that any 
procurement involving an amount exceeding that has to be transacted by the Local 
Government Contracts Committee. As a result, private individuals and companies 
bid for supply of goods and services including medicines, scholastic materials and 
even construction of health centres, classrooms, staff quarters for teachers and 
nurses among others. In this way, privatisation plays a role in the provision of 
services in the health and education sectors under decentralised governance.  
 
2.3. The relationship between decentralised governance and development  
 
The central objective of this study is to analyse whether decentralised governance 
enhances development. Hypothetically, decentralisation is said to enhance 
development due to political and economic assumptions, which are explained 
below. 
 
The study starts from the following questions: Is decentralisation likely to achieve 
the intended goals in the harsh realities of developing countries like Uganda? 
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Under what circumstances can decentralisation policies yield development results? 
What factors are behind the creation of such conducive circumstances? From the 
description of the objectives of decentralisation, it becomes clear that 
decentralisation is about building sustainable institutions that contribute to the 
realisation of sustainable development and the resultant poverty reduction. 
 
However, the link between decentralisation and development is not automatic, it 
can only be valid if certain conditions are met, including amongst others, the 
functioning of accountability mechanisms at both national and local level, political 
commitment at national level, availability of financial resources at local level, 
human capacity and sufficient information flows, donor and civil society 
involvement, and citizen participation mechanisms. These are summed up as 
political and economic prerequisites for decentralisation to result in sustainable 
development. 
 
When underdevelopment is interpreted in a multi-dimensional manner as going 
beyond the notion of income to include the aspects of voicelessness, vulnerability 
and limited access to social services, then the ideal type relationship between 
decentralisation and development can be illustrated as indicated in Figure 1. 
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             Figure 1:  Decentralisation and development  
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Figure 1 shows that political (democratic) decentralisation is expected to offer 
citizens, including the poor, the possibility of increased participation in the local 
decision-making process from which they have generally been excluded and which 
will provide them, it is expected, with better access to services. In the same line of 
the political argument, decentralisation is believed to offer a way of sharing power 
more widely within a country, among regions and among various ethnic groups, 
thereby creating a conducive ground for political consensus and stability. 
Generally, an established political system offers a better foundation for 
development.  
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It is assumed that increased local participation would lead to the economic 
arguments due to the principle of subsidiarity. Local involvement in decision-
making and supervision is expected to result in both responsiveness, in terms of 
resource allocations to priority areas, in addition to efficiency gains through 
enhanced governance and accountability. The main question is whether the reality 
matches the presumed relationships. One clear deficiency in this model is the fact 
that although extremely important, human resource capacity has not been identified 
as a critical issue without which development may not be achieved.  
 
The model over-exaggerates the political argument as it assumes that the grassroots 
citizens actually share power. The fact is that decentralisation, as with community 
development, favours village elites who are in the best position to take advantage 
of whatever authority is decentralised. Chambers (1983: 18-19) shows how the 
elite become the champions and beneficiaries of decentralised development by 
emphasising that it is the elite who articulate the villagers’ interests, wishes and 
concerns, which emerge as “the villagers” priorities for development. In this way, 
decentralisation fails to reduce poverty among the masses as it benefits the well-off 
elites.  
Another challenge that the model seems to ignore is the fact that although the aim 
of decentralisation is to stimulate the participation of the grassroots people in 
development programmes, most often such programmes/projects are decided on 
and planned by “outsiders”, be they Government agents or non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) who decide on the needs of the people (Roberts, 1979: 39). 
 
In the context of Uganda’s decentralisation policy, the elite at the district level tend 
to monopolise planning, implementation and evaluation of decentralised projects, 
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yet the execution of decentralised governance is supposed to be exacted at a level 
as low as the village if it is to be people-centred.  
 
In this investigation, the two service areas of Education and Health are used to 
analyse the linkage between decentralisation and development. It therefore 
becomes pertinent that an effort is made to relate the Health and Education service 
sectors to development under a decentralised governance system.  This will be the 
focus of the section that follows. 
 
2.4 The linkage between Education, Health and development 
 
Education and Health are basic objectives of development; they are important ends 
in themselves. Health is central to well-being and Education is essential for a 
satisfying and rewarding life; thus, both are fundamental to the broader notion of 
expanded human capabilities that lie at the heart of the notion of development. At 
the same time, education plays a key role in the ability of a developing community 
to absorb modern technology and to develop the capacity for self-sustaining 
growth and development. While Health is a prerequisite for increased productivity, 
successful Education relies on adequate health. Therefore, both health and 
education can be seen as vital components of growth and development (United 
Nations, Report on the World Social Situation, 1997: 22-23). 
 
The two human capital issues of Health and Education are considered together 
because of their close relationship. This is true because improved Health and 
Education help families escape some of the vicious cycles of poverty in which they 
are trapped. At the same time, the most important root cause of poor health and 
illiteracy is poverty itself (World Bank, World Development Report, 1998/99: 8). 
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Education and Health are also closely related in economic development. On the 
one hand, greater health capital may improve the return to investments in 
education, partly because health is an important factor in school attendance and in 
the formal learning process of a learner. Better health during working life may in 
effect lower the rate of depreciation of education capital; likewise, greater 
education capital may improve investments in health, because many health 
programmes rely on basic skills, which are learned at school, including personal 
hygiene and sanitation, education is also needed for training of health personnel 
(World Health Organisation (WHO) Report, 2000: 101). 
 
There is therefore a direct linkage between health, education and development. The 
more educated a community is in terms of skills and knowledge, the more 
productive and adaptive the members will be to the changing world. Investment in 
Education and Health therefore forms the bedrock for development. Even at 
individual level, a healthy, educated person is more productive, lives a better life, 
and therefore creates a better taxable base, which generates more revenue that can 
enhance development. 
 
It is because of the indispensable relationship between education, health and 
development that the government of Uganda decided to decentralise the provision 
of these two services with the aim of enhancing efficient and effective service 
provision. The Uganda government has done this by introducing the Universal 
Primary Education (UPE) and Universal Secondary Education by which all school-
going children are entitled to free, compulsory education, which is managed by the 
Local Governments through Central Government transfers. Health services are also 
decentralised by having health facilities that were previously situated at district 
headquarters extended to counties, sub-counties and parishes. The Central 
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Government, releases funds on monthly basis for the provision and management of 
the Health and Education sectors among others. 
 
Having analysed the linkage between education, health and development, the 
question that arises then is “why decentralisation?” The next exposition attempts to 
provide an overview of the political, social and economic rationale for 
decentralisation which, if achieved, can enhance development. 
 
2.5. Rationale for decentralisation 
 
Larmour (1985: 353) argues that particular forms of decentralisation are presumed 
to have particular benefits or to be answers to particular evils. Quoting Simon 
(1945: 279), Larmour suggests that arguments for decentralisation are often like 
proverbs with most principles answerable by an equally plausible contradictory 
principle. For example, decentralisation promotes efficiency and reduces it; 
decentralisation enhances national unity and inhibits it. Decentralisation promotes 
efficiency if resources are adequately available and the practitioners, both elected 
and administrative officials, have the capacity to plan, implement and evaluate the 
decentralised programmes, otherwise decentralisation could lead to inefficiency. 
Similarly, instead of decentralisation enhancing political stability and national 
unity, it could degenerate into tribalism especially if Local Governments are based 
on tribal (ethnic) districts, which is the case in Uganda.   
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2.5.1. Decentralisation promotes democracy 
 
Decentralisation proponents argue that if the policy is well implemented it leads to 
improvements politically as well as developmentally. In 1994, the Ministry of 
Local Government in Uganda summarised the decentralisation policy objectives as 
follows:  
“In sum, decentralisation is a democratic reform, which seeks to 
transfer political, administrative, financial and planning authority 
from the centre to Local Government Councils. It seeks to promote 
popular participation, empower local people to make decisions 
and enhance accountability and responsibility. It also aims at 
introducing efficiency and effectiveness in generation and 
management of resources and the delivery of services.” 
(Decentralisation Secretariat, 1994: 33-34).  
 
The technical argument in favour of decentralisation implied in the citation above 
is the principle of taking planning and decision-making down to the lowest area 
level feasible, as this is expected to increase the accuracy of problem solving, the 
commitment of involved people to implement their plans (ownership), and 
experience participatory as opposed to representative democracy. The argument 
therefore is that decentralisation enhances both effectiveness and efficiency22 in the 
use of public resources. 
 
Firstly, when immediate beneficiaries are involved in planning for allocation of 
public resources, the activities planned are likely to better suit local needs and 
 
22 Effectiveness and efficiency are difficult concepts. Effective relates to “doing the right thing” that means, make 
the appropriate choices regarding allocation of scare resources to optimise their utility. Efficiency relates to 
optimising resource use once decisions regarding the desired output and input are made [doing things right].   
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priorities as compared to a situation where the Central Government plans and 
delivers on their behalf. This increases effectiveness as regards the use of the 
scarce public resources, which enhances development. 
 
Secondly, decentralisation is expected to increase efficiency with regard to the use 
of public resources mainly through improved governance, as a result of increased 
ownership, improved fine-tuning to local circumstances, and increased direct 
mechanisms of accountability both politically and administratively (Nsibambi, 
1994: 44). 
 
According to the Joint Annual Review on Decentralisation (JARD: 2004, pp) the 
ultimate goal of decentralisation in Uganda considering both the political as well as 
the economic motives is: 
“To build a long term sustainable public service below the national 
level that delivers goods and services in an effective and efficient 
manner, whilst addressing issues of poverty and sustainable 
growth with equity, whilst enhancing peace and stability”.   
 
This goal is in line with the question that this study seeks to answer. Since when 
decentralised governance is perpetuated by a prudent public service, which can 
deliver goods and services effectively and efficiently, then such governance 
enhances development. 
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2.5.2. Decentralisation enhances efficiency and effectiveness 
 
The Decentralisation Secretariat Report (1994: 11) states: 
“Decentralisation seeks to promote popular participation, 
empower local people to make decisions and enhance 
accountability and responsibility. It also aims at introducing 
efficiency and effectiveness in the generation and management of 
resources and in the delivery of services, hence making local 
people get value for money out of their taxes and make 
development more responsive to the needs of the local people”. 
 
According to Conyers (1982: 167), decentralisation is based on two distinct aims, 
namely administrative and political23 aims. Administrative aims emphasise 
efficiency in terms of cost effectiveness in delivery of services, while political aims 
emphasise popular participation. Where administrative24 aims are central, 
deconcentration with tight central control tends to be the norm, while if political 
aims are central, there tends to be more devolution, autonomy and transfer of 
power and resources to sub-national levels of government. 
 
Saito (2003: 23) argues that decentralisation brings services closer to people and as 
a result, locally specific issues are more easily identified and tailor made solutions 
are implemented. Public services provided by Local Governments are also 
 
23 Political aims of decentralisation can be classified as:  
• Facilitation and protection of people’s rights. 
• Increasing responsiveness of governance. 
• Promotion of equitable development.  
• Promotion of national unity.  
24Administrative aims are concerned with: 
• Making development plans more relevant. 
• Mobilising local revenue for local development. 
• Ensure local consent for and cooperation in implementing national plans.  
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delivered more speedily than by Central Government, since decision-making at 
local levels shortens time-consuming bureaucratic procedures. He also adds that 
decentralised governance increases people’s opportunities at grassroots level to 
participate more actively in the decision-making process of government. Effective 
participation allows the exercise of people’s rights to shape decisions, which affect 
their own lives. 
 
2.5.3. Decentralisation enhances responsiveness 
 
It is believed that popular participation makes development plans more responsive 
to local conditions rather than the monolithic administration remote from the local 
demands. Popular participation also makes mobilisation of local resources for self-
reliance more viable, therefore enhancing sustainable project funding rather than 
donor dependence. Since projects are implemented with popular consent, 
implementation of national plans becomes efficient because local people take 
ownership of these plans (Rondinelli, Nellis and Cheema, 1984: 57; Smith, 1985: 
137; Oluwu, 1989: 201; Cameron, 1990: 56) 
 
Participatory development enhances the satisfaction of service users, which in turn 
increases locally generated revenues. People who value the services they receive 
become more willing to pay for those services. Local participation also contributes 
to increasing accountability of public servants (Migdal, Kohli & Shue, 1994: 34-
36). This is true for Uganda’s case because public servants are accountable to 
Local Government Public Accounts Committee (LGPAC) whose role is to ensure 
accountability by public servants. 
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It is also argued that locally elected decision-makers are likely to be more 
responsive to local needs than Central Government bureaucrats. This is due to the 
fact that these leaders can be voted out in the subsequent election, or even have a 
vote of no confidence moved against them through a petition if they do not respond 
adequately to the needs expressed by the voters. 
 
This also enables the local leaders to control the bureaucracy, because if the 
bureaucracy is left unchecked it can be extremely powerful. The bureaucracy 
controls state resources and plays a central role in the planning and implementation 
of development initiatives. However, the bureaucracy tends to serve the interests of 
the narrow groups at the centre rather than the rural population. It can therefore, be 
argued that if the bureaucracy is put under local authority control, it can serve the 
needs of the rural people; hence, decentralisation in this way promotes 
responsiveness (Mutizwa-Mangiza, 1989: 39-47).  
 
2.5.4. Decentralisation and national unity 
 
It is argued that in culturally diverse states, decentralisation is the best means of 
promoting national unity in a country characterised by diversity. Ghai and Regan 
(1992: 299) assert that only when people feel that their local cultural identity and 
local economic needs are secure will they feel secure in participating in a wider 
polity. 
 
Since decentralisation places emphasis on equitable development, it reduces fears 
related to regional imbalances and the resultant threat to unity. Therefore, sub-
national centres help to mitigate national disunity as they create satisfaction about 
controlling their own affairs rather than being dominated by others.  
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This enhances development because each of the empowered Local Governments 
strive to develop their own particular locality. This is even more the case in 
Uganda, because each Local Government benefits from the Local Government 
Development Programme (LGDP), which is competitive in that the best 
performing districts are given a bonus of twenty per cent of the funds released to 
them the preceding financial year.       
 
Decentralisation also often aims at promoting equity between regions, urban and 
rural areas, different ethnic and religious groups, different income groups, and 
even between gender groups (Ghai and Regan, 1992: 233-282; UNDP, 1993: 76-
77). In Uganda, equity is promoted through Central Government releases like the 
Conditional, Unconditional, and Equalisation grants. These are monthly releases 
by the Central Government to all District Local Governments. 
 
Interest groups including women, youth, elderly and disabled persons are 
represented not only on the Local Councils but also on commissions and boards 
like the District Land Board, Local Government Public Accounts Committee, and 
District Service Commission. Promotion of equity through Central Government 
transfers and catering for various interest groups establishes satisfaction, stability 
and thus creating a conducive environment that enhances development.  
 
Despite the above advantages of decentralisation, there are a number of arguments 
against this system of governance and several of these will be explored in the next 
section.  The focus will be specifically placed on a critique of the assumption that 
decentralisation results in development. 
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2.6. Critique of the assumption that decentralisation results in development 
  
Despite the merits associated with decentralisation, it is not a panacea for all 
governance problems because there are a number of criticisms levelled against it. 
These criticisms relate to democracy, responsiveness, unity, role conflict between 
the elected and administrative officials, resource redistribution, fiscal constraints, 
corruption, sensitivity to geographical context, tribalism and ethnicity, among 
others. These are discussed in detail below. 
 
2.6.1. Decentralisation and democracy  
 
Critics note that popular participation is difficult to assess because decentralised 
planning and management are undermined by the top-down approach with many 
assumptions made about involving local people (Ghai & Regan, 1992: 330). The 
central issue concerning the right to participate is “participate in what?” If local 
leaders/governments have little power or resources, participation can be 
meaningless.  
 
This is particularly true in developing countries where the poor are disengaged 
from all forms of administrative structure (de Gandusson, 1989: 114-116). 
Therefore, decentralised systems end up serving the interests of the elite and this 
implies that the prevention of Central Government tyranny, does not guarantee the 
absence of local tyranny because power is devolved to non-democratic and non-
participatory local bodies dominated and exploited by elite groups whose concern 
is to protect their privileges (Cameron, 1990: 59-60).  
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Indeed, Todaro (2003: 7) quoting the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) 
Report 2002 on poverty in Uganda cites a poor woman in Uganda as saying: 
“When one is poor, she has no say in public, she feels inferior. She 
has no food, so there is famine in her house; no clothing, and no 
progress in her family”.    
 
The above citation implies that decentralisation in Uganda does not necessarily 
empower the ordinary population. Instead, there is always an elite clique that 
benefits from the system. Therefore, within decentralisation, there is centralisation 
at the district headquarters that makes it difficult for the benefits of decentralisation 
to trickle down to the lowest level of Government, which is the village council 
(Local Council One) (Bidandi, 2002: 11). 
 
The UNDP (1993: 78) argues that even where decentralisation is in practice, there 
is always a need to retain some strong Central Government to ensure that Local 
Administrations respect national standards on such matters as women’s rights and 
civil rights. This is in line with the decentralisation policy in Uganda because in 
order to check on excesses by the Local Government, the Central Government 
enacts laws from time to time that regulate the running of decentralised functions. 
Such guidelines include financial discipline, making bye-laws and ordinances that 
conform to national laws, and having a quota for the representation of women, 
elderly and youth on Local Councils and their inclusion on the statutory boards. In 
addition, District Service Commission operations are regulated by the Central 
Public Service Commission. In this way, the Central Government ensures 
standards and rule of law, which creates sanity.  
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It is also argued by the proponents of decentralisation that the policy fosters civil 
society, which is contested by its opponents on the basis that civil society cannot 
be distinctively independent from the state (Kamstom, 1999: 114). Decentralisation 
would not completely or automatically enhance the independence of civil society 
from the state particularly because the boundary between the state and society 
becomes more blurred at local levels. As a result, the hope placed in civil society to 
check the abuses of state power is unlikely to be realised, consequently, 
decentralisation may end up being a form of “bad governance” (Larmour & Qab, 
1985: 301).  
 
In the Ugandan context, the devolution of responsibilities still suffers from a top-
down or boss-subordinate approach to government programmes so that it is not 
necessarily the interests of the grassroots people that are served. Similarly most of 
the policies are still developed by Central Government Ministries and not at the 
levels of the District or Lower Local Governments.  
 
Some Central Government officials, fearing loss of financial resources and 
influence, tend to doubt the capacity of the Local Councils and therefore take 
decisions without consulting them. This is why there is insufficient funding from 
the centre because fiscal decentralisation decisions are made at the centre (Bidandi, 
2002: 11).  
 
Although Rondinelli recognises the strong political implications of a proposal to 
decentralise, he does not agree with Slater (1989: 491-500) when he concludes that 
decentralisation is necessarily linked with democracy in developing countries. 
Although decentralisation and democracy are certainly not mutually exclusive 
concepts, they are also not necessarily correlated.  
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A highly centralised government whose officials are elected regularly by universal 
adult suffrage would certainly be more democratic than one that is structurally 
decentralised, but tightly controlled by an authoritarian political party. Some 
regimes pursue economic decentralisation and privatisation with no intention of 
promoting democratisation in the Western sense of the term, as China’s rulers have 
already demonstrated.  
 
2.6.2. Responsiveness and resource allocation  
 
With regards to the claim that decentralisation results in greater responsiveness of 
elected politicians than Central Government bureaucrats, the critics argue that this 
ignores the fact that there is large-scale ignorance and apathy about Local 
Government. The turnout of voters at local elections is usually low, although this is 
a major problem of elected representative governments at all levels rather than 
only at the local level (Cameron, 1990: 59). 
 
Concerning equitable development, this will largely depend on the fiscal 
arrangements. If the fiscal measures for equalisation are well managed then 
decentralisation may promote equity within a region.  
 
2.6.3. Disunity under decentralisation  
 
National unity may also fail to be achieved if ethnic groupings agitate for 
secessionist demands under a decentralised form of government (Lamour, 1991: 
91). For instance, in Uganda, the agitation for new districts is driven by ethnicity 
rather than the desire to take services nearer to the people and to enhance 
development.  
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In Tororo district for example, Tororo County which largely comprises the Iteso 
tribe have been granted district status. In the same district of Tororo, Butaleja 
county has been declared a district yet it mostly comprises the Banyole tribe. This 
tribal setting makes Local Governments mere ethnic groupings, which greatly 
undermines national unity and patriotism.  
 
Bidandi (2002: 44) also argues that the recruitment of staff and awarding of tenders 
is tribalised. This does not only undermine nationalism, but also negatively impacts 
on the quality of services delivered as incompetent people are charged with service 
delivery.  
 
2.6.4. Conflicts between elected and administrative officials  
 
Criticisms are also levelled at the hybrid form of decentralisation as being 
dominated by administrative officials, not achieving the intended coordination of 
bureaucratic agencies, suffering from a lack of fiscal resources, and unable to 
resolve conflict between the interests of elected members and those of the 
administrative officials (Rondinelli, 1983: 301; Mawhood, 1983: 19; Conyers, 
1985: 24; Smith, 1985: 540-557; Oluwu, 1989: 221).  
 
Conflicts between the elected leaders and administrative officials in the Ugandan 
decentralisation context are rampant. The councillors are the bosses of the 
administrative officials, yet the latter are often more educated than the former. As a 
result, most of the time is wasted on conflict resolution instead of planning for 
development (Galiwango, 2004: 46).  
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This is why many Town Clerks and Chief Administrative Officers have dragged 
their Local Councils to courts of law. In nearly all these cases, the actions of the 
Local Councils have been declared ultra vires by the judiciary, as it was the case in 
Pallisa, Kiboga, Mbarara, Sembabule districts, and Mbale Municipality.  
 
Uganda’s decentralised system of Local Government comprises two sets of 
officials namely the elected officials and those who are appointed. The elected 
officials are supposed to be policy-makers while the appointed (administrative) 
ones are implementers. Unfortunately, there is frequently role conflict due to 
interference from either arms of government especially from the legislative wing. 
This contravenes the principle of “eyes on, hands off” for politicians. This 
confusion strains cordial relations, which is essential if development is to take 
place (Nsibambi, 1998: 66; Mutabwire, 2002: 11).  
 
2.6.5. Decentralisation and redistributive measures  
 
In this analysis, decentralisation will be construed to be “pure” decentralisation of 
fiscal federalism theory in which Local Governments raise local revenue and 
undertake local expenditure without the benefit of Central Government transfers. 
In this scenario, decentralisation increases disparities instead of reducing them 
because Local Governments are endowed differently. This implies that while the 
well resourced Local Governments develop, the poor ones remain underdeveloped.  
 
A centralised system of governance thus needs to play the redistributive role for 
mainly two reasons. Firstly, attempts by the Local Governments to redress income 
disparities are likely to be unfair. The poor in well-off regions will fair better than 
the poor in more deprived regions. Households in the regions that enjoyed the 
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same income before redistribution will have different incomes after redistribution.  
This is either because of the income differentials among regions, or because both 
incomes and redistribution policies differ from one region to another.  
       
Secondly, decentralised redistribution is self-defeating. If a jurisdiction adopts 
policies to redistribute income, imposing high taxes on the rich and giving high 
benefits to the poor, the rich will tend to leave for more lightly taxed areas and the 
poor will tend to move from areas that offer lower benefits. The generous 
jurisdiction will then be over-populated and hence fail to sustain the policy. This 
implies that the Central Government should have the responsibility of 
redistributive programmes and thus must control a large share of taxes and public 
expenditures (Conyers, 1983: 97-109). 
 
One failure of income redistribution is the failure to appreciate that income is 
supposed to be redistributed among jurisdictions as well as among individuals. 
This is ignored by most literature on fiscal decentralisation, which regards regional 
disparities as abnormal phenomena resulting from accidental shocks that will be 
reduced and eliminated automatically by the movement of goods, capital and 
labour. There is therefore no guarantee that transfers to low income areas will 
effectively benefit poor residents (Krugman, 1987: 117; Myrdal, 1957: 92).  
 
What has to be noted however is that the poor in low income regions are poor for 
good reasons; they live in a place that offers fewer economic opportunities, less 
infrastructure and lacks economies of agglomeration and other location specific 
externalities. Therefore, raising individual incomes is not the same thing as 
increasing the development potential of the area; it cures the symptoms rather than 
the illness. The question that arises then is: Is decentralisation likely to be more 
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effective at reducing inter-jurisdictional disparities than a centralised system? The 
answer to this is “no” because in a decentralised system, the local jurisdiction 
would collect all taxes from and undertake all expenditure on behalf of its 
residents. Yet, to the contrary, a centralised system would redistribute income from 
richer areas to poor ones (Davezies, 1989: 92; Oliveira, 1991: 129; Prud’homme, 
1984: 193). 
 
Despite the conceptual and statistical difficulties, these theories are quite clear that 
richer jurisdictions do subsidise at least poor ones through National Budgets. It can 
then be concluded that centralised National Budgets tend to reduce regional 
disparities.  
 
2.6.6. Fiscal constraints under decentralisation  
 
Certain critics also assert that decentralisation can jeopardise economic stability. 
This is because decentralisation makes macro-economic policies more difficult to 
implement. The two main instruments of macro-economic policy are monetary and 
fiscal policy. Fiscal policy constitutes the control over the amount and structure of 
taxes and expenditures and the management of the budget deficit or surplus; 
therefore, it is a powerful instrument for stabilising the economy. This is an 
instrument that only the Central Government can manipulate because Local 
Governments have no incentives to undertake economic stabilisation policies 
(Saito, 2003: 38). 
 
The advocates for decentralisation advance their cause on the grounds of 
efficiency. They argue that inhabitants of different jurisdictions have different 
tastes. As a result, in Local Government X, the people may require a health 
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service, yet in Local Government Y people prefer an education service. 
Decentralisation makes it possible for the residents of Local Governments X and Y 
to receive what will better match their demand. This argument is however, more 
hypothetical than real. It focuses more on demand efficiency and ignores supply 
efficiency. In developing countries the problem is less with identifying preferences 
and more with the capacity to satisfy basic needs due to limited availability of 
resources (Galiwango, 2004: 73). 
The above assumption is also based on the premise that local leaders will be 
elected on the basis of competence. However, in developing countries, local 
elections are often a mere rehearsal of national elections, therefore, tax 
payers/voters do not express their preferences in the way they vote. Local elections 
are usually decided on the basis of personal, tribal and party political loyalties. It is 
even difficult for elected officials to fulfill the preferences of the electorate because 
of the mismatch between available resources (revenue) and promised expenditures. 
The hypothesis on which this model rests therefore appears rather fragile 
particularly in developing countries (Saito, 2003: 82). 
 
According to Rondinelli and Nellis (1986: 3-23) the greatest ambiguity in the 
decentralisation policy is the insistence of national leaders on transferring planning 
and administrative functions without providing localities with sufficient financial 
resources. As a result, available resources do not match the services demanded. 
This is supported by Tardoff (1994: 19) when he argues that limited resources do 
not allow improvement of services since implementing decentralisation becomes 
too complicated to be coped with given the limited resources, skills and knowledge 
available to Local Governments. Davezies, Laurent, Nicot (1994: 209) echo the 
same when they assert that decentralisation in Gambia in the 1980s and the early 
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1990s revealed institutional confusion and ineffective services. Accordingly, they 
argue that decentralisation “by default” was pursued by NGOs.  
 
In the Ugandan context, the Central Government retains the buoyant sources of 
revenue like the Value Added Tax (VAT), Income Tax, Customs and Excise 
duties; leaving Local Governments depending largely on Graduated Tax25 which 
has also been abolished. The abolition of Graduated Tax implies that Local 
Governments, especially the rural ones, will now solely depend of Central 
Government transfers. This will greatly undermine the autonomy of Local 
Governments because their operations will largely be regulated by the centre, as 
they cannot generate local revenue.  However, Central Government transfers 
cannot match the magnitude of responsibility that has been devolved from the 
centre to the Lower Local Governments.  
 
Decentralisation is also undermined by the fact that the greater part of the Central 
Government grants are conditional which leaves no room for Local Government 
discretion. The unconditional grant is mostly dominated by administrative costs 
especially salaries and wages (Nsibambi, 1989: 47; Mutabwire, 2002: 11). 
 
2.6.7. Decentralisation is not absolute  
 
Rondinelli (1979: 492) argues that all Governments have a mixture of centralised 
and decentralised functions; hence, he does not regard decentralisation as a 
panacea to the political, economic and administrative problems in developing 
countries. Even the greatest advocates of decentralisation recognise that the Central 
 
25 Graduated Tax is payable by every male adult between the ages of 18 and 60; female adults engaged in gainful 
employment also pay it. It has been abolished since the 2005/06 financial year.   
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Governments often enact and implement policies that lead to greater territorial 
justice or redistribution of wealth more effectively than territorial units. He further 
argues that he has noted Local Governments that have easily been captured by elite 
groups or vested interests who are unwilling to share power or allow greater 
participation.  
 
Decentralists also recognise that certain functions of the state cannot be 
decentralised. For example, services which are essential to the survival of the 
nation like the Army, services that benefit from economies of scale and 
standardisation in production, that depend on large networks of facilities that can 
only be distributed by a government large and powerful enough to redistribute 
wealth in the face of opposition, or that depend on massive capital investments, 
may be better administered by Central Governments than by decentralised units 
(Slater, 1989: 501).  
 
Samoff (1989: 526) argues that after the spate of military coups in Africa in the 
mid 1960s, it was widely assumed that the fragile political systems of the newly 
independent states had limited capacity to meet rapidly escalating demands. As the 
post-colonial leaders sought to depoliticise development, advisers were 
emphasising centralised decision-making as a strategy for rationalising the use of 
scarce resources, especially skilled personnel. The new leadership and its external 
advisers agreed that decentralisation was likely to reinforce racial, ethnic and 
religious agendas, and in general make governing more difficult.  
 
The colonial philosophy was that while service delivery could and should be 
decentralised, access to decision-making should not; thus decentralisation was 
initially introduced as a strategy for prolonging colonial rule. The implication of 
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this is that depending on the motives of the centre for establishing decentralisation, 
can result in decentralised systems of governance being established for negative 
motives and thereby serving the centre rather than the periphery.  
 
In Uganda, decentralisation does not cover essential service areas like the defence 
of the country. This is left to the Uganda Peoples Defence Forces, which is 
managed centrally. The collection of major revenues like Income Tax, excise duty, 
licensing of motor vehicles among others is centrally undertaken so that proceeds 
are kept as part of the Consolidated Fund. It is from this fund that redistribution to 
the various sectors of Government including Local Governments is done.  
 
Kessides (1993: 212) analysed the issue of which services lend themselves better 
to privatisation26 as a form of decentralisation on the basis of market and demand. 
He argues that decentralisation of such infrastructure services like railways, 
highways, power production and transportation cannot easily be feasible because 
of the infrastructure investment involved. It is argued that the smaller the cost of 
investment, the better the rationale for decentralisation. Similarly, it is difficult to 
decentralise public transport infrastructure because it is difficult to finance through 
fees.  
      
The technical nature of a service also determines whether a service can be 
decentralised. Some services need a certain degree of technical and managerial 
expertise; for example, garbage collection is easier to provide than bulk clean 
water. The lesser the technical expertise required to provide a service, the easier it 
is to decentralise. 
 
26 According to the Decentralisation Secretariat 1994, decentralisation manifests itself in four forms namely 
devolution, deconcentration, delegation and privatisation.  
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Providing local public services is a complex task that encompasses many functions 
like selecting the appropriate investment, supervising its construction, operating, 
regulating, and maintaining the system, and finally monitoring and auditing 
performance. For this reason, the desirable degree of decentralisation for a given 
public service in a given geographical context is likely to differ from one function 
to another (Kessides, 1993: 222). This argument is true in the Ugandan context 
because several infrastructure services cannot be decentralised due to the high 
levels of technical expertise involved. Such infrastructure services include the 
Uganda Electricity Distribution Company, the Uganda Posts, National Water and 
Sewerage Corporation, among others. These are bulk services that require 
significant investment and technical expertise and therefore decentralising them 
would enhance inefficiency instead of development.  
 
The construction of infrastructure is often contracted out to the private sector. 
However, the operation, regulation and maintenance of the facility, which is the 
most important function in the provision of the service, can be decentralised. The 
supervisory function can be performed by the Central Government, which will 
conveniently undertake the monitoring and auditing because of the expertise 
involved. For instance, in Uganda, water for production in form of dams and valley 
tanks are financed by the Central Government by having private firms constructing 
the water sources. After that, these infrastructure services are handed over to Local 
Governments for operationalisation and regulation.  
 
Galiwango (2004: 33) argues that more often than not, for most types of 
investment, two or more levels of government will be involved. Considering the 
education service sector in Uganda, whereas primary education is fully 
decentralised, secondary and tertiary education continues to be managed by the 
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Central Government which does not only finance it but also recruits, promotes, and 
disciplines teachers through the Education Service Commission. In this case both 
the Local and Central Governments in Uganda participate in the provision of the 
education service.  
 
Currently, even human resource management of Local Government staff is not 
wholly decentralised. Until 2005, all Local Government staff were being recruited, 
promoted and reprimanded by the District Service Commission. However, the 
amendment of the Local Governments Act, 2006 reverted the appointments of the 
Chief Administrative Officers and Town Clerks of Municipalities back to the 
centre under the Public Service Commission.  
 
2.6.8. Decentralisation and corruption  
 
Whereas decentralisation may lead to enhanced transparency and accountability, 
there is a possibility that it might be accompanied by more corruption. If 
corruption is more widespread at the local than at the national level, then 
decentralisation automatically increases the overall level of corruption. 
 
Some people argue, however, that this corruption may not be so bad in terms of 
redistribution, because the “benefits” of decentralised corruption are probably 
better distributed than the “benefits” of centralised corruption. This corruption 
increases the costs in terms of allocative efficiency, because it leads to supply of 
services for which the levels of kickbacks are higher, rather than those which are 
demanded. It is costly in terms of production efficiency because it leads to 
corruption, thereby avoiding strategies which are cost effective and favouring 
ineffective technologies which waste resources.  
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Although corruption is hard to assess and measure, there are reasons why 
corruption is likely to be more prevalent at the local than at the national level. 
Firstly, local politicians and administrative officials are likely to be more subject to 
pressing demands from local people whose votes count. In addition, local officials 
usually have more discretion than national decision-makers; indeed, it is precisely 
this discretion that is the theoretical advantage of decentralisation. This discretion 
comes about in the Ugandan case because Local Governments are by law 
empowered to determine their own budgets and execute them without interference 
from the centre. 
 
Through the District Service Commission and the Local Governments Contracts 
Committee, the Local Governments can appoint in service people of their choice 
with whom they can connive to misappropriate resources or, using the latter 
committee, to allocate tenders to themselves or their relatives/friends to provide 
goods and services more often of poor quality. As a result of this, decentralisation 
does not enhance development.  
 
Secondly, the fact that Central Government bureaucrats are at least moved from 
place to place and never stay long in the same location makes it more difficult for 
them to establish unethical relationships with local interest groups, unlike local 
bureaucrats whose careers are spent in the same location. Corruption often requires 
the cooperation of both politicians and administrative officials and this is better 
disposed at the local level than at the national level. Besides, monitoring and 
auditing are usually better developed at the national than at the local level 
(Bidandi, 2002: 47). 
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Murkeji (1961: 213) states that students of underdevelopment have warned that the 
proliferation of administrative arrangements at the local level can bring about 
deterioration in the quality of administration as large numbers of officials with less 
education, a narrower outlook, and hardly any experience are employed.  
 
Yin and Lucas (1973: 48) assert that the public confidence in the honesty as well as 
competence of local councillors and administrative officials declines as most of 
them are convicted of corruption. In this case, decentralisation does not strengthen 
trust in the fairness of government.  
 
2.6.9. Capacity of Local Government management  
 
Smith (1987: 26) argues that problems related to administrative decentralisation 
arise mainly from poor management of Local Government bureaucracies. The 
decentralised administrative systems are said to be plagued by poor design, acute 
shortage of skilled human resources, financial mismanagement and collapse, and 
other dysfunctional elements.  
 
In contemporary African administration, management deficiency is a major 
constraint to decentralisation. This is of course not to under-emphasise political 
factors such as the contribution of interference from the centre as well as socio-
economic factors, including differing resource bases of different parts of the 
country.  
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2.6.10. Production inefficiency  
 
Advocates of decentralisation argue that it leads to production efficiency. The real 
issue here is whether local provision is more cost-effective than national provision. 
Economies of scale in the various local public services are scarce, because the 
provision of public services in each jurisdiction is independent of the provision in 
other regions.  
 
The other argument is that Central Government bureaucracies are likely to attract 
more qualified personnel, not necessarily because they offer higher salaries, but 
because they offer better careers, with a greater diversity of tasks, more 
possibilities for promotion, less political intervention, and a longer term view of 
issues. Central Government bureaucracies also invest more in technology, research 
and innovation. In developing countries, Central Governments tend to make few 
such investments, but local bureaucracies make almost none (World Bank, 1990: 
69). 
 
2.6.11. Sensitivity to geographical differences  
 
Proponents of decentralisation tend to ignore geography. As a result, 
decentralisation in African countries is regarded using the same concepts as 
decentralisation in countries in Europe or in big cities. When analysing 
decentralisation it is pertinent to note that population size matters because 
decentralisation is more likely to succeed in a heavily populated country where 
sub-national units are as big as or even bigger than some small countries.  
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The same is true for geographical size, for in a large country like the Democratic 
Republic of Congo or Sudan where communication is difficult, decentralisation is 
more desirable than in small countries like Burundi. The same probably also 
applies to the levels of development because studies have shown that 
decentralisation is more likely to be successful and/or less risky in middle and 
high-income countries. For the lowest income countries, decentralisation may be 
limited to rhetoric (Bahl & Linn, 1992: 393). 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
 
Prud’homme (1992: 1-17) argues that decentralisation measures are like a potent 
drug, which when prescribed for the relevant illness, at the appropriate moment 
and in the correct dose, can have the desired salutary effect; but in the wrong 
circumstances, can harm rather than heal. Research on decentralisation in Africa 
has generally been theoretical, with little case material presented. As a result, these 
studies have been of little help in explaining current problems faced by African 
decentralised systems. Rondinelli (1989: 494) argues that decentralised 
administration fails in Africa because of inter alia the organisational format 
adopted, the division of responsibilities, the levels of competence of personnel, 
inter-personal relations, and the level of resources available.  
 
Although decentralisation analysts tend to demarcate between political and 
administrative aims, it is inevitable that as an organisational concept, 
decentralisation is viewed as a political issue because it can be used as an 
instrument for a wider range of political, economic or social purposes and for good 
or ill depending on the motives and intentions of political leaders (Rondinelli and 
Nellis, 1986: 57-87). 
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It is therefore evident from the review of the decentralisation arguments that both 
supporters and opponents use the same rationale for their own end. This then 
implies that there is no singularly proven logic for or against decentralisation. 
Whereas the issues of economic efficiency and local resource enhancement are 
emphasised more by neo-liberalists, the arguments of enhanced participation and 
national harmony among social divisions are underlined by the neo-populists. The 
neo-populists therefore support decentralisation for mainly democratic values 
rather than economic reasons. The neo-liberalists focus more on economic gains 
such as allocative efficiency and reduced transaction costs derived from 
strengthened Local Governments. Therefore, the rationale for decentralisation can 
be expressed in terms of political democratisation as well as economic 
restructuring.  
 
The reviews also reveal that pure decentralisation in Uganda is not possible 
because national policies and priorities have to be adhered to by the Local 
Governments. Besides, the Local Governments cannot generate sufficient local 
revenue on their own to facilitate development. Human resource inadequacies were 
also revealed, since the recruitment of administrative officials is not based on merit 
but sectarianism like “son/daughter of the soil”. As long as decentralisation in 
Uganda is characterised by corruption among other evils, then development 
remains elusive. 
 
In order to establish whether or not decentralisation in Uganda enhances 
development, it is pertinent to analyse the current legal and institutional framework 
of Local Government in Uganda. This will receive attention in the chapter that 
follows.        
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                                             CHAPTER THREE 
INSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL ARRANGEMENTS OF THE 
CURRENT DECENTRALISED LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
SYSTEM IN UGANDA 
 
3.0  Introduction 
 
This chapter will focus on the current institutional and legal arrangements of the 
decentralised Local Government System in Uganda. The chapter is important 
because it augments the theoretical framework provided by the literature review 
undertaken in the previous chapter. In this respect, this chapter will attempt to 
present the decentralisation policy as it is enshrined in the law of Uganda and to 
describe its structural establishment. 
 
Subsequently, this chapter will contextualise the decentralisation policy by 
analysing the four pillars of decentralisation namely; the legal framework, as well 
as political, fiscal and the administrative decentralisation. The study of the pillars 
of decentralisation will enable this investigation to establish the relationship 
between the theoretical and legal aspects of decentralisation and the practice 
thereof in the field as this applies to the two selected districts in Uganda. This 
relationship will either reveal conformity or contradiction, which is the core 
objective of this study. 
 
Besides the legal framework, the analysis of the pillars will also help in explaining 
the different levels of Local Government from the Village Local Council up to the 
Ministry of Local Government. This analysis will also illustrate the 
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intergovernmental relations that exist within the Local Government system itself, 
as well as between the Local Governments and Central Government in Uganda. 
 
The chapter also gives a special consideration to the institutional arrangements 
concerning Education and Health. Then, it is concluded by summarising the 
highlights of the institutional and legal arrangements of the current 
Decentralisation System in Uganda and how it reflects on development. 
 
3.1. Pillars of decentralisation 
 
According to Steffensen (2004:22), the decentralisation system rests on four pillars 
that are illustrated by figure 2.  
 
      Figure 2: Foundation and Key pillars of decentralisation 
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Source:  Steffensen, 2004:52 
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3.1.1.   The legal framework for decentralisation in Uganda 
 
The existence of a strong legal framework for decentralisation facilitates the 
definition of roles and responsibilities and provides guidance on implementation of 
the policy. Decentralisation in Uganda has benefited from the enactment of 
specific legislation. The devolution of powers in Uganda was occasioned by the 
1993 Local Governments (Resistance Councils) Statute, which devolved a number 
of previously held Central Government powers to elected Local Authorities. This 
statute provided for decentralisation, which in effect increased democratic control 
and participation in decision-making and to mobilise support for development, 
which is relevant to local levels. 
 
The devolution of powers were further consolidated and strengthened by the 1995 
Constitution, which in Chapter Eleven provides for the principles, structures and 
finances of Local Governments. Article 175(i) of the same Constitution states that 
the system of Local Government in Uganda shall be based on the district, with the 
council as the highest political organ; as enshrined in Article 180 of the 1995 
Constitution. 
 
 
Articles 191 and 192 also empower the Local Governments to levy, charge, collect 
an appropriate fees and taxes in accordance with the Local Governments Financial 
and Accounting Regulations (LGF & AR), 1998. Article 193 also provides for the 
Conditional, Unconditional and Equalisation Grants payable to Local Governments 
out of the Consolidated Fund. 
The same Constitution under article 194 lays out the functions of the Local 
Government Finance Commission (LGFC). While articles 198-200 cater for the 
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District Service Commission. In this way, the Constitution provides a concrete 
base upon which decentralisation rests. 
 
To further elaborate and operationalise the decentralisation policy, the Local 
Governments Act (LGA) was enacted in 1997. The objective of the LGA was to 
amend, consolidate and streamline the existing law on Local Governments so that 
it is in line with the Constitution. The LGA, 1997 also intended to ensure good 
governance by establishing democratic, responsive and accountable local 
governance that would enhance development. It also aimed to provide for revenue, 
political and administrative set-up of the Local Governments. 
 
Part IV of the LGA sets out the functions, planning and legislative powers of Local 
Government Councils. In the execution of their functions, Local Councils are 
under an obligation to ensure they protect the Constitution and other laws of 
Uganda (Section 31(c) of LGA, 1997). Section 31(d) of the LGA, 1997 also 
ensures that Local Governments comply with Central Government policy. 
 
Under the Second Schedule of the LGA, 1997, the functions of the Central and 
Local Governments are set out in detail. The schedule also empowers Central 
Government Line Ministries to delegate their functions, powers and 
responsibilities to Local Government Councils. The delegated functions can only 
be affected subject to agreement of all parties, the provision of adequate resources 
and measures taken to bring the change to attention of the public, (Section 33, 
LGA, 1997).  
 
The Act also sets out institutional structures that facilitate Human Resources and 
Financial Management in Local Governments. Such structures include the District 
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Service Commission (DSC), which is provided for by part IV of the LGA, the 
Local Governments Contracts (Procurement) Committee for both the District and 
Urban Authorities, the Local Governments Public Accounts Committee (LGPAC) 
which are provided for under part VIII of the LGA.  
 
Although Local Governments are autonomous, they are expected to adhere to 
national policies and performance standards in the execution of their 
duties/functions. To ensure this compliance, various Central Government Line 
Ministries have the mandate under part IX of the LGA, 1997, to inspect, monitor 
and where necessary provide technical advice, support and training to Local 
Governments. 
 
In 2001, the Local Governments Act was amended to provide for affirmative 
action, definitions, administrative and procedural issues that were either earlier 
omitted or required amendments due to implementation challenges. Some of the 
amendments include: 
• Section 32 that make councillors and administrative officials personally 
accountable for financial loss of the Local Government arising out of 
malpractices.  
• The salaries and other expenses of the District Service Commission to be 
paid from the Consolidated Fund.  
• The quorum (Coram) of three judges for a tribunal to investigate 
allegations against a District Chairperson was changed to one judge and 
two persons of high moral character due to the limited number of judges.  
 
These amendments were influenced by practical experiences arising out of the 
implementation of the LGA, 1997. Section 31 of the Act and Schedule II of the Act 
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mandates Local Government Councils to design development plans based on the 
size of the resource envelope vis-à-vis the locally determined priorities, which 
should be in line with the National Programme Priority Areas (NPPA). 
 
3.1.2. Political decentralisation 
 
Political decentralisation entails the devolution of powers from the centre to the 
Local Governments to enable citizens to exercise their Constitutional democratic 
rights to elect leaders who represent them in decision-making organs, which are 
legally charged with the responsibility of designing, approving, overseeing and 
monitoring implementation of plans and budget in their defined areas of 
jurisdiction with the ultimate aim of ensuring effective and efficient service 
delivery and hence enhance development.  
 
Political decentralisation in Uganda literally means devolution of powers to Local 
Councils at lower local levels at the district and below to the village level. The 
village and parish councils also handle conflicts in the villages; hence, they 
administer justice through Local Council Courts (Nsibambi, 1994: 43). As an 
integral aspect of political decentralisation, electoral democracy is carried out after 
every five years since 1998 as required by the 1995 Constitution and the amended 
Local Governments Act, 2001. These elections also permit sufficient 
representation of various marginalised sections of the community like the women, 
youths, people with disabilities and the elderly. 
 
Meetings at the village and parish councils are presided over by the chairpersons of 
the respective councils but at sub-county/town council, municipality/city division 
and district/city councils, the speaker who is elected from amongst the councillors 
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presides over the council sessions. Local Councils from the village up to the 
district/city have executive committees headed by the chairperson. Executive 
committees at the Higher Local Government (HLG) are fulltime and are paid 
salary monthly from the Consolidated Fund, while the other councillors are part 
time. 
 
The decentralised Local Government in Uganda is managed under a pyramidal 
structure as illustrated in figure 3. 
 
Figure 3:  Structure of the LG council from LC I to LC V 
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At the Higher Local Government level, the structure has the district and city Local 
Government. The district/city councils are as is the case with the parliament at 
national level, the highest political authorities within their areas of jurisdiction 
(Section 10, LGA, 1997) 
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The HLG councils comprise the following: 
• District chairperson/city mayor. 
• One councillor directly elected for each electoral area, which is normally a 
sub-county/division. 
• A number of female councillors such that at least one third of the 
councillors are female. 
• Two youth councillors, one of whom must be female. 
• Two councillors with disabilities catering for both sexes. 
 
The district/city council has planning, legislative and executive powers. The 
district/city council is the planning authority of that jurisdiction and among the 
functions that cannot be delegated are the approval of annual estimates and 
development plans (Schedule 4, LGA, 1997). The chairperson is the political head 
of the district, answerable to the council and he/she is directly elected. 
 
For one to qualify to be elected as a district chairperson and / or city mayor, one 
must be qualified to a level of at least advanced level or equivalent. There is 
however, no academic qualification for other members of the district/city council. 
The chairperson and other elected councillors are elected by universal adult 
suffrage (MoLG, 2005: 48).  
In each district/city, there is an executive committee consisting of the 
chairperson/mayor, the vice chairperson/deputy mayor and such number of 
secretaries not exceeding three, as the council may decide (LGA, 2005). The vice 
chairperson/deputy mayor and the secretaries are nominated by the 
chairperson/mayor and approved by the council. At least one of the offices of the 
secretaries must be held by a female councillor. 
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The executive committee performs the executive functions of the council, which 
include initiating policies and submitting them to council for approval, monitoring 
the implementation of national, district and Lower Local Council (LLC) 
programmes (Part III, LGA, 1997). 
 
The HLG councils appoint standing committees from among the members of the 
council not exceeding the number of secretaries. No council member is supposed 
to belong to more than one committee (section 23 LGA, 1997). The standing 
committees closely interact with technical departments and discuss in depth 
specific issues before they are presented to the council. 
 
For the Lower Local Government (LLG), the set-up is a replica of the HLG. The 
council of the sub-county, town council or division is the highest political 
organ/authority where the chairperson is also elected directly by adult suffrage. 
The councillors to the LLG councils are elected from the parishes/wards. For both 
the LLG and HLG levels, two elderly people of at least fifty-five years of age are 
elected by the elderly league. One of them has to be female. These become ex-
officio members of the council. 
 
At the LLG, just as it is with the HLG, there exists an executive committee with a 
speaker and deputy. The difference is that only the position of the chairperson is 
fulltime, while all other members of the executive and the council (including the 
speaker) are part-time who are only entitled to a sitting allowance (JARD, 2004: 
47). 
 
In the above Local Council hierarchy, a city division is equivalent to a 
municipality; a municipal division and town council are equivalent to the sub-
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county. The urban authority includes the city council, city division council, 
municipality and town council. Every Local Council is a body corporate and may 
sue or be sued. 
 
Below the LLG are administrative units/councils. The administrative units in the 
rural areas are county, parish and village, while those in urban areas are the ward 
(parish) and cell (village). The composition of the administrative council is as 
follows: 
• At the county level, a council consists of all members of the sub-county 
executive committees within the county. 
• At the parish/ward level, a council consists of all members of the village/cell 
executive committees in the parish/ward. 
• At the village level, all persons of eighteen years of age and above residing 
in that village/cell (Section 46, LGA, 1997). 
 
Administrative units largely have administrative roles as provided for in Section 49 
of the LGA, 1997. The administrative units have the power to draw attention to the 
higher authorities to any matters of their interest. The county administrative unit 
also serves as the constituency advisory team to the area Member of Parliament.  
Other functions of the administrative units include: resolving disputes at that level; 
monitoring delivery of services; and assisting in maintenance of law, order and 
security. 
 
3.1.3. Fiscal decentralisation 
 
Fiscal decentralisation is a fundamental facet of Uganda’s decentralisation policy. 
The 1993 Local Government Statute recommended delivery of funding from the 
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Central Government in form of Block and Equalisation Grants. After the 
promulgation of the 1995 Constitution and the resultant enactment of the LGA, 
1997, Local Governments are currently receiving Central Government transfers in 
the form of Unconditional, Conditional and Equalisation Grants. 
 
With the introduction of the Poverty Action Fund (PAF) in 1997/98, the Local 
Governments share of the National Budget has significantly increased up to over 
forty per cent (46%) in 2006/07 financial year. Out of this, eighty nine per cent 
(89%) of the transfers by 2006/07 were in form of Unconditional Grants. This 
gives discretion to Local Governments to plan for location tailored projects. 
 
To streamline the Central-Local fiscal relations, the Government of Uganda 
introduced the Fiscal Decentralisation Strategy (FDS) whose main objective is to 
promote Local Government autonomy and widening of participation in decision-
making in order to enhance the effectiveness in allocation of resources towards the 
achievement of the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) goal in line with local 
priorities, which strategy now covers the whole country. 
 
The Equalisation Grant whose main objective is to cater for Local Governments, 
which even after receiving the Unconditional and Conditional Grants remain in 
dire straits. The intention is that the Grant should address service delivery gaps in a 
few worst off Local Governments. The reality however, is that access to this Grant 
has now become a right to most LGs because of poor local revenue performance; 
hence defeating the original purpose.  
 
While central transfers remain the main source of revenue for funding 
decentralised service delivery, local revenue mobilisation remains critical for 
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sustainable implementation of the decentralisation policy. Unfortunately, local 
revenues have been declining over the past years. 
 
Whereas local revenue stood at Uganda shillings eighty six billion 1997/98, it had 
declined to approximately Uganda shillings thirty billion in 2003/04 financial year. 
This was largely due to corruption by revenue collectors, who used fake 
acknowledgement documents, spending at source and political interference 
(Mutabwire, 2002: 41).  
 
During the 2001 presidential elections, one of the presidential candidates promised 
to abolish Graduated Tax (GT). This compelled the Government to set a minimum 
of three thousand shillings from ten thousand shillings. Although this negatively 
affected local revenue, the situation was even worsened in 2005/06 financial year 
when it was totally abolished. The implication of this is that Local Governments 
now largely depend on Central Government transfers. This dependence greatly 
undermines autonomy of the Local Governments under devolution, which is the 
strongest form of decentralisation (JARD, 2004: 11).  
 
Key to the efficacy of fiscal decentralisation is the institutionalisation of prudent 
financial management and accountability mechanisms. The Government of Uganda 
has taken considerable measures to improve financial management in Local 
Governments, which include training of key Local Government staff and 
computerising the accounting system. In addition, information about financial 
transfers to Local Governments is regularly publicised in the print media for the 
public to be informed and demand accountability.     
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Fiscal decentralisation also concerns Local Governments Procurement procedures. 
The Local Governments Act, 1997, 2001, 2006 and the Local Governments 
Financial and Accounting Regulations 1998, the Local Governments Contracts 
Regulations 2006 define the rules that govern the Local Governments procurement 
procedures. 
 
Under the decentralised system, Local Governments in Uganda have been 
empowered to collect revenue and spend it in accordance with the laid down 
procedures. Section 78 of the LGA, 1997 mandates Local Governments to 
formulate, approve and execute their budgets and plans. This empowerment helps 
Local Governments to identify their priorities and design development strategies, 
which are tailored to specific locations. 
 
Section 81(1) of the LGA, 1997 also empowers Local Governments to levy, charge 
and collect fees and taxes. The Fifth Schedule of the Act details sources of Local 
revenue, assessment procedures, distribution of grants to Lower Councils and 
borrowing powers. 
 
Local Governments are prohibited from appropriating funds on expenditure items 
not approved in the budget (Section 83(1), LGA, 1997). To ensure this, Section 
83(2) of the LGA, 1997, provides that the Auditor General or his/her representative 
has to approve withdrawal of moneys from the General Fund Account of the 
Council. Grants from the Centre are supposed to supplement the Local revenue of 
the Local Government. 
 
Section 80 of the LGA, 1997 provides that urban Local Governments shall have 
autonomy on financial and planning matters in relation to the District. However, 
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their plans shall be incorporated in the District Development Plans (DDPs). This 
autonomy also applies to the sub-county/LLG councils.  
 
In addition to the DSC and Contracts Committees as institutions for promoting 
accountability and transparency, there is the Local Government Public Accounts 
Committee (LGPAC). The LGPAC is established by Section 89(1) of the LGA, 
1997. This Committee acts on the reports of the Auditor General, Resident District 
Commissioner (RDC), the Inspector General of Government (IGG), Commissions 
of Inquiry, among others. Section 89(9) of the LGA, 1997 and Sections 30(b) and 
(c) of the amended Act, 2001, oblige Local Governments to act on the 
recommendations of the LGPAC. 
 
The accountability legal framework (Section 89(8), LGA, 1997) requires the 
Minister responsible for Local Governments to lay the reports of the LGPAC 
before parliament. In addition, section 91(1) of the LGA, 1997, establishes the 
Internal Audit Department, whose reports are submitted to the council and copied 
to the LGPAC. Local Governments are also enjoined by Section 89 of the LGA, 
1997 to keep Books of Accounts and produce final accounts to the Auditor General 
who is the External Auditor of the Local Governments. 
 
The standing committees are also actors in the fiscal management of the 
decentralised Local Governance. These committees of council are empowered by 
Section 23 of the LGA, 1997 to monitor, evaluate performance of sectors, 
reviewing budgets of departments under their sectors and recommend to council 
for their integration in the budget. They also scrutinise monthly expenditure 
returns, tender awards and quarterly financial reports so as to recommend 
appropriate action by the council. 
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Section 17 of the LGA, 1997 also establishes the Executive Committee to check 
the excesses in financial management. The functions of the executive committee of 
council in relation to financial management as provided for in Regulation 8 of the 
LGF&AR, 1998 include the following:  
• Exercise general supervision and control over councils’ finances. 
• Propose policies and projects for consideration by the council. 
• At the end of each financial year, evaluate the performance of the council 
against approved work plans and budgets. 
• Examine the annual and other accounts of the council together with the audit 
and LGPAC reports. 
• Receive quarterly internal audit reports after being examined by the LGPAC 
and report to the council. 
 
Section 86 of the LGA, 1997, outlines how revenue is to be shared under the 
decentralisation system in Uganda. Various levels of Local Governments have 
different shares. In the city and municipality councils, revenue is collected by the 
Division Councils that retain fifty per cent of all the revenue collected and remit 
the rest to the city/municipality council. 
 
In rural areas, revenue is collected by the sub-county council that retains sixty five 
per cent or any other higher amount as the District Council may approve, the 
remaining per centage is passed over to the District Council. The HLG can, with 
the concurrence of the LLG, collect revenue on behalf of the latter but shall remit 
the required per centage of the revenue so collected to the relevant LLG. 
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The distribution of grants by the LLG to other councils is provided for under the 
Fifth Schedule of the LGA, 1997. This Schedule requires that Local Council One 
(village/cell) is given twenty-five per cent of the revenue due to the sub-
county/division and the parishes are given ten per cent. This is supposed to 
empower Local Councils up to the Lowest Level of decentralisation.  
 
Section 7 of the Local Governments Financial and Accounting Regulations, 1998, 
designates the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) and Town Clerk (TC) as the 
Accounting Officers of their respective councils, while section 8 makes the Chief 
Finance Officer (CFO) the receiver, paymaster and Chief Accountant of the Local 
Government.  
 
In the execution of the duties of the Accounting Officer, the CAO/TC is to: 
• Ensure the appointment of the CFO/Treasure, Chief Internal Auditor and 
other staff necessary to carry out the accounting and financial management 
of the council. 
• Maintain a budget desk through the CFO/Treasurer. 
• Establish and operate a reporting framework through the Chief Internal 
Auditor (CIA). 
• Ensure that all staff and councillors are aware of and conform to the 
requirements of the LGF&AR, 1998.  
• Appoint Accounting Officers at Lower Local Governments for purposes of 
accountability and reporting. 
 
In view of the above, the Act outlines the following functions for the Chief Finance 
Officer:  
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• Supervises and coordinates the budget desk in the preparation of work plans.  
• Ensures that approved estimates of expenditure on Votes are not exceeded.  
• Ensures that no expenditure is incurred unless it is provided for in the 
approved budget and has been authorised by the Accounting Officer or any 
other person who is explicitly delegated to do so. 
• Ensures that proper Books of Accounts are kept, final accounts are produced 
on time and are audited. 
• Supervises all officers entrusted with the receipt and expenditure of funds.  
 
In emphasising integrity in Local Governments, Section 71 of the LGA, 1997 
provides for the office of the Resident District Commissioner (RDC). The RDC is 
the representative of the President and Central Government in the district, he/she 
performs the following:  
• Coordinates the administration of Government services.  
• Advises the District Chairperson on matters of National nature. 
• Monitors and inspects the activities of Local Governments. 
• Sensitises the populace on Government policies and programmes. 
• Advises the Chairperson to instruct the Chief Internal Auditor to carry out 
special audit.  
• Draws the attention of the Auditor General to the needs for special 
investigation audits of LGs. 
• Draws the attention of the IGG to the need to investigate any case of 
mismanagement or abuse of office. 
• Draws the attention of any relevant line Ministry of the divergence from or 
non-compliance with Government policy by any council within his/her area 
of jurisdiction.  
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To check on the excesses of administrative officials, Chapter Thirteen of the 1995 
Constitution provides for the office of the Inspector General of Government (IGG). 
The institution of the IGG is operationalised by the Inspectorate of Government 
Act, 2002. The functions of the IGG according to Section 8 of the Inspectorate of 
Government Act (IGA), 2002 are as follows:  
• Promote and foster strict adherence to the rule of law and principles of 
natural justice in administration.  
• Eliminate and foster the elimination of corruption, abuse of authority and 
public office. 
• Promote fair, efficient and good governance in public offices. 
• Enforce the Leadership Code of Conduct. 
• Investigate any act, omission, advice, decision or recommendation by a 
public officer or any other authority in the exercise of administrative 
functions. 
• Stimulate public awareness about the values of Constitutionalism. 
• Investigate Law enforcement agents and security agencies. 
• Take necessary measures for detection and prevention of corruption.  
 
In the performance of its duties, the Inspectorate is deemed to be independent as it 
is not subject to the direction or control of any person or authority other than the 
parliament (Section 10, IGA, 2002). Since the establishment of this institution, a 
number of cases in Local Governments relating to abuse of office and corruption 
have been investigated and mitigation measures administered. 
 
The IGG investigates cases of bribery and extortion, conflict of interest, 
embezzlement, false claims, forgery and uttering of false documents especially 
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academic certificates, tenders and contracts, victimisation among others. The 
IGG’s work helps in building integrity systems in Local Governance by enhancing 
good governance, exemplary leadership, adherence to accountability, transparency 
and observance of human rights. 
 
In addition to the general functions of the IGG, the institution is also supposed to 
enforce the Leadership Code of Conduct. The Code requires specific officers to 
declare their incomes, assets and liabilities every two years. This is meant to 
prohibit conduct likely to compromise the honesty, impartiality and integrity of the 
said officers. Both elected and administrative officials in the service of Local 
Governments are bound by the Leadership Code. This helps in enhancing integrity 
in Local Governments under the decentralised system in Uganda. 
 
The integrity measures outlined above ensure that the two arms of Local 
Governments are responsive and accountable not to the Central Government but to 
the Service users (citizens). Figure 4 illustrates how under decentralisation both 
elected and administrative officials are accountable to the citizens whom 
decentralisation is meant to benefit. It also explains how participatory planning, 
user committees and community based monitoring enhances efficiency and 
effectiveness in service delivery, hence, development.  
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Figure 4:  Decentralised Local Government accountability framework 
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3.1.4. Administrative decentralisation and institutional arrangements 
 
The establishment of the decentralisation policy in the Local Government System 
in Uganda changed the mandate of the Ministry of Local Government (MoLG). 
Subsequently, the new mission of the MoLG is to build strong Local Governments 
rather than administering and managing “decentralised” outposts of the Central 
Government machinery.  
 
As a result, the role of the MoLG has been relegated to that of supporting; 
monitoring, supervising, policy development and coordination with line Ministries 
and donors. This change in role has therefore led to the restructuring of the MoLG 
as reflected on page 358. 
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To help the MoLG and the centre, a number of organs are established to strengthen 
decentralisation. One of such organs is the Local Governments Finance 
Commission (LGFC), which is established by the LGA, 1997. Its major role is to 
advise the president on the distribution of revenue between the Central 
Government and Local Governments. Its advice covers the Conditional, 
Unconditional and Equalisation Grants. They also advise on potential sources of 
revenue and appropriate tax levels for Local Governments. 
 
In addition to the LGFC there is a non-statutory body that brings together Local 
Governments in Uganda called the Uganda Local Governments Association 
(ULGA). ULGA advocates and negotiates with Central Government on behalf of 
the member Local Governments. It does this by getting involved in fora like the 
Local Governments Budget Committee (LGBC), Local Governments Releases and 
Operations Committee (LGR&OC), Local Revenue Enhancement Coordination 
Committee (LRECO) where matters concerning LGs are discussed. 
 
Besides these bodies, line Ministries inspect, monitor, supervise and where 
necessary offer technical advice and training to Local Governments in order to 
ensure the implementation of national policies and adherence to performance 
standards on the part of Local Governments. The Central Government does not 
interfere with Local Governments when acting within their mandate. This implies 
that Local Governments should not overstep their legal boundaries (Section 31(i), 
LGA, 1997).  
 
The Central Government exercises some influence over Local Governments 
despite their corporate status. This influence does not however stretch beyond the 
legal confines enjoined by the constitution and the LGA. One of the avenues by 
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which the Central Government influences Local Governments is through Grants 
from the former to the latter (Section 193(i) of the Constitution, 1995; Section 84, 
LGA, 1997). 
 
The Central Government also influences Local Governments by insisting that 
Local Governments’ budgets accord National Priority Programme Areas (NPPA) 
preferential budget outlays (Section 78, LGA, 1997). In addition, the presence of 
the offices of the Auditor General, RDC, Commissions and Boards are all 
supposed to regulate the corporate operations of Local Governments.  
 
What has got to be noted however is that the Local Government System under the 
decentralised system is based on the principle of non-insubordination but with 
clear levels of interdependence as well as jurisdiction linkages. The system allows 
horizontal and vertical linkages, which could be used to enhance development. 
 
As a result, Local Government operations are divided in four categories, namely; 
the centre, which includes the MoLG and other sector Ministries like the Ministry 
of Finance Planning and Economic Development (MoFPED), the Ministry of 
Education and Sports (MoES), Ministry of Health (MoH) among others. The 
Central Government Sector Ministries network to coordinate and advocate for 
resources to be transferred to Local Governments.  
 
Below the Central Government are the HLGs, which constitute the District, City 
and Municipality authorities. These have the political wing under the chairperson 
or mayor, while the administrative wing is under the CAO or TC.  
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The third category is the LLG, which is the Sub-County/Town Council. At the 
bottom are the service beneficiaries and management committees. This 
arrangement facilitates planning, effective implementation, monitoring and hence 
creates a conducive environment for development. Subsequently, the ideal Local 
Government line of operation between the Central Government and the Local 
Governments is illustrated on page 359.  
 
Administrative decentralisation at the local government level is largely concerned 
with Human Resources Management (HRM). HRM generally refers to the process 
of administering people at work to achieve organisational goals. As regards Local 
Governments in Uganda, it is the way the employees of Local Governments are 
managed.  
 
The decentralisation policy in Uganda introduced the Separate Personnel System 
(SPS) for the management of Local Governments staff. The aim is to strengthen 
the capacity of Local Governments to deliver functions and services that fall within 
their mandate. Under the SPS, Local Governments become employers. Section 53 
of the LGA, 1997, provides that Local Governments may abolish or create offices 
in the public service of a district or urban council in accordance with the 
regulations in existence. The process of recruitment, promotion, disciplining is the 
responsibility of the Local Governments through the District Service Commission 
(DSC). 
 
Section 56 of the LGA, 1997, establishes the District Service Commission with 
powers to appoint persons to hold or act in the service of a district or urban 
council, including powers to confirm appointments, to exercise disciplinary 
measures or even dismissal.  The implication of this is that the administrative 
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officials of the respective Local Governments are fully accountable to the councils 
through their chief executives.  
 
Each district is mandated to have one service commission, which offers services to 
all Local Governments under its jurisdiction (Section 55(1), LGA, 1997). The DSC 
is appointed by the District Council on the recommendation of the District 
Executive Committee (Section 55(2), LGA, 1997). The same section details the 
composition of the DSC. 
 
The DSC comprises the chairperson and a number of members not exceeding five. 
One of the members should represent the urban council(s) located in that District. 
The council should also ensure that one third (1/3) of the members of the DSC are 
women and one member should be a person with disability. 
 
Members of the DSC hold office for four years and are eligible for appointment for 
one more term. Members of the Commission are supposed to be persons of high 
moral character, proven integrity, residents in the district, have a clean track 
record, seasoned, experienced and capable of taking decisions independently 
without influence. These members are paid salaries, allowances and other expenses 
from the Consolidated Fund.  
 
The DSC excludes members of parliament, Local Government Councils or 
executive body of a political organization/party or a public officer (Section 57(2), 
LGA, 1997). Local Governments administrative officials are protected by Article 
173 of the 1995 Constitution and Sections 60 and 62 of the LGA, 1997.  
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The Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) is the head of the public service in the 
District, while the Town Clerk heads the Urban Authority. Section 56(1) of the 
LGA, 1997, outlines the following functions for the CAO:  
• Responsible for the implementation of all lawful decisions taken by the 
District Council. 
• Give guidance to the Local Government Councils and their departments in 
the application of the relevant laws and policies. 
• Supervise, monitor and coordinate the activities of the District and Lower 
Council employees and departments; and ensure accountability and 
transparency in the management and delivery of council’s services. 
• Develop capacity for the development and management of the planning 
functions in the district.  
• Supervise and coordinate the activities of all delegated services and the 
officers working in those services. 
• Have custody of all documents and records of the Local Government 
Council. 
• Act as a Liaison Officer between the District Council and the Central 
Government. 
• Advise the chairperson on the administration of the council. 
• Carryout any other duty that may be assigned by the District Council from 
time to time.  
 
Section 66(1) of the LGA, 1997, provides that an Urban Council other than a 
Division Council shall have a Town Clerk who shall be the head of the 
administration of the relevant Urban Council and shall undertake the following 
functions:  
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• Responsible for the expending of the council’s funds and be the Accounting 
Officer of the relevant council. 
• Advise the council on legal and administrative matters. 
• Responsible for the implementation of lawful decisions taken by the council. 
• Supervise and coordinate the activities of all offices and departments of the 
council. 
• Supervise and coordinate the activities of the officers seconded by the 
council. 
• Have custody of all documents and records of the council. 
 
Section 69(1) of the LGA, 1997, provides for the removal of the CAO/TC. The 
District or Urban Council may recommend the removal of the CAO/TC as the case 
may be by a resolution supported by two thirds of the council members on the 
following grounds:  
• Abuse of office. 
• Incompetence. 
• Misconduct or misbehaviour. 
• Such physical or mental incapacity as would render the CAO/TC incapable 
of performing the duties of CAO/TC. 
 
Below the CAO are the Lower Chiefs at the sub-county or parish level. Section 
71(1) of the LGA, 1997, provides that there shall be a chief of each sub-county and 
in each parish who shall be appointed by the DSC. The Chief shall be the Head and 
Accounting Officer of the respective sub-county or parish. It is the duty of Chief 
according to Section 70(3) of the LGA, 1997, to: 
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• Obey all lawful directions from the council, other Higher Local Councils or 
authorised officers in respect of the execution of his/her duties. 
• Carry out general administration in conformity with Government regulations 
and policies, District ordinances or byelaws made by the Council, Trust 
Fund or Secretariat or by Lower Councils. 
• Implement the respective councils’ lawful policies and decisions. 
• Collect and account for the Local Governments’ revenue. 
• Obey and execute orders and warrants issued by any court of competent 
jurisdiction. 
• Assist in the maintenance of law, order and security. 
• Assist in the prevention of crime and public nuisance. 
• Detect, apprehend and bring offenders to justice. 
• Collect data and keep records of the council. 
• Assist the relevant council in planning, budgeting and budget 
implementation. 
• Supervise and monitor the implementation of socio-economic development 
projects.  
 
At the District level, administration and management of service delivery is 
undertaken through Directorates and Departments like Finance, Education and 
Sports, Health, Planning, Production and Marketing, Works, Administration, 
Community Based Services, Natural Resources, Statutory Bodies and Internal 
Audit as illustrated on page 360. 
 
Besides the administrative officials, the other institutional role players include the 
Statutory Bodies like the DSC, DLB, LGPAC and Contracts Committee. These 
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bodies undertake their role on behalf of the District Local Government. These 
bodies enhance development, good governance, exemplary leadership, 
transparency and accountability.  
 
The amendment of the LGA in 2006 abolished the Local Government Tender 
Board and replaced it with Local Government Contracts Committee. The LGCC 
comprises senior administrative officers in the District or Urban Council. The 
Contracts Committee is appointed by the CAO/TC as the case may be. Each 
committee has a secretary who should be at the rank of Assistant Chief 
Administrative Officer (ACAO) or Assistant Town Clerk (ATC). In the 
performance of its functions, the LGCC is expected to exhibit impartiality, 
transparency and integrity. It is supposed to act independently without external 
influence especially from political leaders. 
 
In a rural setting like Uganda, Land Management is cardinal. To strengthen the 
decentralisation system, the management of land was also decentralised. Article 
240(1) of the 1995 Constitution provides for the establishment of the DLB in each 
district in Uganda. The DLB is appointed by the District Council upon the 
recommendation of the District Executive Committee (DEC). The DLB according 
to 241(1) of the Constitution performs the following:  
• Holds and allocates land in the district, which is not owned by any person or 
authority. 
• Facilitates the registration and transfer of interests in land. 
• Causes surveys, plans, maps, drawings and estimates to be made by or 
through its officers or agents. 
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• Compiles and maintains a list of rates of compensation payable in respect of 
crops, buildings of non-permanent nature and any other thing that may be 
prescribed. 
• Reviews every year the list of rates of compensation referred to in the 
paragraph above. 
• Deals with any matter, which is incidental or connected to the foregoing.  
 
The operation of the statutory boards under decentralisation in Uganda is 
illustrated on page 361. 
 
From the above it can be deduced that the four pillars of decentralisation, namely, 
legal, political, fiscal and administrative decentralisation manifest an ideal 
decentralised structure if well implemented. Such a structure clearly defines the 
roles of the various role players, especially the interaction between the elected 
leaders and administrative officials subsequently eliminating role conflict and 
hence, creating a conducive environment for development. 
 
While the political wing of the council makes political accountability to the service 
users who are their electorate and hence determine their mandate, the 
administrative wing of the Local Government Council is accountable to both the 
political wing and the service users. This makes decentralised governance 
responsive to the grassroots rather than to the Central Government. When these 
two wings network with the statutory boards, standing committees and the various 
Directorates they enhance efficiency, effectiveness, which together lead to 
development.  This is illustrated by an ideal structure of the Local Government 
Council at District level on page 362. 
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3.2 Overview of decentralised Education and Health services delivery  
          in          Uganda 
 
This section of the chapter will analyse the Education and Health Sectors as 
decentralised functions of Local Governments in Uganda. An effort will be made 
to analyse the legal, institutional and operational arrangements of the two service 
sectors. This analysis is pertinent because the two service sectors are used as case 
studies in determining whether or not decentralisation enhances development. 
 
3.2.1. Education sector 
 
The Education policy in Uganda caters for both primary and post primary 
education sectors. The policy on Universal Primary Education (UPE) is to ensure 
access to education for all irrespective of ones’ gender, disability and 
categorisation. Effective 2007, the Government of Uganda will introduce Universal 
Secondary Education (USE).     
 
Under the Second Schedule part 2, paragraph 1 of the LGA, 1997 the District 
Councils are responsible for the provision of Education services, which cover 
nursery, primary, secondary, trade, special, and technical education. Part 4 of the 
same Schedule, devolves nursery and primary education to the Lower Local 
Governments. 
 
In addition to the LGA, other laws that pertain to the education sector are the 
Education Act and Education Service Act, 2002. The Education Act provides for 
the development and regulation of education, the registration and licensing of 
teachers in public schools and related matters. 
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The Act recognises the District Education Committee which is a standing 
committee appointed by the council under the LGA, 1997. Section 4 of the 
Education Act, makes this committee responsible for the administration of all 
educational services transferred to the District or Urban Councils.   
 
The Education Service Act sets out the roles and responsibilities of the Education 
Service Commission established under Article 167 and 168 of the 1995 
Constitution. The functions of the ESC include, monitoring, offering technical 
advice, support and training to the DSC and to hear grievances from persons 
appointed by the DSC to offer services to the Education Sector in the Local 
Governments (Section 8(1)(h)-(i), ESA, 2002).  
 
Although Secondary Education is decentralised according to the LGA, 1997, the 
practice is that the Ministry of Education and Sports (MoES) has, save for the 
decentralisation of the payroll, retained the management of Secondary Education at 
the Centre. Subsequently, the Central Government appoints secondary school 
teachers, promotes and reprimands them, approves the boards of governors and 
even procurement is managed by the centre and as such, even accountability is 
rendered to the centre.  
 
This is indeed inconsistent with the LGA, 1997 and the spirit of decentralisation. 
This is largely due to selfish motives and not to promote efficiency as the Central 
Government Officials claim. The centre only fears to lose influence and resources 
if they let go the delivery of the Education services in totality (Bidandi, 2002: 17). 
 
The current education system in Uganda is based on the Kajubi Report of 1987. 
According to this Report, education plays a key role in achieving moral, 
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intellectual, ideological, cultural and social development of the people in society. 
Despite this importance, the capacity of education has been seriously eroded at all 
levels due to depredations of wars, civil strife and consequent economic decline.  
Following the recommendations of the Kajubi Commission on Education, UPE 
was introduced in 1997. UPE is the provision of basic education (primary) to all 
Ugandan children of school-going age. This programme guarantees accessibility, 
equity, quality, relevance and affordability (Makubuya, 2000:14). 
 
To achieve the above goals, UPE was identified as a key sector to benefit from the 
Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP); hence, since 1997, the Poverty Action 
Fund (PAF) releases have always included the UPE Capitation Grant. The grant is 
aimed at improving equitable access to basic education by removing the burden of 
paying school fees from the parents. 
 
PAF releases to schools are supposed to enhance the quality of primary education 
by providing schools with resources necessary to run the schools. The UPE grant is 
channeled to the Local Governments as a Conditional Grant since education is one 
of the decentralised services. The District/Urban authorities are required to design 
UPE work plans, which they submit to the MoES for analysis and approval. 
Therefore, UPE releases are linked to the District work plans and annual estimates 
(budgets) (Education Work Plan, 2002: 113).  
 
In designing these work plans, Lower Local Governments like sub-counties, town 
councils and division councils are directly involved. The UPE grants cater for extra 
instructional materials like supplementary books (readers), teachers’ reference 
books, syllabi, ball point pens, markers, chalks, chalkboards, management of 
school related items like registers, record books, wall clocks, stapling machines, 
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file covers, ledger books, vote books, banking books and administrative imprest 
(Bitamazire, 2004: 14). 
 
The CAO/TC is responsible for the safe management of UPE funds. The financial 
and accounting procedure for UPE complies with regulations laid down by the 
relevant authorities for Government financial transactions generally (PFA, 1964, 
TAI, LGF&AR, 1998). The District/Urban authorities have to carry out 
supervision and monitoring visits to the schools to assess value for money and 
compliance with expenditure guidelines and financial accountability (GoU, MoES, 
2002: 91).  
 
The introduction of UPE in 1997 led to an increase in enrolments from three 
million to eight million pupils by the year 2006. As a result, the available number 
of teachers and classrooms could not cater for the large numbers. To manage the 
UPE numbers, the number of teachers had to increase from 81.564 in 1997 to 
168.493 in 2006. This increased the ratio of teacher to pupils to stand at 1:55. The 
increase in the number of teachers and pupils inevitably led to the need for 
teachers’ houses and classrooms respectively (Bitamazire, Ministerial Policy 
Statement, 2006).  
 
The above scenario warranted the launching of the Schools Facilities Grant (SFG), 
which helped in increasing the number of classrooms from 25.678 to 97.409 by 
2006. In addition to classrooms, the SFG programme has also helped in the 
construction of teachers’ houses, kitchens, pit latrines/toilets and provision of 
furniture for both the offices and learners’ desks. 
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All SFG constructions in the country are standardised by having specifications for 
construction designed by the Ministry responsible for Housing of the Government 
of Uganda. Therefore, bills of quantities and drawings are supplied by the MoES 
with special consideration for people with disabilities, which the contractors are 
obliged to comply (Education Sector Investment Plan, 2005:14).  
 
The Education Sector Investment Plan (ESIP) was launched to achieve efficiency 
and effectiveness in the delivery of the education services as a decentralised 
function. ESIP helps in the proper division of functions and responsibilities among 
stakeholders. Subsequently, the MoES has retained the role of developing, 
improving and adjusting education policy through wide stakeholder decisions, 
ensure that policy decisions are communicated to all stakeholders, monitor the 
effectiveness of the education system, to ensure the best value for money and, to 
support the decentralisation levels in all aspects of education management and 
capacity building. 
 
The Central Government is therefore still responsible for developing curriculum 
nationally and for setting the required standards through the Education Standards 
Agency (ESA). Under decentralisation, the Local Governments have retained the 
duty of Education Planning, School Management and teacher management. 
Efficiency and effectiveness are the major goals of decentralisation of education 
services delivery. To achieve this, the education service sector is structured as 
illustrated on page 363. 
 
According to this structure, the management of the education sector under the 
decentralised system is headed by the District Head of Education (DHE) who is at 
the rank of the Director of Education or Senior Education Officer with a minimum 
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academic qualification of a Masters degree of Educational Management. Below the 
Education Head are two sections of Administration and Inspectorate, both under 
Senior Education Officers. The administration section handles the management of 
education in general including the appointment of SMCs, deployment of teachers, 
monitoring and supervising of payment of salaries, while the Inspectorate ensures 
quality under ESA, through inspection, refresher courses, in-service training, and 
workshops among others.  
 
Besides the two sections, an Education Officer is appointed for each county who 
undertakes administration. There is also a Sports Officer to manage sports 
activities like games and sports. The Education sector in Uganda attaches a lot of 
importance to learners with disabilities. Therefore, an Education Officer in charge 
of Special Needs Education is also appointed within the hierarchy. Each county has 
an Inspector of Schools for the purposes of closer supervision.  
 
The actual delivery of the service is then undertaken by the SMCs, which are 
constituted by the Local Governments for each school. The SMCs plan for the 
schools, supervise the head teachers and teachers, enforce ethical behaviour and 
mobilise parents. This makes education service delivery grassroots based and 
participatory (Bitamazire, 2005: 17).  
 
3.2.2. Health sector 
 
The Uganda National Health Policy (NHP), 1999 and the Health Sector Strategic 
Plan (HSSP), 2000 are directed at accelerating the improvement of the health of 
the population thereby contributing to poverty eradication and economic and social 
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development in Uganda. The purpose is to reduce mobility and morbidity from the 
major causes of health. 
 
The HSSP has a five-programme output, namely: 
• The Uganda National Minimum Health Package (UNMHP). 
• The Health Care Delivery System (HCDS). 
• The Integrated Support System, necessary for the successful delivery of the 
Minimum Health Care Package. 
• Policy. 
• Planning and Information Systems. 
 
The key organisational reform for delivery of the HSSP is the Health Sub-District 
(HSD), which is an integral part of the District Health System. The HSD 
decentralises health service delivery further down wards to the village level, which 
is now the principal level for the health service delivery. The HSD constitutes a 
near self contained service zone that brings basic health care, including essential 
referral services closer to the community.  
 
In this management, the District has a major hospital(s) and at lower levels, every 
city/constituency has the Health Centre IV that is manned by a medical doctor, 
with a theatre. Below this, there is the Health Centre III, which is situated at the 
sub-county/division. Every parish/ward has the Health Centre II.  
 
As a result of the above arrangements, responsibility for health service delivery 
now predominantly lies with the Health Sub-District. The overall management is 
undertaken by the District Director of Health Services (DDHS). This 
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decentralisation has also helped in community mobilisation as communities and 
families now take greater charge of their own health and health services (HSSP, 
2000: 11).  
 
The NHP and HSSP recognises three categories of Private Health Sub-Sectors, 
namely the: 
• Private Not For Profit (PNFP) sector. 
• Private Health Practitioners (PHP) sector. 
• Traditional and Complementary Medicine Practitioners sector. 
 
Due to their contribution in the health service delivery, the Government of Uganda 
gives each of these sectors subsidies. 
 
To ensure effectiveness and efficiency in the delivery of health services, the 
Government of Uganda provides Primary Health Care (PHC) through PAF releases 
in form of Conditional and Equalisation Grants. A typical structure of Health 
services delivery is illustrated on page 364.  
 
The structure illustrates that there are three major actors in the Health Sector 
delivery namely the Administrative, Political and Service Users (Population). At 
the apex of the hierarchy is the chairperson, secretary for health and the District 
Health Committee (DHC). The administrative wing is headed by the CAO who is 
the head of the administrative officials. While the District Council appoints the 
District Health Committee, the DSC appoints the administrative officials working 
in the Health Sector. The District Chairperson and Secretary for Health provide 
political supervision. Technically, the head of health services in the District is the 
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DDHS and the District Health Management Team (DHMT). These are helped by 
the stratifications at the county IV to village levels. 
 
3.3. Conclusion. 
The fore going chapter has analysed the institutional arrangements under which 
decentralisation in Uganda is operationalised. Special emphasis has been made to 
analyse the pillars of decentralisation in general and the education and health 
sector service delivery as major indicators of development. These have been used 
as case studies to illustrate the relationship between decentralisation and 
development. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
4.0 Introduction 
 
The main objective of this chapter is to outline the various scientific methods and 
techniques employed in order to arrive at empirical findings. The chapter covers 
the research design, study population, sample size, methods of selection, data 
collection, processing and analysis, as well as the study limitations, data 
management and quality control. 
 
In this chapter, not only does the researcher identify the various steps that have 
been adopted in conducting the investigation, but also the logic behind them. In 
this way, the researcher is able to select methods/techniques, which are relevant to 
the study (Kothari, 2001:10). 
 
In this respect, attention will firstly be devoted to the research design. 
 
4.1 Research design 
 
The investigation is based on a qualitative research approach making use of 
descriptive survey and case study techniques. The qualitative research  has been 
chosen because the investigation involves in-depth study of entities that constitute 
decentralisation like the legal, political, fiscal and administrative aspects, which are 
features of all Local Governments in Uganda (Santosh, 2001: 24). 
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With qualitative studies, only small samples of individuals, groups or events are 
invariably chosen, in view of the in-depth nature of the study. In such studies, one 
cannot engage in intensive examination of all the factors, as it would entail huge 
costs and energy expenditure. For the above reason, qualitative studies use small 
samples (Wilkinson, 2002: 98; Sekaran, 2003: 269).  
 
Although qualitative methods are dominant in this study, some quantitative 
methodology has been applied through the use of a structured questionnaire 
administered to key role players involved in decentralised local governance in the 
two selected districts. Owalabi (2004: 26) asserts that an important technique to 
strengthen the reliability and validity of a research design is by combining 
qualitative and quantitative methodologies through triangulation, which is 
characterised by the use of multiple methods of sampling, research instruments, 
and statistical analyses.  
 
The investigation involves the following qualitative techniques: Interviews, Focus 
Group Discussions, Case Studies, and Field Studies. Welmen and Kruger (2004: 
182-183) state that field studies are important because they aim at discovering the 
relations and interactions among sociological variables in real social structures. 
This makes the investigation more realistic because it is on the spot under natural 
circumstances of the specific case. 
 
A case study design is employed because this investigation focuses on analysing a 
limited number of units (districts) and social service sectors. Therefore, with a case 
study approach, the investigator directs all efforts to the uniqueness of the 
particular case in all its complexity in order to justify generalisation. In this case, 
Local Governments are established under the same legal framework, with the same 
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structures and therefore a critical and in-depth investigation of Local Governments 
in one or two districts can empirically represent the rest without distorting the 
reliability of the findings (Okum, 2001: 149).  
 
Case studies involve in-depth, contextual analysis of similar situations in other 
organisations, where the nature and definition of the problem happen to be the 
same as experienced in the current situation. Case studies usually provide 
qualitative rather than quantitative data for analysis and interpretation (Sekaran, 
2003: 35). 
 
Odum (1929: 229) and Young (1956: 247), support the use of case study 
methodology by asserting that it is a method which is very popular in qualitative 
analysis because it involves a careful and complete observation of a social unit, be 
that unit a person, family, an institution, a cultural group, or even the entire 
community. It is a method of study that focuses on depth rather than breadth. The 
case study places more emphasis on the full analysis of a limited number of events 
or conditions. Therefore, the object of the case study method is to locate the factors 
that account for the behaviour patterns of the given unit as an integral totality. 
 
The research relies on historical data, current information, practical realities and 
concerns, and personal experience in ascertaining the relationship between 
decentralisation and development. At the practical level, empirical data pertaining 
to decentralisation and how it relates to development is generated from the two 
districts.  
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4.2 Study population 
 
Uganda’s population at the time of this study, based on the Uganda National 
Bureau of Statistics and the 2002 Population Census Report, is approximately 
twenty seven million. This study covers two districts of Sembabule and Masindi 
with a population of about two hundred thousand (200.000) and four hundred and 
twenty thousand (420.000) respectively. 
 
During the Financial Year 2006/07, the District of Masindi was divided to create 
Buliisa District, which had hitherto been a county of Masindi. For the purposes of 
this study, the researcher chose to continue with the mother district whose 
population estimation had subsequently reduced from about six hundred thousand 
(600.000) to about four hundred twenty thousand (420.000). Therefore, a 
population of six hundred twenty thousand (620.000) constituted the total study 
population.  
 
Although Uganda is one of the pioneering countries in Africa in terms of 
decentralisation, the degree of decentralisation measures differs from one Local 
Government to another. In order to obtain a balanced picture, two districts have 
been chosen for this study, namely Masindi and Sembabule. In Masindi, which is 
located in the Mid North West, a large amount of assistance by the donor 
community has been provided and various stakeholders have clarified the working 
relationships with each other reasonably clearly and hence, making it one of the 
success stories of decentralised local governance in Uganda. Other successful such 
districts include Rakai, Mukono, Iganga, Mbarara, among others.  
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Other districts are attempting to follow these pioneering districts. One such 
example is Sembabule, which is in the Central Region. It is one of the districts 
created in 1997 having been carved from the Masaka district. It is characterised by 
conflicts between stakeholders and is therefore not attractive to donor partnerships. 
These problems encountered by Sembabule represent the challenges and risks 
associated with decentralisation endeavours in Uganda, which could occur in other 
districts as well. Sembabule is, therefore, selected as a contrasting case to Masindi 
district.  
 
Although urbanisation cannot be dismissed in Uganda, this study focuses more on 
the rural areas. This does not mean that urban areas are insignificant for the 
purposes of development studies. However, since poverty is largely a rural issue in 
Uganda, where the majorities reside in rural areas and engage in farming in one 
way or another, this choice is deemed justified (Saito, 2003: 15).  
 
The two districts chosen represent interestingly enough, slightly different degrees 
of poverty and development within Uganda. Whereas Masindi out performs the 
National average, Sembabule does not. However, despite the differences, both 
districts were improving in the Human Development Index by 2005 (UNDP, 2005: 
15). Therefore, comparisons of the two districts are useful for analysing the 
similarities and differences of the impact of decentralisation efforts on 
development. Tables 1 and 2 illustrate the District Human Development Profile 
and District Human Poverty Profile respectively, which show the contrast.  
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Table 1 District human development profile  
 
  
 Income  
Index  
Education 
Index  
Life expectancy  
Index  
Human 
Development 
Index  
MASINDI 0.2231 0.69 0.4033 0.3758 
SEMBABULE 0.374 0.505 0.392 0.375 
NATIONAL  
AVERAGE 
0.2098 0.605 0.4323 0.4046 
 
Source: UNDP 2005:15 Uganda Human Development Report, Kampala 
 
Table 2 District Human Poverty Profile 
 
 
 Not expected 
to survive to 
age 40 (%) 
2005 
Illiteracy 
P2 (%) 
2005 
No access to 
safe water 
2005 
No access 
to Health 
services  
(%) 2005 
Under 
weight 
children  
(%) 2005 
Human 
Poverty 
Index (%) 
MASINDI 33.1 38.1 86 55.7 25.9 43.8 
SEMBABULE 37.8 46.9 80.5 55.6 34.4 47.4 
NATIONAL 
AVERAGE  
36.3 38.4 51.5 51 31.8 39.3 
 
Source: UNDP 2005:22, Uganda Human Development Report, Kampala. 
 
The justification for the choice of education and health sectors is mostly due to 
their impact on human development. This is important because human 
development is at the centre of overall development. A healthy and educated 
population is both a necessary condition for development and one of the central 
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objectives of development. In Uganda, households’ economic status is linked with 
their health and educational status as well as their social capital (UNDP, MFPED 
Millennium Development Goals, 2002: 11). In Uganda, households continue to 
consider ill health and ignorance as the major causes of poverty. So the 
achievement of human development is central to the reduction of poverty and 
subsequently the enhancement of development. To theses two social services are 
added water, sanitation and nutrition.  
 
The status of health and education also affects the overall rate of economic growth 
and development. The UNDP Report on Human Development, (2003: 9) states that 
there is a dramatic impact of health on economic development and growth. The 
report indicates that more than half of Africa’s growth shortfall vis-à-vis that of 
East Asia is explained in terms of disease burden, demography and geography, 
rather than by the more traditional macroeconomic variables.  
 
Recent studies have found a powerful impact of malaria and AIDS on per capita 
income. Similarly, the same studies have also found evidence that education 
influences the growth rate of a country. Both health and education also have a 
direct influence on the pattern of employment be it wage employment or self-
employment (MFPED, PEAP, 2005/8: 142).  
 
Investment in education and health contributes to the accumulation of human 
capital, which is essential for higher incomes and sustained economic growth. 
Evidence in Uganda shows that education is a profitable investment, from both an 
individual and social perspective. Non-income returns are also significant, parental 
education is a powerful factor in child survival, and education above the primary 
level is associated with lower fertility. Educated women are also much more likely 
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to receive antenatal care and have deliveries attended by health professionals. 
Education also plays a critical role in strengthening civil institutions and building 
democratic society, empowering women and other disadvantaged groups, as well 
as protecting the environment (MFPED, PEAP, 2005/8: 153-155). 
 
With the introduction of UPE in 1997, enrolment of pupils rose up to about eight 
million by 2006 academic year. Given that Uganda’s population is about twenty 
seven million, this enrolment constitutes a large fraction of the country’s 
population. Articles 30 and 34(2) of the 1995 Constitution provide for the right to 
basic education for every Ugandan. Subsequently, Universalising Primary 
Education is Governments’ chief priority and is therefore central to the Education 
Strategic Investment Plan (ESIP, 2005: 43).  
 
Given that every home in Uganda benefits from either or both the education and 
health service sectors, then the two have the greatest influence on the socio-
economic life of the ordinary population in the rural setting. Therefore, public 
expenditure on education and health by Government is expenditure in the line of 
development of a nation. 
 
Public subsidy to education and health is justified by externalities of market 
failure. For instance, young people cannot finance education even if the economic 
return to it is high. By educating people, the state endows them with a permanent 
and inalienable asset; and the provision of basic education allows this asset to be 
broadly spread across society.  
 
Just as good health is essential in enhancing development, the reverse is equally 
true. Therefore, given that the burden of disease has remained high, is in itself a 
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justification for considering health as a case study for development in Uganda. In 
2004, over 75 per cent of the life years lost was due to premature deaths mainly 
due to preventable diseases. Prenatal and maternal conditions, malaria, acute 
respiratory tract infections, AIDS, and diarrhea together accounted for over 60 per 
cent of the total national death burden. Uganda is also experiencing an increase in 
the occurrence of non-communicable diseases such as hypertension, diabetes, 
cancer, mental illness and chronic heart disease (UPPAP, 2005: 20). 
 
The foregoing exposition, therefore, justifies the choice of education and health as 
social sectors to be used in establishing the relationship between decentralisation 
and development in Uganda. 
 
4.3. Sample size 
 
This study involves 960 respondents, 660 of them are individual respondents to the 
survey questionnaire, while the remaining 300 are focus group discussants. Among 
the individual respondents, there are 100 teaching staff, 100 medical staff, 100 
elected leaders, 60 administrative officials, 60 members of the commissions and 
boards (30 from each district), 200 service users (100 for each of the two service 
areas), and 40 non-governmental organisation representatives (20 from each 
district).  
In addition to the individual respondents, twenty (20) Focus Group Discussions 
(FGDs) were conducted in which relevant guided topics were presented and 
discussed by carefully selected participants. Each of the FGDs comprises fifteen 
(15) participants selected particularly due to their speciality, these being mainly 
professionals with expert knowledge that are able to analyse the topics in-depth.  
 
Comment [h11]: Indicate spread 
across the two districts as you have done 
for the last few categories below.
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The Focus Group Discussions as a technique of investigation were generally 
selected because of the advantages associated with it. Members are purposively 
chosen on the basis of their experience/expertise on the topic on which information 
is sought. For the purpose of this investigation, the FGDs comprise such people as 
Education Officers, Inspectors of schools, Head Teachers, Health Inspectors, 
Medical Superintendents, nurses, CAOs, CFOs, TCs, among others. 
 
FGDs are sessions aimed at obtaining respondents’ impressions, interpretations 
and opinions. This provides the opportunity for a flexible, free-flowing format for 
the members. The unstructured and spontaneous responses reflect the genuine 
opinions, ideas and feelings of the members about the topic. FGDs are relatively 
inexpensive and can provide fairly dependable data within a short-time frame. It 
also provides valuable qualitative information (Sekaran, 2003: 220; Welman & 
Kruger, 2004: 188). 
 
The sampling procedure applied in this investigation is non-probability sampling, 
which does not afford any basis of estimating the probability of each item in the 
population. Non-probability sampling is also known as deliberate, purposive and 
judgment sampling. In this type of sampling, items for the sample are selected 
deliberately by the researcher. In other words, the researcher purposively chooses 
the particular units of the universe, which constitute a sample on the basis of which 
a small mass so selected out of the total population will be typical or representative 
of the whole. Therefore, in non-probability sampling design, the elements in the 
population do not have any probability attached to their being chosen as sample 
subjects (Kothari, 2001: 73). 
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Purposive sampling entails obtaining information from specific target groups. This 
type of sampling confines itself to specific types of respondents who can provide 
the desired information. In other words, it involves choosing subjects who are most 
advantageously placed or in the best position to provide the information required 
(Sekaran, 2003: 277). This author further argues that qualitative studies also allow 
small samples of individuals, groups or events to be invariably chosen, in view of 
the in-depth nature of the study.  
 
Mouton (2001:64) supports this argument by asserting that the desired sample size 
does not depend on the size of the study population only but also on the variance 
(heterogeneity) of the variable. As a general rule, the larger the variance of the 
variable, the larger the sample required. Therefore, in subjects that are relatively 
homogeneous, a relatively smaller sample may be sufficient. Since decentralised 
systems of governance in Ugandan districts are relatively homogeneous, a sample 
size of nine hundred sixty (960) is considered sufficient to generate reliable 
information (data). 
 
In addition to the non-probability sampling design, the case study approach entails 
that a limited number of units are analysed which makes the survey well 
demarcated and specific. The uniqueness of the survey dictates the quality and 
quantity of the interviewees. The use of triangulation in this study also enables an 
intensive examination of the small sample of the items, as it is easy to corroborate 
findings from the different instruments like interviews, questionnaires, in-depth 
probing, and FGDs. This greatly helps to reduce bias and errors and thereby 
ensuring that the research findings are reliable (Welman & Kruger, 2004: 183-
184).  
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Therefore, the above techniques justify the selection of the sample size of 960 
respondents from the two districts, since the research findings generated using 
these qualititative techniques would be authentic and valid.  
 
4.4 . Sample selection 
 
This study involves objective (structural) as well as subjective (attitudinal) aspects. 
The structural research instruments require respondents to respond to questions 
that need testing, such as whether the objectives of decentralisation are being 
achieved like empowerment, accountability and democracy among others. On the 
other hand, attitudinal aspects require respondents to make their own judgment 
without structured questions but just guiding ones. In this case, room is left for 
respondents to express their opinion as regards decentralisation and development. 
 
As a result, the study analyses the policy performance in terms of objectives in 
relation to realities at the grassroots level and also the participatory implications. 
To achieve this, specific respondents/participants are selected and involved in this 
study that include elected leaders, administrative officials, members of district 
commissions, non-governmental organisations, the private sector, and individual 
citizens.  
 
The elected leaders are selected because they are the policy makers, they design the 
development plans, appoint statutory boards (commissions), appoint School 
Management Committees, approve Local Government estimates/budgets. 
Therefore, their decentralised functions influence the quality and quantity of 
services delivered, hence, their participation impacts either negatively or positively 
on development. 
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The administrative officials like the CAO, CFO, DEO, DDHS, nurses, and teachers 
among others are the implementers of Government programmes. The CAO is the 
Accounting Officer of the District Local Government; he/she is the head of all 
administrative officials in the district. The CFO is the Chief Accountant of the 
Local Government, the DDHS and DEO are the heads of the health and education 
sectors respectively. The administrative officials do not only implement 
programmes but also inspect, evaluate them to ensure compliance to set standards. 
They also initiate/formulate policies for standing committees and councils to 
approve. In this way, these officials control quality, guarantee value for money 
before payments are made, and therefore determine the quality and quantity of 
services delivered. 
 
Members of the commissions like the DSC are selected because they recruit, 
appoint, discipline, promote and confirm all administrative officials apart from the 
CAO and TC in the civil service of the Local Governments. Given that human 
capital is pertinent to service delivery, the quality of personnel appointed largely 
depends on the integrity and competence of the DSC. 
 
The administrative officials further impact on service delivery because they have 
replaced the Local Government Tender Boards. Instead of the LGTB, Contracts 
Committees are comprised by administrative officials. The CAO/TC appoints 
senior civil servants to constitute it. The Contracts Committee awards tenders for 
the provision of goods and services. This Committee appropriates Local 
Government revenues and therefore impacts on service delivery and the resultant 
development. 
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Representatives from Non-Governmental Organisations and the Private Sector are 
selected because they participate in the empowerment of the peasantry through 
advocacy, capacity building, micro-financing, and most importantly play a leading 
role in the fight against AIDS. The NGOs therefore complement government 
efforts in enhancing development. 
 
Service users are selected because they are the beneficiaries of the services 
delivered. Their satisfaction has to be investigated in order to ascertain how the 
services impact on the population in terms of development.  
 
The Focus Group Discussants are carefully selected because of their specialisation 
and experience. The investigator has to rely on these FGD participants to elicit 
technical information, which enriches the data gathered from questionnaires and 
interview schedules. These are mainly medical/ health and education practitioners 
who manage the two service areas regularly in the two districts. 
 
4.5 . Data collection 
 
In this investigation, the researcher enlists the services of two research assistants 
who have to undergo training for one week before going on a pilot scheme by 
collecting data from the field. This pre-testing of the interview schedules and 
questionnaires helps the researcher to determine the competence of the research 
assistants, as well as the validity and reliability of the research instruments.  
 
The research assistants have to interview ten service users, ten elected officials, 
and ten administrative officials for the pilot project. After the operationalisation of 
the research instruments, they are then circulated among a few research workers 
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for critical review with regard to the wording, format, sequence of questions, and 
where necessary to redraft in light of their comments. Interview schedules are 
originally in English, but some could be translated in vernacular depending on the 
locality. 
 
The research assistants then collect data from respondents and key informants 
through face-to-face interviews using structured interview schedules. This is the 
most important tool; therefore, it has to be carefully presented in person. The 
research assistants carefully administer the questions and record the responses. A 
tape recorder is used with the consent of the participants, especially during the 
FGDs and face-to-face interviews.  
 
Structured questionnaires are also used. These are dispatched to respondents who 
are able to read and write. The researcher follows up with in-depth probing of 
principal respondents like the CAO, CFO, DEO and DDHS. This helps in 
generating detailed information regarding the performance of decentralisation.  
 
4.6 . Research instruments and procedures 
 
The research instruments include interviews, questionnaires, Focus Group 
Discussions, and the secondary sources constituting the literature review.  
 
4.6.1. Interviews  
 
To generate data from respondents, a structured interview schedule is administered 
as the primary research instrument. This is preferred because as the respondents 
express their views, the researcher notes down the responses. Depending on the 
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exigencies of the situation, the researcher takes a lead from a respondent’s answer 
and, where relevant, asks other questions not on the interview schedule. In this 
process, new factors are identified, resulting in a deeper understanding. Therefore, 
this method allows for greater flexibility because it enables the interviewer to 
restructure questions and repeat them since it is face-to-face (Kothari, 2005:97-99, 
Thakur, 1998:95, Wilkinson, 2002:201-206, Young, 2001:222, Kumar, 1997:56). 
Furthermore, the same questions are administered to every respondent in the same 
manner to ensure the findings are comparable. 
 
The interview schedule is developed by the researcher in such a way that it caters 
for the study objectives and the research problem. It is mainly useful among 
illiterate respondents, especially the service users.  
 
4.6.2. Questionnaires 
 
Questionnaires are administered to mainly service providers like elected leaders, 
administrative officials, and members of statutory boards, NGOs, the private 
sector, but also to literate service users. The researcher uses the selection type of 
questions, which mainly involves multiple choice because, as Thanulington (2003: 
93) states, multiple-choice questions are more convenient and less bothersome to 
both researchers and respondents.  
 
This method of data collection is adopted given that this inquiry involves a large 
number of respondents who cannot be interviewed face-to-face. In this method, 
questionnaires are sent to respondents that are purposively selected. They answer 
the questions and return the questionnaires to the researcher. The questionnaire 
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consists of a number of questions printed using the likert-type scale on a set of 
forms. 
 
The method is cost effective when the universe is large and widely spread 
geographically, it is free from the bias of the interviewer, responses are in the 
respondent’s own words, respondents have adequate time to give well thought-out 
answers, respondents who are not easily approachable can be reached 
conveniently, and large samples can be made use of and thus the results are more 
dependable and reliable (Kothari, 2005: 100-101; Santosh, 2001: 141; Sekaran, 
2003: 236-237; Kumur, 1997: 57; Young, 2001: 222; Wilkinson, 2002: 213-218). 
 
Summated scales/Likert-type scales are selected and used because they are 
relatively easy to construct and they are more reliable because respondents answer 
each statement, hence providing more information. Each statement is given an 
empirical test for discriminating ability. These items are easy to score because each 
response is given a numerical score, indicating its favourableness or 
unfavourableness, and the scores are totalled to measure the respondent’s attitude.  
 
4.6.3. Focus Group Discussions 
 
This study involves twenty Focus Group Discussions spread equally between the 
two districts and service sectors. According to Sekaran, (2003:220), the focus 
group sessions aim at tapping respondents’ impressions, interpretations and 
opinions. The moderator plays a vital role in steering the discussions as he/she 
draws out information and keeps members on track.  
These discussions are conducted at the District Headquarters and at the Lower 
Local Governments especially at the sub-county level. The participants in these 
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sessions include elected leaders, administrative officials, representatives of NGOs 
and civil society organisations, and service users. During these sessions, the 
researcher and/or the research assistants are the moderators. The moderators record 
the proceedings verbatim. With the consent of the participants, a tape recorder is 
used.  
 
During the FGD the researcher tries as much as possible not to deviate from the 
questions contained in the interview schedules and questionnaires. This is to 
prevent collecting data that is not comparable (Welman & Kruger, 2004: 187). 
While this is done, sufficient room is left for participants to purposively deviate in 
order to experience the life-world of the group members.  
 
During these sessions, the researcher/moderator uses the format suggested by 
Welman and Kruger (2004:187). The moderator introduces the topic to the group, 
rules are set like one person speaks at a time, each participant introduces oneself 
and makes an opening statement regarding his/her experience on the topic, and the 
moderator then guides the discussion by asking questions. The sessions end with 
each participant (in turn) giving a final statement. The data collected is analysed 
and used for the purpose of triangulation by corroborating it with data from other 
sources (instruments) such as the structured questionnaires and face-to-face 
interviews.  
 
4.6.4. Secondary sources 
 
Sekaran (2003: 58) defines secondary data as data that already exists and does not 
have to be collected by the researcher. Some secondary data sources are statistical 
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bulletins, government publications, published and unpublished academic papers, 
textbooks, online data, websites and the Internet.  
 
The advantage of seeking secondary data sources in this study has been because it 
is time saving and cost effective. In using the data, the researcher has to scrutinise 
it first to avoid unsuitable and inadequate data in the context of the research 
problem and objectives. Bowley (1937:18) supports this by aptly observing that it 
is never safe to take published statistics at their face value without knowing their 
meaning and limitations. 
In using the secondary data, the researcher has heeded Kothari’s (2005:111) 
caution. He asserts that the researcher, before using secondary data should see that 
they are characterised by reliability, suitability and adequacy. Subsequently, the 
researcher has had to ensure reliability by analysing such questions as to who 
collected the data, what were the sources of data, were proper data collection 
methods used, at what time were they collected and with which level of accuracy. 
Suitability of the data is analysed by scrutinising the definition of the various terms 
and units of collection used at the time of collecting the data from the primary 
source. The object, scope and nature of the original enquiry have also been 
scrutinised. 
 
Adequacy of the data, which is the level of accuracy achieved in data has also been 
analysed. Therefore, in using the secondary data, the researcher has only 
considered data that is reliable, suitable and adequate. This creates a wealth of 
usable information, which the researcher uses to build a firm foundation for the 
theoretical framework against which primary data is analysed in the subsequent 
chapters. 
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Just as Thanulington (2003:81) states, the researcher finds the use of secondary 
data economical, ensures validity and reliability, and establishes mislinks between 
primary and secondary data. These gaps constitute the area of investigation in this 
study.  
 
4.6.5. Data processing and analysis 
 
Technically, data processing implies editing, coding, classification and tabulation 
of collected data so that they are amenable to analysis (Kothari, (2005: 122). Data 
editing requires that the researcher will edit the data by examining the collected 
raw data to detect errors and omissions. Therefore, the researcher will undertake a 
careful scrutiny of the completed questionnaires and/or schedules. Editing will help 
to ensure that the data are accurate, consistent with other facts gathered, uniformly 
entered, and are well arranged to facilitate coding and tabulation. Editing will be 
done both in the field and centrally.  
 
Field editing will involve the investigator reviewing the reporting forms for 
completing (translating or rewriting) what the investigator has written in 
abbreviation and/or in illegible form at the time of recording the respondents’ 
responses. This type of editing according to Sekaran (2003: 254) is necessary in 
view of the fact that individual writing styles often can be difficult for others to 
decipher. This sort of editing will be done as soon as possible after the interview; 
preferably on the same day to avoid guessing later what the informant could have 
said. Central editing will take place when all questionnaires or interview schedules 
have been completed and returned to the central collection centre/office. The 
editor(s) here will only correct the obvious errors such as entry in the wrong place 
like entry recorded in months when it should have been recorded in weeks. 
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Coding refers to the process of assigning numerals or other symbols to answers so 
that responses can be put into a limited number of categories or classes. The 
researcher will ensure exhaustiveness and mutual exclusiveness (a specific answer 
is placed in only one one cell in a given category set). Coding will be necessary for 
the efficient analysis, as several replies will be reduced to a small number of 
classes, which contain critical information required for analysis.  
 
Classification will take place after the data has been edited and coded. 
Classification will involve arranging data into sequences and groups according to 
their common characteristics or separating data into different but related parts 
(Santosh, 2001: 154-156). As regards this study, data will be classified according 
to the sample selection like elected leaders, administrative officials, service users, 
and others. Classification in this study will help to present the facts in a simple 
form, to clearly bring out points of similarity and dissimilarity, facilitate 
comparison, and highlight relationships. This will facilitate presenting a mental 
picture which, in turn, will enable tabulation.  
 
Tabulation is the process of summarising raw data and displaying the same in 
compact form (in the form of statistical tables) for further analysis. This will be 
done by orderly arranging data in columns and rows. Tabulation will be done 
manually and using electronic devices. Manual tabulation will be preferred in 
analysing results from the FGDs while electronic devices will be used in analysing 
coded data from questionnaires and/or schedules. 
 
Analysis of the data will take place after editing, coding and tabulation. Analysis 
will be both descriptive and inferential (i.e. inferential analysis is often known as 
statistical analysis). The former will be used in the case of FGD results while the 
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latter will be used for the analysis of results from questionnaires and schedules. It 
will be on the basis of inferential analysis that the task of drawing inferences and 
conclusions will be performed. The quantitative data will be analysed using the 
Statistical Package for Social Scientists (SPSS). Triangulation will help qualitative 
and quantitative analysis to yield simultaneous interpretation of results. These will 
be augmented by relevant quotations from respondents, wherever possible and 
relevant. 
 
4.6.6. Data management and quality control 
 
Several measures will be employed to ensure reliability and validity of data and 
ease of its management. In the first instance, the pages of the schedules and 
questionnaires will be firmly fixed using staples and each of these research 
instruments will be accorded a number that will serve to identify it from any other. 
Two separate files will be kept (maintained); one for the original copies and 
another for photocopies/duplicates. The two sets of files will be kept in different 
cabinets so that in the event one gets lost, the other will be used.  
 
The research assistants will be subjected to induction training for one week to 
enable them internalise the study problem, objectives, and subsequently the 
research instruments. The training will include inculcating interview skills like 
listening, probing and recording responses correctly. These skills will make the 
administration of the interviews effective and enhance the reliability and validity of 
the data collected. 
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4.6.7. Study Limitations 
 
Like any other research undertaking, this study is expected to face both practical 
and methodological limitations. Methodological limitations will include the small 
sample of nine hundred sixty (960) respondents out of a study population of over 
six hundred thousand. The practical limitations may include limited funds, time 
and knowledge of computerised statistical analysis packages.  
 
However, the researcher plans to mitigate these limitations by firstly recruiting 
committed and hardworking research assistants who will undergo training on the 
administration of the interview schedules, questionnaires and management of 
respondents. Research ethical issues will constitute part of the training for the 
research assistants. Each research assistant will be offered transport, lunch and a 
token allowance to facilitate work. This amount will not be enough, but adequate 
to ensure a good job is done. Research assistants will be briefed in advance about 
what is expected from them. 
 
Before the final administration of the research instruments, there will be a pre-test 
undertaken on a small sample of about thirty respondents. This will help to reveal 
the likely hindrances or challenges and subsequently, remedial measures will be 
put in place to correct these problems before the investigation takes place. 
 
The researcher and/or research assistants will conduct pre-visits to the respondents 
to make appointments, explain the purpose of the investigation and hence, build 
confidence. This will help in minimising suspicion, which is a likely cause of 
hiding or misrepresenting information by the respondents. 
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To ensure reliability and consistence, the researcher and research assistants will 
meet at the end of every session to edit the data and appraise their performance. 
This formative evaluation will help to reveal deviations and likely problems. The 
researchers will then chart the way forward. 
 
As regards limited computer knowledge, the principal researcher will improve his 
computer knowledge by taking more lessons. In addition, he will seek the 
assistance of computer statistical analysts to help in the application of the SPSS. 
The methodological limitations will be mitigated by the researcher adopting 
appropriate research techniques, which will include the qualitative research design; 
the use of the case study method; and, above all, triangulation of research findings 
will enhance reliability and validity. The case study method will allow for a deep 
and detailed study, which will be comprehensive and representative.  
 
4.6.8. Ethical issues 
 
The researcher will seek permission from relevant authorities like the Chief 
Administrative Officers of Masindi and Sembabule, Town Clerks of Masindi and 
Sembabule Town Councils, sub-county chiefs, Heads of Civil Society 
Organisations and NGOs, among others. Respondents will be given information in 
advance so that permission and appointment is sought to conduct interviews. 
Examples of letters obtained to secure the permission of chief officials to conduct 
the investigation in their districts are presented on pages 362 and 363. Data 
generated will be treated with utmost anonymity and confidentiality. Respondents 
will reserve the right to withhold information or even to withdraw from the process 
although such a scenario will be avoided as much as possible.            
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In the next chapter, the findings generated from the research methods described in 
this chapter will be presented as they pertain to the general performance of 
decentralisation in the Ugandan districts of Masindi and Sembabule. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DECENTRALISATION IN 
UGANDA WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO THE MASINDI 
AND SEMBABULE DISTRICTS 
 
5 0 Introduction 
 
This chapter analyses the general performance of decentralisation in relation to 
service delivery and development in the two selected districts in Uganda. It will 
cover aspects such as the participants in decentralised governance, their 
relationships, the quality of service delivery, the responsiveness and value of the 
services, partnerships with the private sector, and the distribution of benefits under 
decentralised governance. 
 
The findings are generated from the research instruments, namely the 
questionnaires, interview schedules, and focus group discussions. As pointed out in 
the previous chapter, the questionnaire mostly made use of a five-point Likert scale 
to obtain ratings for each of the items. In the discussion of the findings, reference 
will be made to responses to specific items on each of the various aspects relating 
to decentralisation and development. The per centages of respondents who 
“agreed” with a statement represent the sum of responses under the categories 
“strongly agree” and “agree”, while the per centages of respondents who 
“disagreed” with a statement represent the sum of responses under the categories 
“strongly disagree” and “disagree”. Where applicable, the remaining per centage 
represents those respondents who were neutral with respect to the particular 
statement. 
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This chapter is a response to the general objective of the study, which is to analyse 
the performance of decentralisation policy in terms of its effectiveness in the 
delivery of services. The chapter specifically addresses the effectiveness of the 
legal and institutional framework of decentralisation in Uganda. However, before 
focusing on the findings in respect of the performance of decentralisation in 
Uganda, it is first necessary to provide an overview of the biographical profile of 
the respondents. 
 
5.1. Biographical data 
 
The study on the general performance of decentralisation covered all the relevant 
stakeholders, namely the administrative staff, elected officials, service users, 
private sector, and members of the Commissions and Boards of the Local 
Governments in the two districts. 
 
All the targeted nine hundred sixty (960) respondents participated. Out of these, 
four hundred forty five (445) were males and five hundred fifteen (515) were 
females, representing 46.4 and 53.6 percent respectively. The per centage of 
females is higher because it was established that there are more female service 
users especially in respect to the Health and Education service sectors than males. 
Most health centre records revealed that more female service users visited the 
service units to have their children treated or for antenatal care than male service 
users. 
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With regards to the ages of the respondents, the frequency was as indicated in table 
3 below:  
 
Table 3: Age bracket of the respondents 
 
 
Age (in years) Frequency Percentages 
  20 –29 249 25.7 
  30 – 39 276 28.8 
40-49 180 18.8 
50-59 155 16.2 
               60+ 100 10.5 
Total 960 100 
 
Source: Original 
 
Nearly ninety per cent of the respondents were within the age bracket of 20 to 59 
years, which represents the economically active sector of the Ugandan population. 
This is the age bracket when people are analytical about their quality of life and 
therefore value quality service delivery. 
 
The education level of respondents is also significant when making an appraisal of 
government performance, which this chapter is particularly concerned with. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
149
Table 4 The education levels of respondents 
 
 
Education level Frequency  Percentage  
Primary      372     38.8 
Secondary     221     23.0 
Certificate    135     14.1 
Diploma    136     14.1 
Bachelors degree      73       7.6 
Masters degree      21       2.2 
Doctorial degree        2       0.2 
Total    960    100 
 
Source: Original 
 
The table above reveals that over sixty percent (60%) of the respondents had 
attained post primary education. Quite a significant proportion of the respondents 
(38.8%) had at least attended primary level education. This was possible because 
the study used the purposive sampling technique whereby the researcher selected 
segments of the population from which he could generate the required data (basic 
literacy skills was a factor considered when choosing respondents). 
 
Generally, most service users had attained primary and secondary education, and 
service providers were mainly graduates with diplomas and degrees. The elected 
officials had mainly attended secondary education with a few graduates like the 
chairpersons of the two districts. 
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The occupation of the respondents was pertinent in this research due to the 
influence this had on the attitudes of respondents with respect to decentralised 
service delivery. They manifested the following characteristics:  
 
Table 5: Occupation of respondents 
 
 
Occupational category Frequency  Per centage 
Public servant        265     27.6 
Politician       205     21.4 
Private sector       234     24.2 
Peasants       256     26.8 
Total       960     100 
 
Source: Original 
 
Of the respondents, over seventy percent were involved in decentralised service 
delivery related roles. Within the private sector were the business persons who 
were local contractors and service providers who were partners in local 
governance. Therefore, their experience and/or expertise was central in the 
generation of original, authentic and empirical data. It is important to note that the 
respondents represent a fairly equal distribution among administrative officials, 
elected officials, private sector, and service users. 
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5.2. Working definition of decentralisation and development 
 
For respondents to react objectively to research instruments, it is important to 
analyse how they conceptualise the key terms, namely decentralisation and 
development. Therefore, the Focus Group Discussions that were held at the district 
headquarters of Masindi and Sembabule comprising elected leaders at district level 
resulted in agreement on the following working definition of decentralisation.  
   “Decentralisation in Uganda implies a transfer of political and 
administrative authority for enhanced social harmony, growth and 
poverty reduction27”   
 
The administrative officials asserted: 
“Decentralisation is an alternative development approach by 
which government has recognised that highly centralised and 
bureaucratic approaches to planning and implementing public 
sector programmes hindered development28”. 
 
The above definitions by both elected and administrative officials are in line with 
the central objective of decentralisation in Uganda, which underlines the centrality 
of service delivery.  
“Decentralisation reform objectives intend to shift responsibility 
for development from the centre to Local Governments as 
instruments aimed at improving local democracy and enhancing 
the effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of service delivery” 
(Decentralisation Secretariat, 1994:13) 
 
27 Focus group discussion definition for Sembabule elected leaders on 16.11.2006. 
28 Working definition by FGD with administrative officials of Masindi district on 15.11.2006 
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Whereas the above objective was acknowledged by the discussants, the 
chairperson of Sembabule district noted as follows: -  
“The reality is that over the period of implementation, the main 
argument for decentralisation has tended to concentrate on the 
motive for democratic reform as a means of promoting popular 
democracy and has focused less on the economic argument or 
efficiency and effectiveness of service delivery29”. 
 
The concept development was construed by the elected and administrative officials 
to refer to decentralised service delivery by which a stream of benefits to recipient 
communities would improve their socio-economic welfare and eventually liberate 
them from pervasive poverty. Therefore, development to them means increase in 
quantity and quality of service delivery. 
 
An old woman in Kimengo sub-county of Masindi district understood development 
to mean: -  
“All that we understand by development in the rural setting is having 
health services, good roads, schools, water and security30”. 
 
Having conceptualised the two terms, a critical analysis of decentralised service 
delivery will follow with specific reference to quantity, quality, accessibility, 
human resources, and fiscal decentralisation. Therefore, the next sector will be 
categorised into three broad sections focusing on the performance of 
decentralisation in Uganda. 
 
 
29 Interview with Sentongo on 16.11.2006. 
30 Statement by Birungi on 21.11.2006. 
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Firstly, the institutional framework and relationships between stakeholder groups 
(administrative officials, private sector, elected officials and service users), will 
receive attention with emphasis on the manner they have impacted on or 
influenced service delivery. Secondly, the achievements of decentralisation in 
Uganda will be assessed with specific reference to the quantitative and qualitative 
aspects of service delivery. Thirdly, the challenges associated with decentralisation 
will be discussed. 
 
5.3. Institutional structures for decentralised service delivery 
 
The institutional structures for decentralised service delivery was mainly analysed 
by focus group discussants. Discussants noted that a number of institutional 
structures existed that facilitate the delivery of services to recipient communities. 
During the Focus Group Discussion session held at the Kigumba sub-county of 
Masindi district, the Central Government Line Ministries, Local Governments and 
the Private Sector were identified as the major structures for service delivery under 
the decentralised governance. 
 
5.3.1. Central Government Line Ministries 
 
The discussants at the FGD comprising elected leaders and administrative officials 
at Sembabule district headquarters noted that the Central Government Line 
Ministries had retained the responsibility of ensuring the implementation of 
national policies and adherence to performance standards on the part of Local 
Governments. A Local Council III Chairperson of Lugusulu sub-county of the 
Sembabule district observed as follows:  
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“Although the role of the line ministries was to inspect, monitor 
and where necessary offer technical advice, many Central 
Government Ministries continued to undertake direct roles in 
decentralised service delivery31. 
 
To substantiate the above claim, he quoted the case where the Ministry of Water 
had awarded tenders for the construction of water tanks without involving the local 
leadership in the district of Sembabule. 
 
A similar scenario was quoted during the FGD held at the Masindi district 
headquarters where Zimwe Contractors were awarded to construct water dams 
without the involvement of the Masindi local leadership. This contradicts the spirit 
and objectives of decentralisation, that is, the transfer of authority by devolution 
for the purposes of political, administrative and financial management from the 
Central Government to the Local Governments, including procurement of goods 
and services. 
 
5.3.2. Local Governments 
 
Members of the discussion panels at the district level in both districts agreed with 
the LGA, 1997, when they asserted that Local Government Councils are organs of 
Local Government that are closest to the people. They also concurred that by 
exercising executive and legislative authority, the elected Local Government 
Councils were responsible for effective service delivery, as well as the promotion 
of economic and social development within their areas of jurisdiction. 
 
 
31 Focus group discussion held on 12.11.2006 at Sembabule District headquarters. 
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When asked to identify such services, the FGDs in both Masindi and Sembabule 
outlined education services (covering nursery, primary, secondary, trade, special 
and technical education), primary health care services, water services, construction, 
rehabilitation and maintenance of roads as not falling under the responsibility of 
the Central Government. 
 
In both districts, it was a common feature that technical departments existed and 
were coordinated by the Technical Planning Committee (TPC). These technical 
departments implemented council’s policies and programmes under the guidance 
of the executive committee of council and the supervision of the Chief 
Administrative Officer (CAO). 
 
The CAO of Sembabule district expressed that this institutional arrangement was 
replicated at Lower Local Government levels, which served as entry points for 
development programmes, even by NGOs and/or CSOs. However, during a FGD 
with the elected leaders of Matete sub-county of the Sembabule district, the 
councillors complained that although they participated in planning and identifying 
programmes, the District Local Government often ended up changing their 
proposals. Hence, it was not always the aspirations of the local communities that 
were eventually reflected in the development plan. This contradiction undermines 
one of the advantages of decentralisation of having tailor – made solutions to 
location specific problems.  
 
However, out of 200 service users interviewed, 80 percent acknowledged that the 
service coverage of NGOs spanned beyond conventional service areas like health 
and education to include advocacy and oversight of Local Governments. FGDs 
with administrative officials in both Masindi and Sembabule underlined the 
  
156
increasing role of CSOs in the policy formulation, planning and implementation. 
This had enhanced policy responsiveness to the needs and rights of the poor 
people. 
 
The same service users indicated by an overwhelming 82 percent who said they 
felt more secure under the care of NGOs and CSOs than of the administrative 
officials. They revealed that government workers (administrative officials) were 
more arrogant, egocentric and therefore less responsive to local poverty conditions. 
 
5.3.3. Private Sector 
 
The introduction of decentralisation as a policy was accompanied by the 
liberalisation of the economy. This led to partnership between Government and the 
private sector in the provision of services. Subsequently, the involvement of the 
private sector has increasingly gained currency as an effective strategy in the 
decentralised service delivery. 
 
During the in-depth probing of District Directors (heads of department) in Masindi 
district, they asserted that the private sector was working with Local Governments 
as contractors/suppliers in works, goods or services, operators of Local 
Government services like urban water provision, and managers of tenders for 
revenue utilities like markets and taxi parks. 
 
The same scenario was cited in Sembabule but in addition, the focus group 
discussion with the District Directors, enumerated service areas provided by the 
private sector to include the Private Not For Profit (PNFP) health care institutions 
that receive grants from the Central Government to provide services. In the 
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education sector, the private sector was noted to have provided significant 
education at primary, secondary and even university levels. 
 
The focus group discussions with representatives of the private sector also 
acknowledged / recognised that the private sector did not only deliver services but 
also created employment. Unfortunately, a representative of Link Community 
Development, an international voluntary NGO working in Masindi, revealed that: -  
“Due to a lack of coordination with the District Education 
Department, there was duplication and role conflict32...” 
 
If the private sector was to perform well, then the LGs need to provide a conducive 
environment so that the private sector can deliver the needed services, provide 
employment, and thus contribute to development.  
 
5.3.4. Civil Society Organisations 
 
The role of CSOs has in many ways intensified and deepened both at national and 
sub national level. It therefore has tremendous potential for fostering good 
governance and development at the local level in Uganda. The chairperson of 
Masindi Local Government said: 
“Civil society in Uganda is a necessary counter balance for good 
governance and efficient demand driven service delivery33” 
 
The CSOs mobilise, sensitise, advocate and build capacity amongst the local 
citizens who learn to manage themselves and to demand for their rights. Such a 
 
32 During FGD with private sector representatives on 17.11.2006 at Masindi District Education offices. 
33 Interview with Mr. Birija Steven on 17.11.2006 
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society will ensure that quality services are delivered and even demand for 
accountability. 
 
5.4. Stakeholder relationships and service delivery 
 
There are three pillars that make up society; namely civil society sector (which 
includes the NGOs), faith based organisations, and political parties, (Nsibambi, 
1998: 14). In the delivery of services under decentralised local governance, the 
three sectors relate both vertically and horizontally.  
The quantity and quality of service delivery, by and large, depends on the nature of 
the relationship between the stakeholders. 
 
During the focus group discussion with elected leaders in Miirya sub-county in 
Masindi district, the discussants identified the following as the stakeholders in the 
Local Government setting:  
• Elected officials. 
• Appointed officials (including members of the statutory boards). 
• Service providers (including the private sector). 
• Service users (recipient communities). 
 
Of the two hundred and forty (240) respondents to the interview schedule, service 
users, private sector and civil society organisation members who were asked to 
express their impression on stakeholder relations, 53 percent said it was 
lacking/bad, 39 percent said it was good and 8 per cent were non–committal. 
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Figure 5 Responses on Stakeholder Relationships 
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The LC II Chairperson of Kyatiri Parish in Masindi supported this scenario when 
he asserted that: 
“The elected and appointed officials are often antagonistic to one 
another. The source of conflict is sometimes power (who has more 
authority) and also economic especially when it comes to 
contracts34” 
 
When the service users, private sector and civil society members were interviewed 
about the characteristics of their councillors, a representative of Link Community 
Development, an international NGO in Masindi, described the type of people who 
are councillors as  
“At the grassroots level of L.C I and L.C II, the councillors are not 
necessarily rich and powerful. They are elected primarily because 
other villagers consider them as trustworthy leaders35”. 
 
 
34 Interview with Mugisha on 22.11.2006 
35 Interview with Evans on 22.11.2006 
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This is in line with the findings of Vincent (1971: 114), who found that marital 
status (polygamy), occupation like farming, land rights and cattle ownership, and 
permanency in local residence are the status symbols of village leadership. 
 
As for the profiles of councillors at the sub- county ( L.C III), municipality  (LC 
IV) and district/city (L.C V) level, they tended to be more elite and came from an 
establishment background. Quite a few have attended a university education and 
have impressive careers in the formal sector. Nyakato, a resident of Lugusulu in 
the Sembabule district described the women councillors as follows: -   
“Our female councillors always have a teacher or community    activity 
background35” 
 
As for the male councillors, the majority was found to be businessmen, former 
teachers or generally retired civil servants. This is in line with the findings of 
Tidemand (1994: 34) during his fieldwork study in Buganda, who found that most 
councillors were fluent in English and their profiles were by no means associated 
with poverty by Ugandan standards. He particularly described women councillors 
as those who tended to have experience in organising women’s groups, often in 
association with NGOs. 
 
During an interview with Masindi town councillors, they were asked why they 
wanted to become councillors and a newly elected councillor responded as follows:  
“I want to participate in politics in order to bring development to 
my town37” 
 
 
35 Interview with Nyakato on 17.11.2006 
37 Response by Dorah of Masindi TC on 27.11.2006 
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Another Kyamanywa, who had belonged to the previous council but had been re-
elected said: 
“I want to finish what I had initiated. I had a work plan in my last 
term, but I could not fulfill it38”.  
 
These statements echo what other councillors in Sembabule said during a focus 
group discussion since they indicated that they basically would like to bring 
development to their areas of jurisdiction. In some cases, they responded that they 
wanted to bring more specific improvements to homes in their areas, send children 
to schools, modernise agriculture and increase income-generating opportunities. 
 
The chairperson of Hospital Ward in Sembabule Town Council assessed the   job 
of being a councillor in the following ways: -  
“It is rewarding if we can resolve various simple problems in the 
village: feeder roads, digging and cleaning wells, improvement of 
school building, sanitation and home hygiene and cultivation of 
food39” 
 
From the above exposition, it is clear that local councillors have a sense of 
direction and accomplishment. However, in all these discussions and interviews, 
the common view was that work at the grassroots level of decentralised 
governance is voluntary and since there was no local revenue to be generated, 
some times it was difficult to get things done. 
For the councillors to be efficient and effective, they are expected to harness 
popular participation at the grassroots level to discuss and resolve local issues. 
 
38 Response by Kyamanywa of Masindi TC on 27.11.2006 
39 Interview with the chairperson Mr. Musoke Mulindwa on 12.11.2006 
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Ordinarily, meetings are expected to be convened at village level monthly. When 
asked about the attendance of village council meetings, Kyemashaija, a councillor 
of Lutunku village in Sembabule district described the typical situation as follows: 
“There are certain topics which tend to attract more people to 
come to meetings. They are security, donor assistance projects and 
visits of officials like Members of Parliament (MPs) and higher 
level councils. The topics related to development do not 
necessarily attract higher attendance40” 
 
Of the 200 service users interviewed, 136 respondents representing 68 per cent said 
that they participated in the decision-making process of the LCI. Tukahebwa 
(1997: 52) also found that of the 150 he interviewed on LCI attendance, 63 per 
cent responded in the affirmative with respect to their participation in the decision-
making meetings in their villages. 
 
Figure 6 Responses on participation in village meetings by service users 
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These service users also particularly singled out meetings related to Education and 
Health as attracting more people than other subjects. Accordingly, the high 
 
40 Interview with Kyemashaija on 12.11.2006 
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attendance facilitates the participation of citizens at grassroots level in decisions 
pertaining to school classroom construction, health centre construction and 
management. 
Of the 32 percent who did not attend village meetings regularly, their response was 
that they considered that it was the job of the councillors and not for themselves to 
perform such work that is related to service delivery. Some even asked questions 
like: 
“Since councillors receive allowances, why can’t they do the work 
instead of asking the poor to contribute?41” 
 
Therefore, a significant proportion of service users believed that service delivery 
was precisely what political leaders promised during the election campaigns and 
hence, they should be responsible for undertaking these tasks, yet the leaders could 
not easily sacrifice their personal wealth for community service delivery since they 
spent substantial sums of money during elections. This attitude undermines the 
traditional “bulungi bwansi42” culture which is supposed to be voluntary and by 
which community development could be enhanced. 
 
The FGD session comprising councillors of Matete sub-county in Sembabule 
district qualified the above scenario by asserting that the most participative social 
group were the women and the least participative were the youth. According to the 
youth, their main concern was immediate income since the unemployment rate is 
very high especially among the educated. The Uganda National Bureau of 
Statistics report of 2005/6 financial year puts youth unemployment at 79 percent 
overall and 68 per cent for the educated. However, one councillor explained thus:  
 
41 Question by Nsubuga of Matete Sub-county on 28.12.2006 
42 Bulungi bwansi – This is community welfare service that is voluntarily offered by adult able-bodied     community 
members. 
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“If we wish to attract the youth we have to organise beer drinking 
in conjunction with the meetings43”. 
 
During an interview with the youth of Mitete trading centre of Matete sub- county 
of Sembabule district, they were questioned on their negative attitude towards 
participation in Local Governments and the following response was noted:  
“Participation in Local Government does not carry any meaning 
because even if we participate, our views are never taken seriously 
by councillors who promise to take action but more often than not, 
nothing happens44” 
 
The youth therefore believe that their participation would not change anything.  It 
is interesting to note that such attitudes were not only manifested by the youth. An 
elderly male farmer in Kigumba sub-county in Masindi district complained that:   
“The concerns raised by people at the grassroots level do not seem 
to attract enough attention for problem solving. This makes us feel 
that we are ignored45” 
 
Such attitudes do not promote participative democracy and service delivery. 
Another measure of participation is the frequency of contact between councillors 
and the ordinary people or service users. At the LC I/village level, councillors and 
service users reside in the same neighbourhood; hence, the contacts are very 
frequent and mostly informal. However, the degree of frequency in contacts is 
considerably reduced when it comes to interacting with councillors and 
 
43 Statement by Kakembo on 28.11.06 
44 Quotation from Semambo on 28.11.06 
45 Complaint by Mukasa on 21.11.2006 
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administrative officials at higher levels. Some of the grassroots people did not 
know their councillors at LC III though LC V levels.  
 
Testimonies from the elected leaders and service users regarding the frequency of 
contact between LC V councillors and grassroots people were in conflict. On the 
one hand, LC V councillors maintained that when they were invited to the LC I 
and III meetings, they attended. However, the ordinary people/service users 
insisted they only saw LC V councillors once a year. A young lady in Kabango 
village in the Masindi district expressed her views as follows:  
“For LC V Councillors, we do not see them often. Sometimes once 
in a year or none at all. They just pass by in cars and never stop to 
talk to us. They are worse than LC III councillors46”. 
 
According to this respondent, “Democracy goes into slumber once elections are 
over”. This was the view of most people interviewed in Masindi and Sembabule. It 
has to be noted that the LC system under the decentralised system of governance 
has to work in two ways. On the one hand, it is supposed to disseminate 
government programmes and policies from the Central Government to the 
grassroots level in the same way the councillors are supposed to reflect peoples’ 
views and needs and pass them upwards. From the above views expressed by the 
service users in the two Ugandan districts, it is quite apparent that the hierarchy 
seems to function more as a top-down and less as a bottom-up mechanism. 
 
This is in conformity with the findings of Golooba-Mutebi (1999: 18) who found 
that local councillors in Mukono cited people’s ignorance, poverty and 
unemployment as being responsible for their hostility towards community 
 
46 Statement by Akumu Anne on 22/11/2006 during an interview 
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participation. Accordingly, it made the work of councillors to mobilise the 
grassroots people very difficult, yet sometimes there had been little or no financial 
assistance from the higher levels of Government especially the Central 
Government. 
 
However, even if financial assistance is available, it is more often than not 
monopolised by the chairperson of the local council without the knowledge or 
participation of the councillors. When one councillor in Masindi district was asked 
whether increased funding would improve the situation, he responded thus:  
“Yes, we will be more motivated to try to convince the people who 
are ignorant and those who are stubborn. We would make more 
visits to the villages”47  
 
The other stakeholder relationship that this study analysed is the one between 
service providers (especially administrative officials) and the service users. This is 
probably the most important relationship if quality services are to be delivered. 
When the teachers in Masindi Town Council were asked during the FGD session 
which factors affected school performance, they almost unanimously stated that it 
was their relationship with the parents of the pupils. The same was echoed by the 
Medical Superintendent of Masindi Hospital when he asserted as follows:  
  “If doctors and nurses have a bad attitude towards their   
 patients, then patients are unlikely to use a health facility48”. 
 
Good relationships with service providers can enable users to be organised in 
support of a facility to raise funds for improvement and/or development. Both 
 
47 Interview with Kanaginagi Atenyi of Masindi district on 09.12.2006 
48 Quotation by medical superintendent of Masindi Hospital on 10.12.2006 
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teachers and medical practitioners agreed during the FGDs that one way of 
improving and formalising the relationship between service providers and users in 
education and health is the establishment of school and health management 
committees. During the FGD by the District Directors of Sembabule district at the 
district headquarters, the CAO emphasised the partnership between service 
providers and users in the following way:  
“It is because of the strategic importance of teamwork that the law 
emphasises the formation of school and health management 
committees. These committees bring the service providers and 
users together in a partnership49”. 
 
5.5. Decentralised governance and the quality of service delivery 
 
The relationship between elected leaders and the service users at the grassroots 
level revealed a significant gap in terms of the expectations of decentralisation. 
This gap exists because of a lack of coherent understanding of the roles among 
stakeholders which invariably affects the quality and quantity of services delivered. 
 
During the FGD session with the District Directors (heads of department) of the 
Sembabule district. It was noted that due to decentralisation, there had been a 
marked increase in the levels of services delivered by Local Government entities. It 
was also highlighted that decentralisation had increased the civic responsibility of 
the recipient communities. The group further acknowledged that the 
implementation of the system of decentralised service delivery in Uganda had also 
attracted an unprecedented growth in the volume of government and donor 
 
49 Statement by Mr Twesigye CAO of Sembabule during FGD session on 16.11.2006 
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funding. The consequence of this increased transfer of resources had seen the 
expansion of the quantity and quality of service facilities. 
 
The chairperson of Sembabule Local Government during an interview argued that:  
“Decentralised service delivery is responsible for the reduction of 
the severity of household poverty and has led to indirect creation 
of employment opportunities. The labour based approach to feeder 
roads maintenance is one of the ways by which household incomes 
have increased50”. 
The Secretary for Health of Masindi district supported the above assertion when 
she said:  
“The expansion of health, water and sanitation services has led to 
comparatively increased access to services and subsequently 
improved the quality of life51”. 
During the interaction between the researcher and the district executive committee 
members of the People With Disabilities (PWDs) in Sembabule at the district 
headquarters, they were asked to express their view about the quality of services 
delivered and how they impacted on the disabled. They noted that service delivery 
mechanisms took into consideration the needs of the marginalised. The chairperson 
of the PWDs said:  
“Today, we are considered as important members of the society. 
Education facilities are constructed with provision for people with 
disabilities and the sanitary facilities are provided separately for 
both sexes52”. 
 
50 In-depth probing of Mr. Herman Sentongo, chairperson Sembabule on 16.11.2006. 
51 FGD session with members of the district executive committee on 14.11.2006 
52  Statement by Mr. Nsereko during FGD session with PWDs on 16.11.2006. 
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The members of the PWDs committee were also appreciative of the removal of 
user fees that had also enabled the poor categories of the communities to access 
services like education and health. 
 
A general statement was presented to 660 respondents (including the service users, 
administrative officials, elected leaders and private sector representatives) on 
whether decentralisation was a good policy that had led to development. The 
responses were 66 percent (436) said Yes, 32 per cent (211) said No, and 2 percent 
(13) were Uncertain. The dominant view was that people considered 
decentralisation to be useful and performing well. When asked why they rated 
decentralisation positively, most respondents said it had improved service delivery, 
provided jobs to their children, and reduced the distance to health and education 
service centres. 
Figure 7 Responses to whether decentralisation led to development 
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The 32 percent who responded that decentralisation had not led to development 
were largely angry and frustrated. Some had lost in the previous elections, others 
were denied tenders or employment opportunities, and some thought government 
was responsible for the widespread poverty. 
 
The degree of appreciation for decentralisation was relatively higher in Masindi 
than in Sembabule, whereas for Masindi, the degree of appreciation was 71 percent 
that of Sembabule was 61 percent. The response pattern indicated a similarity with 
the reason for choosing the two districts, namely Masindi is an old, well 
established, politically stable district where decentralisation had been originally 
piloted, Sembabule was a newly created, small district characterised by political 
and ethnic squabbles. The two districts provide a contrasting environment for 
investigating decentralised service delivery. 
 
Different age groups also showed varied responses as regards the performance of 
decentralisation. To the youth, the system was not appealing. A frustrated and 
angry young man in Chema village of the Masindi district stated during an 
interview that:  
“Nobody listens to us. We have no voice in the government53”. 
 
The same disappointment was attested to by several rural youths in both districts as 
many of them thought decentralisation had been established to benefit a few 
“thieves” at the district headquarters who were after amassing wealth instead of 
ensuring service delivery and poverty reduction. 
 
 
53 Interview with Abdallah Ochia on 14.11.2006. 
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Education levels also influenced the responses with respect to satisfaction about 
the performance of decentralisation. The investigation generally revealed that the 
higher the level of educational attainment, the lower the level of satisfaction with 
decentralisation. Intuitively, it can be reasoned that the educated have had more 
interactions with other affluent Local Governments that offer alternatives for 
comparison. The other reason could be that since they are learned, their analytical 
capacity is more developed and therefore their expectations are higher in respect of 
decentralised service delivery. However, from the Focus Group Discussions in 
both Masindi and Sembabule districts, it was generally acknowledged by the 
administrative officials that there was significant improvement in the quality of 
services in the health, education, road, water and production sectors. 
 
According to the Chief Administrative Officer of Sembabule district, improvement 
had been registered because of increased involvement or participation of people in 
the planning and delivery of the services. However, some of the participants in the 
FGD session54 also noted that some times the increase in services had been 
undermined by deterioration in quality. For instance, they reported that the high 
involvement rates in primary schools for the Universal Primary Education (UPE) 
had led to deterioration in the quality of education offered. 
 
5.6. Decentralisation and poverty reduction 
 
In response to the question of whether decentralisation had led to poverty 
reduction, the responses generated from the 200 service users that were 
interviewed were 68 percent agreed, 3.1 percent were neutral and 28.9 per cent 
 
54 Focus group discussion by District directors of Sembabule district on 16.11.2006 
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disagreed. When asked to explain why they felt that poverty had reduced, one 
woman in Kasaana, Sembabule district said:  
“Naked children are now rare. They wear some sort of cloth.  We 
can also do small business55” 
 
The 28.9 percent who disagreed also had reasons. For example, an old man in 
Lugusulu sub-county of Sembabule district believed that decentralisation had not 
done enough as regards extension services by the agriculture and veterinary 
departments. As a result, soil fertility had been declining and cattle related diseases 
were on the increase, which contributed to perpetuating poverty. 
 
Figure 8: responses on whether decentralisation has led to poverty reduction 
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55 Interview with Babirye who owns a small shop at Kasaana Township on 12.11.2006. 
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Another Muhima man from the same sub-county of Lugusulu also said life was 
never easy and blamed it to lack of responsiveness by Local Government extension 
workers. He said:  
“In the past, cattle were considered wealth but now there are 
fewer animals. Diseases often affect the animals. It is difficult to 
sell them when we need to56” 
A youth in Mitete parish of Sembabule district while lamenting about poverty said:  
“Poverty is even getting worse because of HIV/AIDS. Even 
investment in education makes the future bleak. It is possible to get 
HIV/AIDS regardless of education level57” 
 
Nonetheless, despite the pessimistic expositions above, basing on the responses 
given to this statement, respondents were generally more positive than negative 
about the fact that poverty had been reduced as a result of decentralisation. 
 
5.7. Decentralisation and empowerment of the socially disadvantaged 
 
The theories of decentralisation argue that decentralisation brings services closer to 
the people and through their participation, especially of the socially disadvantaged, 
they are more empowered by participating in the decision-making process. This 
question on empowerment was posed to the youth, women, elderly and disabled 
persons during the Focus Group Discussions. The responses to whether 
decentralisation had enhanced empowerment amongst these interest groups were 
56 percent responded Yes, 39 percent responded No, and 5 percent were Uncertain. 
 
 
56 Interview with Rugasha on 12.11.2006. 
57 Lamentation by Semwezi on 13.11.2006. 
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However, it is interesting to note that these responses varied from one interest 
group to another. The women felt more empowered because of the affirmative 
action arising from the quota system which requires that women representatives 
comprise a third of the council, the executive committee and the statutory boards at 
all levels of local governance. Some women argued that they are more empowered 
because of their involvement with NGOs and CBOs that are working in their areas. 
These organisations help to create awareness, mobilise, offer micro-finance 
opportunities and build capacity among the females. 
 
While the young and energetic women were appreciative of the empowerment 
arising from decentralisation, the men and the elderly women had contrary views. 
One old man in Kiryandongo sub–county in the Masindi district during an 
interview responded as follows:  
  “This Government.  Everything they bring is for women.  
They  are given loans, from micro finance, heifers, poultry. 
  We men are neglected58”. 
 
The elderly women and youths echoed this feeling of being marginalised too. An 
elderly woman in Kigumba complained that:  
“We the elderly are often asked to look after children who are 
mainly orphans who have lost parents due to HIV/AIDS59” 
 
The general trend in Uganda is that when people grow older than 60, they start 
losing most of their relatives and friends; hence, their social networks shrink. This 
explains why, after 60, most old people have less positive views. They are most hit 
 
58 Interview with Okello of Kiryandongo on 20/11/2006. 
59 Interview with Maama Kiseka on 20/11/06 
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by poverty yet they cannot get help because of a lack of a social security scheme in 
Uganda. This interpretation largely corresponds with the average life expectancy in 
Uganda, which is about 50 years according to the 2005 UNDP Report on Human 
Development. 
 
The youth were among those who felt that decentralisation had not empowered 
them. They argued that although youth councils had been established, they were 
not facilitated and therefore less effective. A youth leader in the Sembabule Town 
Council argued as follows:  
“We, the youth are only important during elections. This is when 
powerful politicians even make telephone calls to us. After that, 
they even do not wave to us if they happen to come home.60” 
 
Another female youth from Kinyara in the Masindi district pointed out that:  
During the general elections, most of us (youths) supported the 
opposition because we thought it was the only way we could 
express out disgust with the lies of the current politicians.61” 
When the youths were asked whether voting for the opposition had helped to 
change the attitude of the leadership, one of them said:- 
“It seems all our leaders are made of the same material. Even the 
ones we voted for have turned into kings and forgotten us.62” 
 
The disabled people were the most positive about the impact of decentralisation on 
their empowerment. According to them, they are now part of the ruling class since 
they are elected to the Local Councils, have an executive of their own from the 
 
60 Interview with Kafeero of Sembabule T/C on 16.11.2006 
61 ,62 Responses from youth leaders during FGD on 21.11.2006. 
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village to national level, they are able to network with NGOs and CBOs, and they 
are no longer segregated from the management of public affairs. Given that the 
disabled did not enjoy such privileges before, they felt that the decentralisation 
policy had greatly empowered them. 
Figure 9 Responses of the socially disadvantaged on whether 
decentralisation had empowered them 
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Generally, the responses manifest that the socially disadvantaged have been 
empowered by decentralisation as compared to the situation before it was 
introduced as a system of local governance. 
 
5.8. Decentralisation and responsiveness of service delivery 
 
Those in favour of decentralisation argue that this system of governance better 
matches public services with the needs of the citizens by designing strategies that 
are tailored to address location specific problems. To test the responsiveness of 
decentralised service delivery, the service users in both districts were interviewed 
as to whether decentralisation was responding to the needs of the citizens. 
Out of the 200 respondents, 34 percent (68) disagreed, 4 percent (8) were neutral, 
and 62 percent (124) agreed with the view that the decentralised service delivery in 
  
177
Uganda was responsive to the demands and needs of the ordinary citizens. Those 
who argued positively said that the citizens at the grassroots level are involved in 
the management of their Local Government affairs through their elected leaders. 
Some of the respondents claimed that through participatory planning, they 
participated in determining the projects to be implemented in their villages 
especially those related to health, education and water. They also indicated that 
LCs consult them on development projects. Some of these service users are also 
members of the health, water and school management committees. This also 
facilitates their involvement in Local Government decision-making. 
 
The 34 percent who responded negatively constituted quite a substantial portion of 
the service users. According to them, cliques of self-seekers have dominated 
decentralisation. They claim that, when elections are held, the rich who want to 
benefit from gaining power in Local Councils use money to get elected or to 
sponsor their agents. Subsequently, the perception is that ordinary citizens have no 
say and do not determine what goes on in their areas since these decisions are 
made by elites who are in power. 
Figure 10 Responses to whether decentralisation enhanced responsiveness 
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According to one service user in the Lwebitakuli sub-county of the Sembabule 
district: 
“The LCs appoint their former campaign agents on the school or 
health management committees. This is the way they are paid.63” 
 
The danger of this is that even when these appointees misbehave, as with 
misappropriation, no one can accuse them because they enjoy the protection of the 
politicians. This makes decentralisation less responsive to the local needs. 
Furthermore, one of the local councillors at the Kyatiri Parish in Masindi district 
had this to say: 
“The decentralisation process has been frustrated by the district 
leaders who, after the parish planning committees have proposed 
what they need in terms of development; it is changed by the 
district council.64” 
 
The same finding was made by Balunywa (2006: 11) when investigating conflicts 
in Local Governments in Uganda when he found that one of the causes of this 
conflict was the lack of networking between higher and lower Local Governments. 
He noted that this affected the efficiency and effectiveness of service delivery. The 
danger of such conflicts is that the recipient communities end up failing to access 
and benefit from the required services, which contradicts the strategic mission of 
the decentralisation policy in Uganda. 
 
 
 
63 Interview with Bonabantu on 23.11.2006 
 
 
64 Interview with Kaheru on 20.11.2006. 
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5.9. Decentralisation and value of the services 
 
Decentralisation is assumed to enhance value for money in service delivery. This is 
true when decentralised service delivery manifests efficiency, transparency, 
responsiveness, accountability, and generally good governance. To test this, the 
researcher sought the opinion of the service users on whether decentralisation was 
providing value for money in terms of service delivery. This particular question 
had two dimensions; the first related to the costs related to setting up service 
delivery units and the second was associated with services being provided in a 
cost–effective manner when the units become operational. 
 
Out of the 200 service users targeted by the survey, 34.8 percent disagreed, 2.3 
percent were neutral, and 62.9 percent agreed with the view that decentralisation in 
Uganda enhanced value for money in terms of service delivery. This positive 
response was particularly in respect of the second dimension, which concerned 
services provided by the units like Health and Education centres. 
 
The 34.8 percent of the respondents who disagreed that there was value for money 
in terms of services were particularly responding to the shoddy work by 
contractors. One services user in Kimengo sub-county of the Masindi district stated 
that:  
“In our district, there is no value for work. The buildings 
constructed are so poor because of corruption. Contractors share 
money with politicians and civil servants.65”. 
 
 
65 Interview with Komakech on 20.11.2006. 
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In Sembabule district, the service users expressed similar dissatisfaction with 
decentralised service delivery. At Kasaana primary school, a five-stance latrine 
collapsed even before it was used. While in the Kigumba sub- county of Masindi, 
the district chairperson who went to commission a new classroom block had to 
adjourn the function when he found the building had cracks in it. This made the 
service users believe that there was no value for money in terms of the services and 
hence, this undermines the performance of decentralisation. 
 
Another pertinent issue that emerged during the Focus Group Discussion with 
service users was that of the distribution of decentralised benefits. Decentralisation 
is supposed to enhance equitable distribution of services and resources from the 
consolidated fund to Local Governments. The resources transfer is supposed to 
create regional balance and to reduce poverty once these resources trickle to the 
grassroots level. However, from the responses, the general perception was that 
decentralised service delivery had not been equitability distributed. Respondents 
argued that “middle men” benefitted more from decentralisation than the average 
citizens in the two districts. A respondent in Sembabule said that:  
“Although citizens in the district are supposed to benefit from 
decentralised contracts, tenders are often awarded to contractors 
from the Masaka district who bring labourers with them. So we 
cannot sell bricks, sand, stones and even unskilled labour. This 
makes us not beneficiaries of the decentralisation policy.66” 
 
Besides this, the service users also claimed that district leaders were not fair in 
distributing projects to the various parts of the district. An old man in the 
Kijujubwa parish in Masindi maintains that:  
 
66 Focus group discussion of service users on 23.11.2006 at Matete sub-county, Sembabule district. 
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“Our road has never been made for the last four years because our 
area never voted for the chairperson during the election.67”. 
 
The implication of this is that leaders provide services to politically friendly areas, 
thereby contradicting the distributive role of decentralisation. 
 
5.10. Conclusion 
 
The views expressed by service users at the grassroots level hinted at both positive 
and negative aspects of decentralisation performance in Uganda. On the one hand, 
it is encouraging that people value the decentralisation system since they 
appreciate the importance of participation, networking amongst various 
stakeholders, and easy access to service units due to proximity. 
 
The overall assessment of the decentralisation system was different in different 
areas, age groups, education levels, and at times genders. As a result, there were a 
number of problems that the grassroots citizens cited that inhibit decentralisation 
performance. These include: poor working relationships between elected leaders 
and administrative officials, inadequate financial resources at the grassroots level, 
non–responsive service delivery, and unequal distribution of decentralised 
resources and projects. 
 
Despite these problems, the service users still contend that the decentralised 
service delivery has largely been successful. The next chapter will analyse specific 
issues in the decentralisation process in Uganda such as human resources 
 
67 Interview with Mzee Kamukama on 27.11.2006. 
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management, procurement management and fiscal related issues with specific 
reference to how these impact on development. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
DECENTRALISED HUMAN RESOURCES AND 
PROCUREMENT MANAGEMENT IN MASINDI AND 
SEMBABULE DISTRICTS 
 
6.0 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter will be to analyse the effectiveness of the arrangements 
for decentralised human recourses and procurement management in the Masindi 
and Sembabule districts. The issue of Human Resources Management (HRM) is 
central to decentralised service delivery since it is the capacity and/or quality of the 
human capital that will determine the quality of the services delivered. For this 
reason, this chapter will seek to analyse the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities 
and threats (SWOT) of the Separate Personnel System (SPS) that operationalises 
the decentralisation of Human Resources Management in Uganda. 
 
As part of this analysis, an attempt will be made to evaluate the adequacy, quality, 
efficiency and effectiveness of service delivery. The focus in this respect will be on 
the performance, retention and development of human resources, and the 
operational environment within which human recourses fulfill their functions.                                                          
 
This chapter will also provide an assessment of decentralised procurement as the 
means by which Local Governments appropriate resources by procuring goods or 
services. This is a decentralised function performed by the Local Governments 
Contracts Committees (LGCC). These replaced the Local Government Tender 
Boards (LGTBs) effective with the amendment of the LGA, 2006. 
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The LGCC now comprises administrative officials appointed by either the Chief 
Administrative Officer (CAO) or the Town Clerk (TC) as the case may be for the 
district and city/municipality respectively. This chapter will serve to review the 
performance of these Committees to assess whether they have addressed the 
weaknesses of the LGTBs such as corruption and a lack of independence. 
 
The Separate Personnel System and the LGCC are confronted by numerous 
challenges in a decentralised setting and the purpose of this chapter will be to 
examine whether these challenges are impacting negatively on the performance of 
decentralisation as it relates to development and service delivery in the two 
selected districts. 
 
The changing roles of Local Governments inevitably call for research. This is 
supported by Lubanga (1998:41) when he said that the focus, needs and demands 
of Local Governments have changed with the introduction of decentralisation in 
Uganda. To achieve this objective, it is first necessary to provide overviews of the 
responsibilities of decentralised Local Governments in the Masindi and Sembabule 
districts. 
 
6.1. Responsibilities of decentralised Local Governments in Uganda 
 
The devolution of responsibilities such as planning, budgeting, resource 
mobilisation, human resources management, procurement and service delivery 
from Central Government to Local Governments changed the magnitude of 
responsibilities that are undertaken by the latter within a system of decentralised 
governance. As a result, Local Governments have ceased being just administrative 
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units of the Central Government and have assumed corporate status (Lubanga 
1998: 49) 
 
The expanded roles and responsibilities of Local Governments have inevitably 
implied increased competencies, in terms of skills. The CAO of Sembabule noted 
as follows:  
“Although there has been tremendous improvement of service 
facilities both in numbers and types, the use of some of the service 
units has been limited due to a lack of corresponding increase in 
staff.67 
 
When he was probed further what could be responsible for this, he replied:  
“It is lack of forward planning that takes into account an 
assessment of the implications of putting up infrastructure without 
corresponding human resources. The health facilities are the main 
problem area.68”. 
 
The Principal Personnel Officer of Masindi district also agreed with the above 
view when he added that some service delivery points lack the required human 
resources particularly in the health and the education sector where the teacher–
pupil ratio was still 1:95 as compared to the national norm, which is 1:55. This 
inhibits the efficiency with which services are delivered, hence negatively affecting 
development69. 
 
 
67/ 68 In-depth interview with Mr. Twesigye, CAO Sembabule district on 16.11.2006. 
 
69 Interview with Mr. Kisembo the PPO of Masindi district on 15.11.2006. 
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During the FGD with the directors or heads of department at the district 
headquarters in Masindi, it was noted that there are a number of challenges 
associated with attracting certain categories of human resources to the districts. 
They cited the example of physical planners who are not readily available within 
Local Governments. 
 
They also emphasised the problem of attracting and retaining competent human 
resources in LGs given the relatively difficult conditions in some areas where there 
is no accommodation, electricity, water and roads. Bullisa county (now district) 
was cited as an example of a difficult environment in Masindi, while Lwemiyaga 
county was cited for Sembabule. 
 
Similar views were expressed during the FGD in Sembabule, except that these 
respondents added that conflicts amongst district leaders also makes it difficult to 
attract competent staff to work in the district since it is polarised into two camps. 
The political environment therefore creates difficulties for administrative officials 
in terms of efficient service delivery since the prevailing conflicts are not 
conducive to networking and teamwork. 
 
Kakumba (2003: 38) discovered similar trends when he investigated the challenges 
of human resources decentralisation and Local Governments performance in the 
Luwero district. He cited lack of capacity, poor motivation and leadership 
squabbles as the problems pertaining to Human Resources Management in a 
decentralised context. 
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JARD (2004:12) sums up the human resources problem as follows: 
“Lack of capacity is the most important reason for the slowing of 
the implementation of decentralisation”. 
In his earlier research, Galiwango (2004:41 asserted that:  
“Too much decentralisation was being rolled out, too fast and yet 
there was too little, in way of resources that were delivered too 
late to enable the LGs to deliver on the devolved responsibilities”. 
 
Despite the above findings, both the service users and the Civil Society 
Organisations interviewed, argued that the capacity of the human resources in 
Local Government had improved and that this had a significant influence on the 
quantity and to some extent the quality of services that were delivered. It is 
interesting to note that 63.9 percent were of the opinion that decentralised Local 
Governments in the two districts have adequate human resources. 
 
Figure 11 Responses regarding whether Local Government human 
resources are adequate 
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However, among those who were neutral or were of the opinion that human 
resources available to Local Governments are inadequate indicated that while the 
higher Local Governments had significantly improved, the Lower Local 
Governments still experience acute capacity gaps. These respondents also argued 
that since significant resources were being made available in terms of Central 
Government transfers that were being channeled to these levels, it was important to 
ensure that these resources were being utilised to enhance capacity at these levels. 
 
Respondents generally acknowledged that one of the biggest challenges that 
confront Local Governments nationwide is the issue of HIV/AIDS since it has had 
a devastating impact on the human resources responsible for service delivery due 
to death or prolonged absence from work due to sickness. HIV/AIDS has also 
impacted on the recipient communities with a similar effect and this has, in turn, 
furthermore increased the burden on the delivery of health services to those 
infected with the disease. 
 
It is interesting to note that, in both the Masindi and Sembabule districts, the 
schedules of responsibilities of the districts were found to be homogenous. These 
responsibilities are categorised according to directorates, which include production 
and marketing, education and sports, works and technical services, health gender 
and community based services, management and support services and finance and 
planning. The composition and functions of these directorates are illustrated in the 
table 6 below. 
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Table 6 Responsibilities of the districts under decentralisation 
 
 
Directorate  Composition  Functions  
Production and 
Marketing  
Departments of Agriculture, 
Veterinary, Fisheries, Environment, 
Entomology, Forestry, Trade, 
Industry and Labour.  
Increasing production and value of 
crops, livestock, fish and diary products, 
providing animal and plant materials, 
improved breeds, advisory services to 
farmers; controlling diseases and pests; 
agro-processing industries; facilitating 
trade and commerce; and promoting 
environment protection. 
Education and 
Sports  
Departments of Inspection, 
Administration and Sports. 
Providing quality education, eradication 
of illiteracy, private primary and 
secondary schools. 
Works and 
Technical 
services 
Departments of Roads, Water, 
Housing, Physical Planning and 
Mechanical Services. 
Providing and maintaining district 
physical infrastructure and water 
sources, land surveying.  
 
Health  Departments of Health Inspectorate 
and TB/Leprosy programme, 
Primary Health Care 
Coordinating, supervising and 
monitoring health services and activities 
of government, NGOs and private health 
sector. 
 
Gender and 
Community 
based Services  
Community Development, Youth 
affairs, Probation and Social 
Welfare, Labour, Gender and Culture 
and Social Rehabilitation. 
 
Strengthening general living conditions 
through sensitisation and mobilisation.  
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Management 
and Support 
Services 
Chief Administrative Officer (CAO), 
County and Sub-County 
Administration, Parish Chiefs, Local 
Administration Police, Prisons, 
Departments of Information, 
Personnel, Planning, the Audit Unit 
and Local Council Affairs Unit. 
Responsible for general administration, 
personnel, information, Law and Order, 
public relations and personnel matters. 
Finance and 
Planning 
Departments of Accounts, Budget 
and Revenue, Population, Statistics, 
Monitoring and Evaluation, Planning 
and Finance 
Handling all financial and planning 
functions of the district and coordinating 
planning activities of various district 
departments.  
 
Source: Masindi District Development Plan 2004-07 
 
6.2. Human resources context in the Local Governments within the Masindi 
and Sembabule districts 
 
The wide-ranging reforms undertaken in the Local Governments have included a 
review of the structures to enable them to cope with the changing demands as well 
as to ensure delivery of their mandates. From the discussions with CAOs of the 
two districts, it became apparent that there are three models in respect of the 
standard type of staffing levels of Local Governments within the two districts, 
namely small, medium and large. In terms of this classification, Sembabule was 
regarded by the Respondents as a small district and Masindi as a large district. 
 
The study revealed that each district has a substantive CAO who is the head of the 
administrative officials. However, in Sembabule the CAO is assisted by a deputy 
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CAO and three assistants, while in Masindi there is a deputy CAO and five 
assistants. Out of the Assistant CAOs there is one for every county. Sub-county 
chiefs assist the ACAOs in charge of counties. Sembabule district has seven sub-
counties. There are also extension workers and support staff in addition to the 
ACAOs in each sub-county. 
 
In addition to the above, Sembabule district has thirty-five parishes and Masindi 
has 124 parishes. Each parish is administratively headed by a parish chief. When 
the senior administrative staff were asked whether employee gaps exist, 31 percent 
indicated that there were gaps that needed to be filled, while 69 percent indicated 
that they were comfortable with the existing numbers of staff in their respective 
directorates. 
Figure 12 Responses on whether gaps existed in the staff establishment    
of the two districts 
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It is important to note that the staff establishment and any vacancies therein are 
impacted on by funding from the Central Government. Indicated in the table 7 and 
8 below are the staffing situations of the two districts by directorate showing the 
establishment, positions filled and per centage gap for each of the district. 
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Table 7 Sembabule staffing situation by directorates 2006/07 
 
Directorate Establishment Filled % Gap 
Management and support services 98 91   7.1 
Finance and planning 45 37 17.7 
Production 74 51       31 
Works and Technical services 42 36 14.3 
Education* 19 16 15.8 
Health  490 299 38.9 
Community services 19     14 26.3 
*Excludes the number of teachers 
 
Table 8 Masindi staffing situation by directorates 2006/07 
 
Directorate Establishment Filled % Gap 
Management and support services 221 216 2.2 
Finance and planning 77 62 19.4 
Production 125 105 16 
Works and Technical services 60 48 20 
Education* 27 24 11.1 
Health  720 601 16.5 
Community services 30 23 23.3 
*Excludes the number of teachers 
 
The tables above indicate that the sectors most affected by vacancies in the 
establishment are Production and Health in the Sembabule district, while the 
Masindi district seems to experience gaps in Works and Technical Services as well 
as Community Services. When the CAOs of the two districts were asked what they 
planned to do to fill the gaps, they expressed reluctance to recruit new staff since 
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the unconditional grant is currently not yet adequate, while the local revenue base 
has dwindled ever since graduated tax was abolished. 
 
In particular, the numbers of employees in professions such as agriculture, human 
medicine, veterinary medicine, surveying, and physical planning were found to be 
inadequate in Local Governments in both districts, especially when such 
professionals are required to work outside the district headquarters where facilities 
are not very conducive. 
 
However, the researcher noted that the existing shortfall/gaps did not pose a 
serious problem because of the interventions from the civil society sector, 
especially the NGOs and CBOs who provide alternative services that cover almost 
all sub-counties. This partnership helps to alleviate what would otherwise be a 
problem, especially in the health sector. 
 
The Focus Group Discussions with the senior administrative officials in 
Sembabule also noted that staff retention was a big problem in Local Governments, 
especially for districts in remote areas and for Local Governments at the lower 
levels. They quoted how doctors had rejected being resident in Lwemiyaga County 
because of remoteness and lack of social amenities. The same applies to 
community workers, agricultural extension staff, and the district water staff who 
insist on staying at the district headquarters and only visit Lwemiyaga 
occasionally. 
According to the CAO of Sembabule, this affects service delivery negatively yet, if 
it is insisted that they reside in Lwemiyaga, the staff members would just tender 
their resignation. This is aggravated by the fact that there are no hardship 
incentives that could motivate specialised staff to work in such areas 
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6.3. Staff qualifications in Masindi and Sembabule Districts 2006/07 
 
Goel (1993: 180) asserts that productivity will only be possible if a corps of 
administration exists who are knowledgeable and skillful and have a sense of 
dedication to the goals of the government. It should be noted that skills and 
knowledge are critical tenets of expertise, which is an outcome of qualifications 
and experience. For the purpose of this study, the qualifications of key top 
administrators were analysed and it was established that overall these personnel 
had the requisite qualifications for posts at the top and middle management levels 
as illustrated in table 9 below. 
 
Table 9 Qualifications of selected staff at district headquarters in 
Sembabule 
 
Portfolio Qualifications of 
incumbent 
Minimum 
required 
qualification 
CAO Post Graduate Diploma Graduate 
PPO Post Graduate Diploma Graduate 
Manager Works Graduate Graduate 
Manager Education Masters Graduate 
Manager Health Masters Graduate 
Town Clerk Graduate Graduate 
CFO Post Graduate Diploma Graduate 
Clerk to Council Graduate Graduate 
Chief Internal Auditor Masters Graduate 
District Planner Post Graduate Diploma Graduate 
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The situation for the district headquarters staff in Masindi was quite similar to that  
of Sembabule because top administrative officials were well qualified. In 
Sembabule district, out of the seven sub-county chiefs, five were graduates and in 
Masindi out of the twelve sub-county chiefs, eleven were graduates. In both cases, 
some of those who were not graduates were undergraduate students on weekend 
programme at various universities, but they were in possession of at least a 
diploma. 
However, other than the sub-county chiefs who were mainly graduates as required 
by law, most staff at the lower Local Governments held office simply because of 
experience. In terms of national policy on decentralised service delivery, the sub-
county (L.C III) is regarded as the pivotal point of development. This is due to the 
fact that agricultural modernization, poverty eradication, universal education and 
the institutionalisation of development planning all have been decentralised. This 
requires high calibre human resources with university education in addition to 
experience. Lubanga (1996: 11) also recommended this when he was the head of 
the decentralisation secretariat in Uganda. 
 
Indeed, the CAO of Masindi admitted that some incumbents especially at the sub-
county and the lower levels, administrative officials did not have the required 
minimum qualifications for the jobs they were holding but they had extensive 
experience and could perform well. At the time this investigation was undertaken, 
the restructuring exercise was being undertaken with a view of down–sizing the 
work force and recruiting qualified staff. 
 
This restructuring exercise in the Local Governments is intended to remove 
unqualified staff, but this is difficult in some instances when experienced sub-
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county chiefs without the requisite university qualifications are found to be more 
competent than young inexperienced graduates. 
During an investigation of human resources in Luwero district, Kakumba (2003: 
37) found the same. In this particular study, the district health inspector and district 
health visitor were quoted as saying that in Luwero, there were some clinical 
officers at the health centres and health sub districts who demonstrated better 
performance than some medical doctors who were more qualified but 
inexperienced. 
Out of the seven sub-counties of Sembabule, the extension service officers have at 
least a diploma in relevant fields like veterinary science and agriculture while the 
coordinators were graduates in veterinary medicine and agriculture from various 
universities. The situation was quite similar in Masindi district with coordinators 
being graduates and the field officers having diplomas. Agricultural officers were 
diplomats of Bukalasa Agricultural institute. 
 
A biographical data analysis from the questionnaires revealed that 49 per cent of 
the staff in both districts was graduates, 36 percent were diploma holders, and 15 
percent had postgraduate qualifications, which included diplomas and masters 
degrees. The pie chart below illustrates the qualifications of the senior staff in the 
two districts. 
Figure 13: Qualification level of senior staff in the two districts 
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The Principal Personnel Officer of Masindi pointed out that personnel had the 
requisite qualifications in the technical fields at the top and middle management 
levels largely due to the stringent regulations and standards set by the Central 
Government. Indeed, this is in line with the legal and institutional arrangements of 
the current decentralised local governance system in Uganda in that the autonomy 
of the Local Governments is regulated by Central Government. With regards to 
human resources issues, it is worth nothing that the Health Service Commission, 
the Education Service Commission and the Public Service Commission regulate 
the DSC. 
 
6.4. Human Resources Development opportunities 
 
The establishment of new Local Government structures like committees of council, 
and statutory institutions like the District Service Commission (DSC), Local 
Government Contracts Committee (LGCC), Land Boards and the Local 
Governments Public Accounts Committee (LGPAC) that are supposed to 
operationalise decentralised service delivery, necessitates that human resources 
have specific knowledge and skills to enable them to perform adequately. 
 
This has in effect exerted pressure on the human resources in Local Governments 
to abreast modern skills and knowledge through further studies, capacity building 
workshops, seminars and others. Competence as a measure of service delivery is 
also encouraged through politicising and publicising decentralised programmes 
because village councillors and civil society members have the right to challenge 
the quality of services delivered. 
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One veterinary assistant in Lugusulu sub-county of Sembabule district lamented as 
follows:  
“Today, work in government is very difficult. We have many 
supervisors. If you don’t visit those cattle keepers, they report you 
to the elected leaders. We work because we have nothing else to 
do.70” 
 
Most other workers in the Health and Education sectors also supported this as well 
as those employed in the Works department. These challenges were ushered in 
through the empowerment of the local community/service users and this has 
enhanced the need for the service providers to ensure efficient and responsive 
service delivery. 
 
In respect of capacity building, the research established a mix of both positive and 
negative experiences. During the FGD with the top management of Masindi Local 
Government, it was observed that sustainable delivery of decentralised services 
required adequate capacity at the technical levels. The PPO of Masindi Local 
Government (MLG) outlined during the discussion that:  
“A number of capacity enhancement interventions such as 
retooling of Local Governments and development of Manuals and 
guides on various aspects of LG operations and training of 
officials have been undertaken.71”. 
 
The importance of capacity building was also emphasised by the CAO of Masindi 
when she said that before the introduction of a uniform operational manual and 
 
70 Interview with  Mwebesa, Veterinary Assistant on 11/11/2006. 
71 Exposition by Mr. Kisembo PPO Masindi District on 15.11.2006. 
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training in Local Governments, many officers were overwhelmed by the new 
decentralised roles and delivered services in a haphazard and uncoordinated 
manner. 
 
To address this critical issue, the Government of Uganda formulated a National 
Local Government capacity building policy that defines and sets out the 
institutional structures for coordination and harmonisation of capacity building 
initiatives. When asked how much they had benefited from these capacity building 
programmes the top management answered in the affirmative while the lower 
cadres such as clerks and assistants to top managers were generally negative. An 
assistant clerk to council noted:  
“Whenever there are workshops, our bosses do not delegate us to 
attend. They attend all workshops apart from those that are not 
sponsored. We are not only denied the opportunity to acquire new 
skills but also to get some allowances.72” 
 
The above quotation implies that capacity building workshops have been 
monopolised by top management thereby denying the lower cadres the opportunity 
to acquire new skills and knowledge. This does not only affect their capacity but 
also demotivates them since they are relegated to the daily, monotonous routine 
work for which they are not paid so well. If this is not addressed it could serve to 
undermine the good intentions of capacity building by the Central Government. 
 
The above scenario however, only affects capacity building workshops organised 
nationally because all respondents, including both the top and lower cadre 
management, acknowledged that each directorate was allocated funds for capacity 
 
72 Statement by Mugisha, Assistant Clerk to the council of Masindi District. 
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building (training) in the district budget. When asked whether they had ever 
attended such training, 69 percent of the staff of Sembabule district in the sectors 
of Production, Works, Education and Health answered in the affirmative, while 27 
percent said no, and 4 percent were non–committal. 
 
Figure 14 Responses of staff who had attended capacity building 
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The above responses indicate that the majority of the staff interviewed had 
attended such training. Those who attended reported that it was easy and cost 
effective to organise such workshops and seminars at local level, yet the added 
advantage was that this type of capacity building involves large numbers of staff 
without leaving their stations. Those who had not attended capacity building 
interventions had various reasons for this, but common amongst them was that the 
selection criteria were discriminative. 
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One revenue officer in the Finance Directorate in Sembabule district noted that:  
“If you are not in good books of the boss, he can never send you to 
such courses. I have had to miss such workshops because I am 
referred to as being argumentative.73” 
 
Sentiments of dissent notwithstanding, the general view was that the capacity 
building programmes had enhanced the quality of human resources, which had in 
turn enhanced efficiency. 
 
Besides the capacity building programmes, the researcher also discovered during 
the FGDs that there were a number of staff who were on further study programmes 
at diploma, under and post graduate levels, at the various universities that offered 
weekend study programmes. In Masindi district, the PPO who was himself 
pursuing a Masters of Public Administration was able to list 17 LG staff on 
weekend study programme, while in Sembabule district there were eight. Some of 
these staff are on government scholarships while the majority are self–sponsored. 
 
The findings of the research furthermore indicated that the training programmes 
provided focused on the areas of administration, community services development, 
health, finance and resource mobilisation. It was noted that both elected leaders 
and administrative officials in the districts and sub-counties participated in these 
training programmes. This was possible because the Local Government 
Development Programme (LGDP) funds have a component of capacity building, 
which are, released quarterly according to work plans designed by the district 
planners. 
 
73 Interview with Mulindwa of the Finance department at Sembabule district headquarters on 16.11.2006. 
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The donor-funded programmes also have training components and therefore 
support government efforts in capacity building. Donors such as DANIDA, Link 
Community International, International Rescue Committee (IRC) and the World 
Bank continue to offer sector support to human resource development under 
decentralisation. Although these efforts were found to be short lined and not 
continually accessible, especially when NGO programmes wound up; they 
nonetheless, provided a mechanism for functional awareness and skills 
development that had enhanced performance amongst service providers. 
 
However, what has to be noted is that although there is enthusiasm, especially 
amongst the middle and lower cadre managers to be exposed to further training in 
order to upgrade their qualifications and competencies, the resources to facilitate 
these workshops are always limited. The PPO of Sembabule district reported that:  
“The bigger chunk of the Central Government releases is 
Conditional Grant which does not leave any discretion to Local 
Governments to allocate it to local priority areas like capacity 
building.74” 
 
Kakumba (2003: 42) found that a good number of staff in the senior management 
positions in Luwero district had sponsored themselves for particular courses, which 
they thought were relevant to their careers. Therefore, he asserted that 
decentralised Human Resources Management had not necessarily enhanced 
capacity building. 
 
 
 
 
74 Interview with Madam Nasaali, PPO of Sembabule on 16.11.2006. 
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Goel (1993: 301) argues that mere acquisition of knowledge does not ensure  
best results since performance depends on motivation, facilitation and career 
development. From the findings, it was quite clear that money is a major 
motivation and that people would work harder if paid more.  Goel (1993: 304) 
elaborates that, however fascinating the individual’s job assignment in public 
agency or private sector, the employee expects to be paid. The wage therefore 
affects the way he/she works, both in terms of quantity and quality of outputs. 
 
As with the Central Government, salaries paid to administrative officials in Local 
Governments remain low and have not been adjusted in line with inflationary 
trends. When the administrative officials were interviewed on matters related to 
motivation, the majority said that motivation was extremely limited due to the 
meagre resources realised from the local revenue sources. To varying extents, they 
noted that some mechanisms are in place, which are meant to motivate staff. The 
interview sessions in Sembabule and Masindi districts revealed the motivators 
indicated in the Table 10 below. 
 
Table 10 Mechanisms of motivating staff 
 
Motivator  Frequency Percentage 
Prompt salary payment 34 22.9 
Provision of transport 26 18.9 
Job security 42 28.4 
Provision of allowances 17 11.5 
Training opportunities 15 10.2 
NGO interventions (e.g. prizes, seminars) 12 8.1 
TOTAL 148 100 
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It is clear from the above that the two districts use different mechanisms to 
motivate staff. However, these responses were generated from four technical areas 
only namely Health, Education, Agriculture, and Works and Technical Services. It 
was also pointed out by staff in lower cadres that these benefits are restricted to the 
top management, leaving the lower cadres depending on wages alone. 
 
The CAO of Sembabule district while commenting on motivation noted that: 
“When the Local Governments were collecting graduated tax, they 
were able to facilitate the LG staff including the lower cadres with 
overtime allowance, night allowance, subsistence allowance. But 
these days we are totally hard up.75” 
 
This is the same situation in other Local Governments because Balunywa (2006: 
23) discovered the same trend when investigating the reasons for the conflicts in 
local governance in the Iganga district. 
 
6.5 The District Service Commission in the Masindi and Sembabule 
 Districts 
 
The Separate Personnel System (SPS) is operationalised by the District Service 
Commission (DSC) which is empowered by the LGA to recruit, confirm and 
discipline staff in the service of Local Governments, except for the CAO, Deputy 
CAO and TC of municipality or city. As noted in chapter three, the DSC is 
appointed by the District council on the recommendation of the Executive 
Committee of the district or city. 
 
 
75 Interview with Mr. Twesigye on 16.11.2006. 
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This section examines the effectiveness of the DSC by analysing its appointment 
procedure, as well as the adequacy of resources and integrity in the execution of its 
duties. The manner in which the DSC members are appointed was analysed 
amongst 240 respondents, which included elected office bearers, administrative 
officials, and civil society organisations. 
 
Of the respondents, 37 percent were satisfied with the way members of the DSC 
were appointed, 59 percent were dissatisfied, while 4 percent were non-committal. 
This is illustrated in figure 15 below. 
 
Figure 15 Responses to satisfaction with appointment of DSC 
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Findings reveal that the majority was not satisfied with the way the members of the 
DSCs were appointed. When asked why, respondents argued that the people who 
were selected as members of the DSC were not the best in the district. 
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One administrative officer in Sembabule district argued that:  
“The DSC is virtually appointed by the chairperson who presents 
name to the executive that he/she appoints. None of the executives 
can challenge the chairperson for fear of being relieved of her/his 
duties.76” 
 
The implication of the above statement is that more often than not, merit was not 
adhered to when appointing members of the DSC.  
 
This was strengthened by one councillor in Masindi Town Council who argued 
that:  
“One cannot be appointed to the statutory boards especially the 
DSC unless one was one of the campaign agents of the ruling 
chairperson. It has become one way of appeasement and 
entrenchment for the incumbents.77” 
 
A similar finding was made by Kakumba (2003: 540) when he discovered that 
appointments to the DSC was monopolised by the chairperson who could not be 
challenged by his/her councillors. Those who were satisfied however argued that 
they did not mind who was appointed as long as she/he was their daughter/son and 
had the requisite qualification. 
 
During an earlier investigation by Galiwango (2004: 52), it was found that the 
chairperson of Sembabule omitted a retired senior head-teacher of one of the 
powerful secondary schools (Ntare secondary school) simply because of tribalism 
 
76 Interview with Matia, on 16.11.2006. 
77 Interview with Kyamanywa on 15.11.2006. 
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and this candidate did not support him during an election. Such incidents do not 
only undermine the performance of the DSC, but also compromise their 
independence and integrity. 
 
The DSCs are operational despite the shortcomings in the appointment of 
members. The DSCs are fulfiling their role in respect of appointing human 
resources in the service of the Local Governments. However, the question that was 
posed to the respondents was the extent to which the DSCs were performing 
competently and with integrity. 
 
It was established from a cross section of senior administrative officials that, as a 
routine, the DSCs invite and co-opt technical members of the relevant departments 
when interviewing prospective candidates. The manager of education in Masindi 
asserted that: 
“As a routine, the DSC relies heavily on the guidelines of the ESC 
and seeks the opinion of the technical team from the education 
sector, when making appointments in the education service78”. 
 
The secretary of the DSC in Sembabule, a senior administrative official at the level 
of senior personnel officer, also confirmed that the DSC follows the specifications 
laid down in the “man and job specifications” drafted by the Ministry of Local 
Government. This does not allow for the DSC to exercise discretion. For example, 
when the DSC of Sembabule could not identify a suitable candidate for the post of 
Town Clerk out of the applicants that were interviewed, they appointed one to act. 
 
 
78 Interview with madam Lubega on 16.11.2007. 
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When the administrative officials were asked to assess the performance of the DSC 
by indicating whether they believed the DSC was competent to handle HR in 
decentralised governance, the responses were mostly affirmative 67.6 percent, 
while 28.2 percent responded No, and 4.2 percent were Uncertain (see Graph 12 
below). From these responses, it is possible to conclude that the performance of the 
DSC is generally satisfactory enough for it to be considered a viable organisation 
in terms of handling human resources in a decentralised system of governance in 
Uganda. 
 
Those who were positive argued that the DSC comprised members who were 
qualified, mature and experienced people who were competent and impartial. 
Those who responded in the negative argued that the DSC did not adhere to the 
principle of merit when recruiting staff because they only considered relatives, 
friends and political supporters in terms of appointments and at times bribery 
occurs. 
Figure 16 Responses assessing the performance of the DSC 
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When the question regarding the independence of the DSC was put to the 
administrative officers and civil society members, the responses generally 
indicated that the DSCs witnessed a considerable amount of political interference 
and hence they were not independent. One community development officer in 
charge of Kiryandongo sub-county in Masindi district noted that:  
“It is difficult to get a job in the district unless the councillors have 
talked to the chairperson. The DSC is just a rubber stamp.79” 
 
Balunywa (2006: 25) discovered the same trend when he was informed that jobs in 
Iganga Local Government are allocated by politicians according to clans, religious 
affiliations and political leaning. This indeed undermines the integrity and 
independence of the DSCs. The PPO of Sembabule, when commenting on the 
independence of the DSCs argued as follows:  
“The law is very clear, the DSC is supposed to be independent. But 
if the appointing authority insinuates that they have interest in a 
particular person (candidate) the members of the DSC have their 
hands tied..80” 
 
During the FGDs, the administrative officials in both districts confirmed that the 
biggest problem experienced by the DSCs is political interference and as a result, 
the committee often fails to make independent decisions. It was also noted that this 
situation is worse immediately after election when elected leaders feel compelled 
to reward their campaigners and or financiers. 
 
 
 
79 Interview with Komakech on 21.11.2006. 
80 Interview with madam Nasaali on 16.11.2006. 
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6.6. The recentralisation of the CAOs and TCs of cities and municipalities 
 
The 2006 amendment of the LGA removed powers from the DSC to appoint 
CAOs, deputy CAOs and TCs of municipalities or cities and recentralised this 
function at the level of the Public Service Commission (Central Government). The 
effect of this is that CAOs, their deputies and TCs are now responsible to the 
Central Government through the Line Ministry of Local Government. 
 
Although these chief officials are now responsible to the centre, they still perform 
the statutory roles as outlined in the theoretical framework in chapter three. They 
are therefore bound by law to implement lawful decisions of their respective 
councils; hence, although their appointments are reversed to the centre, the Local 
Councils still retain their supervisory roles. 
 
Elected leaders and service users were requested to indicate their opinion on the 
recentralisation of CAOs and TCs. As indicated in Graph 13, the responses were 
mostly negative (65.7%), while 29.3 percent of the respondents were positive 
about this, and 5 per cent were uncertain. The elected leaders were mostly not in 
favour of recentralisation of CAOs and TCs because they viewed this as a sign of a 
lack of confidence in the capacity of Local Governments and loss of autonomy and 
authority. These leaders feared that it would be difficult to control CAOs and TCs 
because their appointments were made by and their salaries paid by the Central 
Government 
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Figure 17 Responses on whether the recentralisation of CAOs and TCs is a 
positive development 
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One secretary for Works in Sembabule Local Government stated as follows with 
respect to the recentralisation of CAOs: 
“The Central Government is killing its own child 
(decentralisation). They have turned us into mere shadows. We 
cannot appoint CAOs of our choice, yet we cannot raise our own 
revenue. We are helpless. Decentralisation is now 
recentralisation.81” 
 
This is also expressed by Balunywa (2006: 28) when he argues that the abolition of 
graduated tax and the recentralisation of the appointment of CAOs and TCs, who 
are also accounting officers in their respective Local Governments, had totally 
reversed the intentions and objectives of decentralisation in Uganda. He asserts 
that the previously corporate bodies have now been reduced to mere decentralised 
administrative units of Central Government. 
 
81 Interview with Isa Ntumwa on 16.11.2006. 
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Saito (2003: 127), when analysing Central Government transfers to Local 
Governments, noted that the over dependence of Local Governments on the central 
transfers had actually led to recentralisation. When he investigated fiscal 
decentralisation in the districts of Mukono and Rakai, he discovered that Central 
Government funded Local Governments budgets as of 2003/04 by over 93 percent. 
 
However, when the under-secretary of the MOLG was interviewed on the 
recentralisation of CAOs and TCs, she reasoned that Central Government finances 
the activities of Local Governments and it therefore needs to appoint the CAOs and 
TCs who are the accounting officers in their respective areas of jurisdiction. She 
asked: 
“Why don’t they (local leaders) complain about the Central 
Government transfers but question Central Government 
appointments?82” 
 
When the issue was raised during the FGD sessions with the administrative 
officials of the two districts, it was apparent that their opinions were totally 
different to those manifested by the elected leaders and service users. One ACAO 
from Sembabule supported the appointment of CAOs by the Central Government 
and pointed out that:  
“CAOs are now safe from undue pressure from elected leaders. 
There has been a lot of interference, harassment, nepotism and 
intimidation before.83” 
 
 
82 Interview with Madam Asio on 11.12.2006. 
83 Responses from Katongole on 16.11.2006. 
  
213
During the FGD with administrative officials of Masindi, it was observed that 
many of the court cases in Local Governments in Uganda between CAOs and their 
Local Governments emerged as a result of political victimisation. They quoted the 
cases of CAOs of the following districts against their respective councils namely, 
the Kiboga, Mbale and Pallisa. In all these cases, the administrative officials won 
the cases in the high court. As a result, they were reinstated and paid salary arrears 
and legal costs which were often exorbitant for the respective Local Governments 
whose local revenues have been dwindling over time. The administrative officials 
were of the opinion that recentralisation will rejuvenate the authority of the CAOs 
and TCs and protect them from political victimisation. 
 
6.7. The Local Government procurement system 
 
The amended LGA (2006:72-77) abolished the Local Governments Tender Boards 
(LGTB) and replaced them with the District and Municipal Contracts Committees 
as the case may be. Whereas the district or municipal council on the 
recommendation of the respective executive committees appointed the LGTB, the 
Contracts Committees are appointed by the CAO or TC of the respective local 
authority. Members of the LGTB used to be appointed from among qualified 
people in the general public. However, the members of the Contracts Committee 
are appointed by the CAO/TC from among the senior administrative officials who 
should at least be heads of department (Section 91 of LGA, 2006). 
 
In the execution of their duties, that is, the procurement of goods and services on 
behalf of their respective Local Governments, the Contracts Committees are 
expected to manifest impartiality, integrity and independence. Responses 
concerning the abolition of LGTBs and the establishment of Contracts Committees 
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in their stead were controversial as those relating to the recentralisation of the 
appointment of CAOS and TCs. Whereas the administrative officials, who 
constitute the Contracts Committees, were supportive the elected leaders again felt 
it was a way of limiting their authority. 
 
Subsequently, the administrative officials were overwhelmingly in support of the 
Contracts Committees by 82 percent since they claimed that the administrative 
officers would be more transparent and independent in the execution of their duties 
on these committees since they were people of high calibre and had their jobs to 
protect. The responses of the administrative officials are illustrated in Figure 18. 
Figure 18 Responses of Administrative Officials on Contracts Committees 
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The secretary of the Contracts Committee of Masindi district remarked thus:  
“The elected leaders used to appoint people to the Tender Boards 
some of whom had no requisite qualifications. Their only 
qualification was their loyalty to the incumbent establishment.84” 
 
 
84 Interview with Byaruhanga on 11.12.2006. 
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Another administrative official (sub-county chief) of Miirya sub-county noted that:  
“Tender Boards comprised people most of whom lacked integrity, 
because they were easily corruptible. Indeed they were responsible 
for the shoddy work because they exhorted a lot of money from 
contractors.85” 
 
These arguments were also echoed in Sembabule district. The other reason 
advanced by the administrative officials in support of appointing administrative 
officials to Contracts Committees was that it was more cost effective since instead 
of paying emoluments to Tender Board members, administrative officials would 
only be awarded sitting allowance. In addition, the administrative officials had to 
ensure ethical behaviour because their appointing authority, that is, the CAO/TC 
was also their routine boss at work; hence, misconduct could easily be checked. 
 
As for the elected leaders, they were totally opposed to Contracts Committees. The 
majority of these respondents (89%) argued that appointing administrative officials 
to Contracts Committees via the CAO/TC was a vote of no confidence in their 
capacity to manage Local Governments. 
The secretary for Works in Sembabule remarked that:  
“There is no more decentralisation. The money comes from 
Kampala (Central Government), the CAO from Kampala, now 
even the Contracts Committee is from Kampala (meaning is 
appointed by someone from Kampala). What more is left of 
decentralisation? Very soon we (elected leaders) shall be 
appointed from Kampala.86”. 
 
85 Responses from Kiwanuka on 11/12/2006. 
86 Interview with Isa Ntumwa on 16.11.2006. 
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Another elected leader who echoed negative sentiments about increasing 
interference in Local Governments by the Central Government commented that: 
“How can Central Government trust Civil servants more than us 
who are elected by the people? Politicians do not write cheques in 
Local Governments so it is the civil servants who should be 
accused of corruption.87” 
 
Those who supported the Contracts Committee said they supported it because the 
previous system (LGTB) had been abused by the politicians who used the boards 
to allocate tenders to themselves, which they often sold off to sub contractors. One 
councillor from Pakany sub-county in Masindi acknowledged that:  
“If it was a councillor taking the tender, the outside contractor 
paid 10 percent of what was worth of the project. This made the 
profit margin so small that the contractor had no choice but to 
produce shoddy work.88” 
 
The remaining respondents (2%) who preferred to remain non-committal 
responded as follows when pressed 
“We do not find it wise to support either because the same civil 
servants were working with a few elected leaders to either win 
tenders or sell them. The administrative officials are still under the 
same politicians, so we see no change.89” 
 
What has to be noted is that transferring from the LGTB to the LGCC is not a 
panacea to political interference and partiality. In his study, Balunywa (2006: 51) 
 
87 Interview with Kahwa on 11.12.2006. 
88 Statement from Rwebembera on 11.12.2006. 
89 Interview with Kaloli on 14.12.2006. 
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found that elected leaders in the Mbale Municipality Council prevailed on the 
Town Clerk and the Contracts Committee not to award the Taxi Park Tender to the 
highest bidder. Therefore, it can be deduced that the introduction of LGCC has not 
necessarily improved the procurement system in Local Governments. 
 
6.8. Conclusion 
 
This chapter analysed pertinent issues relating to decentralised service delivery and 
how it relates to development in the Ugandan districts of Masindi and Sembabule. 
Such issues included the analysis of responsibilities of decentralised Local 
Governments, as well as the effectiveness of Human Resources Management and 
procurement systems in Local Governments. 
 
Generally, the findings of this chapter indicate that the Local Governments in 
Uganda fulfil the same responsibilities such as production and marketing, 
education and sports, works and technical services, management and support 
services, and finance and planning. These similarities in function and 
responsibilities facilitated comparison between Local Governments in the two 
selected districts in respect of the delivery of services. 
 
The findings also revealed that the administrative officials had the requisite 
qualifications. The DSC was assessed to be performing well except for political 
interference, which compromised their independence. The recentralisation of 
CAOs drew mixed feelings with administrative officials supporting this while 
elected leaders did not approve of it since they were of the opinion that it dilutes 
their authority and autonomy. The same sentiments were expressed for the 
Contracts Committees. 
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Generally, the Human Resources Management, the performance of the DSC, the 
Contracts Committees, and the recentralisation of CAOs and TCs were aimed at 
enhancing efficiency in service delivery and subsequently development. The next 
chapter will analyse findings in respect of the role of elected leaders and the impact 
of fiscal decentralisation on development and service delivery. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
THE ROLE OF ELECTED LEADERS AND THE IMPACT OF 
FISCAL DECENTRALISATION ON DEVELOPMENT IN THE 
MASINDI AND SEMBABULE DISTRICTS 
 
 
7 0 Introduction 
 
 
This chapter aims, firstly, to present findings relating to the role of elected leaders 
in enhancing development and decentralised local governance in the Sembabule 
and Masindi districts. Secondly, this chapter will provide an exposition of the 
impact of fiscal decentralisation with specific reference to the impact of Central 
Government transfers, the viability of Local Governments, and the manifestations 
or characteristics of good local governance in a decentralised context. 
 
Attention will firstly be devoted to assessing the perceptions of respondents with 
respect to the electoral process in the Sembabule and Masindi districts. 
 
7.1. Electoral process at Local Government level 
 
Local Government political office holders attain their offices through an electoral 
process. During the focus group discussions with service users in the sub–counties 
of Lemiyaga in Sembabule and Kigumba in Masindi, the discussants asserted that 
there was evidence that election behaviour did not depend on the candidates’ 
ability and/or content of manifestos, but rather on material benefits derived from 
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voting for a particular candidate, or sometimes on the basis of ethnic or religious 
background. 
 
An employee of International Link Community in Masindi who was part of the 
FGD argued that:  
“Candidates do not necessarily look for political office and their 
ability to fill it as the main motivation to run in the elections, but 
rather the potential material gains that seem to be the real 
incentive for potential office holders.”90 
 
This can be attributed to the fact that the electoral process emphasises standing for 
election on individual merit to the extent that several individuals defy party 
regulations and contest the elections as independent candidates. As a result, the 
process has not always facilitated the election of the best leaders. 
 
An elderly lady in Sembabule Town Council asserted that: 
“If you have no money, you do not have to waste time to contest for 
any office in the Local Government elections. The voters know only 
one language, money. 91” 
 
In response to the question of whether democracy had led to good governance in 
Uganda, it is interesting to note that the majority of the respondents (67.4%) agreed 
that this was the case. 
 
 
 
 
90 Revelation by Musoke on 10.12.2006. 
91 Response by Nyakato on 11.12.2006. 
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Figure 19 Responses to whether democracy has led to good governance  
                     in   Uganda 
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This overwhelmingly positive response was supported by the FGDs where the 
discussants argued that the introduction of decentralisation and regular elections 
had enhanced political accountability. The LC III chairperson of Mutunda sub-
county in Masindi had this to say in support of good governance:  
“We elected leaders have to work hard to the satisfaction of the 
electorate who evaluate our performance every five years 
 through an electoral process.”92 
7.2. Accountability required of elected leaders at Local Government level 
 
Political accountability can be downward or vertical whereby Local Government 
leaders are accountable to the electorate. This is enhanced when the voters 
periodically demand explanations from elected leaders on issues pertaining to local 
development and service delivery or when they are consulted on development 
 
92 Response by Okello on 17/11/2006. 
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programmes that are implemented in their areas. Elected leaders derive their 
legitimacy from being elected by the electorate and should therefore be 
accountable to the constituents of the local community. 
 
In this respect, the service users were questioned on whether their elected leaders 
consult them on development projects implemented in their areas, the responses 
were mostly negative (59.2%) with only 33.4 percent of the respondents indicating 
that they are consulted by their elected leaders, while 7.4 percent were uncertain.  
This is illustrated in Figure 20 below. 
 
Figure 20 Responses on the extent of consultation with service users by 
                     elected leaders with respect to development 
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During the FGDs, the deputy CAO of Sembabule argued that the public did not 
know that they could access (purchase) the council minutes since most of the 
elected leaders did not provide feedback to their constituents. She further asserted 
that some did not have the capacity to interprete the decisions made by councils. 
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Therefore, the failure by the elected leaders to provide information and to 
periodically communicate to constituents to demand explanations from elected 
leaders on issues of concern. Community members are also unaware of their right 
to recall elected leaders who are unaccountable. This can also be regarded as a 
symptom of the weak capacities of civil society organisations in the areas of 
advocacy and civic education to communities. 
 
During the FGD with administrative officials in Masindi, it was noted that the flow 
of communication was not only faulty vertically (between elected leaders and 
community members), but also horizontally (among elected leaders). Thus, 
communication among the elected leaders is not efficient enough to enhance 
development. 
 
In Sembabule for example, it was noted that the district council was divided into 
two camps of the chairperson and the speaker. The same was found in Masindi as 
the council was divided due to differences emanating from elections. These short 
falls in communication led to relatively low functionality of elected leaders and 
Local Government councils. 
 
7.3. The performance of elected leaders at Local Government level 
 
The capacity of elected leaders has a significant influence on the quality of 
decision-making and subsequently the overall performance of Local Governments. 
This is critical since significant volumes of resources are channeled to Local 
Governments in Uganda. In addition, there are numerous  
guidelines, regulations and procedures that need to be effectively  internalised by 
elected leaders to ensure that they are able to  take resolutions on matters in an 
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informed manner and thereby guide the activities of administrative officials. The 
extent to which this is possible is also influenced by the educational attainment of 
elected leaders. 
 
In this regard, elected leaders, administrative officials and service users of the 
health and educational sectors were asked whether they were of the opinion that 
the educational levels of the elected leaders hindered their performance. Of these 
respondents, 69 percent agreed that it was the case and this clearly points to the 
need for capacity development interventions for elected leaders to enhance their 
contribution to decentralised local governance and service delivery, while 26.4 
percent disagreed and 4.4 per cent were neutral. 
 
Figure 21 Responses to whether educational levels of elected leaders hinder  
                     their performance 
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During the FGDs, the discussants asserted that the quality of elected leaders with 
regard to academic qualifications and experience in public affairs has greatly 
  
225
improved over time, especially at the district level, but still remained a problem at 
the lower levels especially at the sub-county. It has to be noted that the sub-county 
is the locus of development within the context of decentralised local governance in 
Uganda and therefore in the event that the elected leaders are generally deficient, 
then the value for money associated with the whole system of political 
decentralisation and the process of democratisation becomes questionable. 
 
The need for competent elected Local Government leaders is underlined by the fact 
that development planning has been decentralised to Local Governments. This shift 
in the planning process implies that local administrators no longer formulate sector 
plans which are submitted to Central Government line ministries; rather, local 
administrators report to their local council which, in turn, is held accountable to the 
local community in each jurisdiction. 
 
This is supported by Saito (2003: 61) when he argues that, under decentralisation 
in Uganda, elected leaders have to prioritise activities for coherent planning. He 
came to this conclusion after a study of development planning in Rakai and 
Mukono. What was noted in this study was that the participatory approach to 
planning that involved the bottom-up process required political and administrative 
competence. 
 
7.4. Transparency of elected leaders at Local Government level 
 
Good governance and transparency are essential prerequisites for decentralisation 
to impact positively on development. If decentralised service delivery is 
characterised by widespread corruption, the system is inherently weakened. During 
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the FGDs, the discussants were requested to identify the types of corruption in 
Local Governments and the following were listed:  
• Embezzlement or misappropriation of funds. 
• Nepotism, which results in incompetent unqualified administrative 
officials being appointed in positions of leadership. 
• Local favouritism, by especially the Contracts Committee, District Service 
Commission and Land Board. 
• Failure to monitor programmes and therefore to account for funds and 
activities. 
• Failure to deal with corrupt officials when they have been found guilty. 
 
When service users were asked whether they considered elected leaders to be 
transparent, 69.6 percent responded negatively. Many of the service users 
expressed disgust with the widespread corruption, because they believed that this 
inhibits development. However, some noted that they would do the same if they 
were in positions of authority. One young man from the Matete Trading centre had 
this to say:  
“Corruption is so widespread in public offices that if I were in such 
office, I would do the same.”93 
 
When another old woman was asked whether she would also behave like a corrupt 
leader, she said:  
“Yes, this is a social problem. Even if one corrupt person is 
punished, the next person will also get corrupt. Corruption is now 
a virus...”94 
 
93 Statement by Mulindwa on 11/12/2006. 
94 Statement by Keishanyo on 11/12/2006. 
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When the respondents were asked why they believed elected leaders were not 
transparent, they gave various reasons, namely that the elected leaders:  
• Are too involved in tendering processes (33%). 
• Connive with administrative officials to misappropriate district and sub – 
county resources (21.5%). 
• Influence the District Service Commission to have their relatives, friends 
or political allies appointed in the district civil service (35.5%). 
• Do not account to the electorate on their performance (10%). 
 
These findings are similar to those of Saito (2003: 72) where the service users in 
Mukono and Rakai were of the opinion that their elected leaders were corrupt and 
responsible for the lack of development in their areas. 
 
7.5. Autonomy of elected leaders at Local Government level 
 
The effective and efficient implementation of locally initiated development 
programmes requires that sufficient autonomy be granted to Local Councils to 
generate and spend their own resources from local revenue. However, autonomy 
should also extend to decision-making and this is only realised when devolution as 
a form of decentralisation is real and meaningful. 
 
It is interesting to note that when asked whether elected leaders experience more 
autonomy under a decentralised system of governance, 62.3 per cent of the 
respondents disagreed, while 34.3 percent agreed that this was the case and 3.4 
percent were neutral. This is indicative of the fact that most respondents considered 
elected leaders to be less autonomous under the decentralised system of 
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governance.  This is surpising given that this is one of the intentions of 
decentralisation. 
 
Figure 22 Responses to whether elected leaders are more autonomous under  
                    a decentralised system of governance 
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During the FGDs with administrative officials and elected leaders, the arguments 
advanced indicate that autonomy has been eroded largely by Central Government 
legislation and declarations. These discussants cited examples such as the 
interference of Central Government in the generation of local revenues like the 
abolition of graduated tax, boda-boda (bicycle and motorcycle) fees, road toll 
collections – all of which have been major sources of revenue for Local 
Governments. The recentralisation of CAOs and Town Clerks, as well as the 
replacement of Tender Boards with Contracts Committees had also served to 
weaken decentralisation rather than establishing autonomous Local Government 
leadership. 
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Furthermore, Local Government elected leaders are also paid salaries by the 
Central Government through allowances from the Consolidated Fund. This implies 
that the elected leaders have been relegated to the status of salaried officers and 
this undermines their autonomy. Local Governments ordinances are also subject to 
approval by the Central Government. 
 
From the above findings, it is apparent that democracy does not automatically 
enhance good governance because the elected leaders are not responsive and 
accountable to the electorate. Although decentralisation is expected to motivate 
people-centered development, the system was found to be non-participatory as the 
service users are not generally consulted on the projects that are implemented. The 
autonomy of the elected leaders is also under threat particularly from Central 
Government interventions. The next section of this chapter analyses findings on 
fiscal decentralisation and how this impacts on development. 
 
7.6. Fiscal decentralisation and development 
 
 
Fiscal decentralisation is intended to build the capacity of Local Governments to 
deliver services efficiently and effectively and hence enhance development. 
However, the ability of Local Governments to raise local revenue through service 
charges and other sources of income is central. 
Only then can the public hold the elected leaders accountable for their 
performance. This then requires that the public should pay directly for their local 
political representation and the existing infrastructure owned by Local Government 
should be sustained by that Local Government using local revenue. 
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During the FGDs with administrative officials at the district head quarters in both 
Masindi and Sembabule, the discussants were requested to analyse the issue of the 
public paying the salaries of their elected leaders. They argued that this was the 
main mechanism for holding these elected leaders accountable; they also added 
that this would make the elected leaders more responsive to the needs and priorities 
of their citizens when making decisions. The CAO of Masindi argued as follows:  
“If elected leaders are paid by the Central Government, they will 
know that this will continue and they are more likely to respond to 
Central Government, whilst citizens are likely to perceive them as not 
working on their behalf.95” 
 
To the contrary, during the FGDs with elected leaders at the district level, some 
discussants preferred the Central Government financing the salaries of local 
elected leaders. The primary argument in favour of central payment of council 
emoluments was that local revenue would be available for other development 
purposes, yet guaranteeing stability in the payment of elected leaders. 
 
The above expositions represent different interests on the part of the elected 
leaders and administrative officials. The argument in favour of payment from the 
centre is in direct contrast to the rationale of devolution, which is to promote local 
solutions tailored to local problems. One councillor for Sembabule Local 
Government who was opposed to Central Government payment argued that:  
“Our allegiance is going to shift to the centre because he who pays 
the piper calls the tune”96 
 
95 Analysis by Margaret Gimogoi on 20.11.2006. 
96 By Kyemashaiji on 21.11.2006. 
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The general view on this issue is that Central Government payment would turn 
them into “beggars” who would be made to follow the instructions of Central 
Government and this would significantly erode the authority of Local 
Governments. One administrative official in Sembabule remarked as follows:  
“Elected leaders are mandated by the LGA to mobilise for payment 
of taxes. In turn, they are rewarded for their effort in form of 
salaries and allowances derived from local revenue. What will 
motivate them to mobilise for local revenue when the centre pays 
them?”97 
 
Another dimension of the debate during the FGDs focused on whether Central 
Government should be the most appropriate institution to decide on the 
remuneration rates of local councillors. The discussants argued that the minimum 
rates set by the Central Government should be used as guidelines (not instructions) 
and, that Local Governments should retain the liberty to determine own 
remuneration rates. 
 
A discussion on whether local revenue should fund investments and services also 
ensued during the FGDs. During these sessions, it was noted that decentralisation 
and service provision through the Local Government system had the potential to 
enhance quality of service delivery since elected leaders are made responsible for 
monitoring administrative officials. 
 
The youth councillor for Masindi Town Council while arguing in favour of local 
revenue being used to fund investments stated that:  
 
97 Statement by Katongole on 11.12.2006. 
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“The public are more likely to demand for quality services if they 
know that they contribute towards them directly.”98 
 
He further put it simply: 
“If I pay a water provider for water, I expect water in turn, 
otherwise I will not pay.”99 
 
The Vice Chairperson of Sembabule Local Government supported local 
contribution to capital investments and referred to the case of Local Government 
Development Programme (LGDP) whereby Local Governments contribute 10 
percent of the cost of investments. The Plan for Modernization of Agriculture 
(PMA) also has a 10 percent co-funding obligation. According to her:  
“The logic is that such contributions are a guarantee for proper 
priority setting and promote local ownership of the facility and 
that is likely to increase the likelihood that the investment is 
sustained.”100 
 
A further critical issue that was addressed by the study in relation to fiscal 
decentralisation was the viability of Local Governments in terms of local revenue. 
During the FGDs with the CAOs and directors at the district headquarters, an 
operational working definition of a viable Local Government was coined as:  
“Local Government is “viable” in terms of its local revenue when 
the total cost of political representation and minimum expenditure 
on operation and maintenance financed from local revenue do not 
exceed 50 per cent of local revenue.” 
 
98 Response by Dragu on 17.11.2006. 
100 Statement by Saison Sali on 11.12.2006. 
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An analysis of the two Local Governments revealed that none of them met the 
criteria. The Chief Finance Officer (CFO) of Sembabule district asserted that:  
“Several Local Governments do not have the revenue collecting 
potential to become viable”101 
 
Underlying reasons that could explain the trend of declining local revenue were 
analysed during the FGDs. The FGDs with administrative officials and elected 
leaders at the district level outlined the following as the causes of the decline:  
• Political pronouncements against graduated tax. 
• Central Government transfers allegedly hamper the capacity of Local 
Governments to generate local revenues. 
• Lack of adherence to regulations regarding local revenue generation. 
• Imbalance in tax assignments between Central and Local Governments. 
• Generally poor fiscal collection performance especially the graduated tax, 
due to the inadequacy of local tax registers. 
• Poor asset enumeration and assessment procedures. 
• Unwillingness to pay by taxpayers due to mistrust arising from non-
transparent tax administration. 
• Weak link between taxes paid and services delivered. 
• Rigidity of collection exacerbated by widespread poverty. 
 
In this respect, administrative officials, elected leaders and service users were 
asked in the survey to indicate whether they agreed with the statement that local 
revenue is higher than under a centralised system of governance. It is interesting to 
note that 81 percent disagreed with the statement, which confirms the above 
 
101 Statement by Ham on 11.12.2006. 
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sentiments that local revenue has declined under a decentralised system of 
governance. 
 
Figure 23 Responses to whether local revenue is higher than under                     
centralised system of governance 
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When discussants were requested to indicate local revenue sources in order of 
importance from most to least important, they listed them as follows: graduated 
tax, property tax, licences and market dues. According to these respondents, 
graduated tax alone formed 80 per cent of the local revenue for rural Local 
Governments and 30 per cent for urban Local Governments before these sources 
were interfered with. 
 
Administrative officials, elected leaders and service users were furthermore 
requested to express their level of agreement with whether graduated tax abolition 
had impacted positively on Local Governments service delivery. The responses 
indicated that an overwhelming 82.5 percent disagreed with the statement, which 
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implies that the abolition of graduated tax has negatively impacted on service 
delivery. This also explains why the two Local Governments did not meet the 
conditions for viability. 
 
Figure 24 Response to whether the abolition of graduated tax has impacted 
positively on service delivery 
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As a result of the above scenario, the share of local revenues in the total budget of 
the two Local Governments has become insignificant. Subsequently, the low levels 
of local revenue have served to undermine the legitimacy of Local Governments in 
that sustainable sources of local revenue contribute to building a stronger, more 
autonomous and financially viable Local Government system. This will require 
much less dependence on Central Government sources of revenue, an issue that 
will be discussed in more detail in the next section. 
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7.6.1. Increased dependence on Central Government transfers 
 
While local revenue has been declining Central Government grants have increased. 
As a result, Local Governments have become increasingly more reliant on central 
grants. An increasing proportion of these grants are being provided as conditional 
grants, limiting the autonomy of Local Governments. The implication of this is that 
Local Governments administrative officials and elected leaders are likely to 
become more responsive and accountable to the Central Government rather than to 
the local electorate. 
 
The CFO of Masindi indicated that reliance on central transfers in the Masindi 
district has increased from 54 to 95 percent between the financial years 1999/2000 
to 2006/2007.  This is graphically depicted in figure 25 below. 
Figure 25 Increasing LG Reliance on CG transfer in Masindi district from  
                    1999 to 2006 
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In 1999/2000, that is, before the interference of Central Government in Local 
Government revenue mechanisms, Masindi Local Government was contributing 
over 45 percent to the budget. However, the political events that unfolded between 
2001 and 2006 general elections have left this Local Government with the capacity 
to contribute only 5 percent to the budget. The situation is even worse in 
Sembabule where local revenue constituted only 3.7 percent of the budget during 
the 2005/06 financial year. Having noted that Local Governments depended on 
Central Government transfers to deliver services, the question that arose was 
whether the transfers were adequate or not. 
 
7.6.2. Adequacy of Central Government transfer for Local service delivery 
 
The administrative officials and elected leaders were asked to express their opinion 
on the adequacy of Central Government transfers and the majority (71.4%) 
believed that the Central Government transfers were inadequate for effective 
service delivery, while 27.3 percent believed to the contrary and 1.3 percent was 
neutral. 
Figure 26 Responses on the adequacy of Central Government transfers 
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When asked during the FGDs to explain why they believed Central Government 
transfers were inadequate, administrative officials and elected leaders argued that 
although the amount of fiscal transfers from the Central Government had 
increased, these transfers are not commensurate with the responsibilities that the 
Local Governments have to undertake especially given that local revenue sources 
have been destabilised. 
 
The CFO of Sembabule argued that although the LG transfers had increased, 80 
percent of these funds were conditional grants with stringent conditions attached to 
them. This predominance of conditional grants potentially undermines the rationale 
underlying decentralisation. 
 
The FGD of the elected leaders at district level supported the analysis by the CFO 
Sembabule but added that the reason for the increase in conditional grant is that 
many activities area funded by Poverty Action Fund (PAF). The PAF was created 
when Uganda benefited from the debt relief of the Highly Indebted Poor Countries 
(HIPC) initiative in 1998. 
 
According to these discussants, the PAF Particularly focuses on the five priority 
areas of education, health, water and sanitation, agriculture, and feeder roads. 
Although the conditionality negotiation is a recent development which makes the 
budgeting process by the Central Government inclusive, when it comes to 
determining the release transfers, the exercise is done arbitrarily depending on the 
central resource basket and national priorities. 
 
When asked what they thought should be done to address the problem, the 
discussants responded that there is a need for Central Government to renounce 
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their earlier pronouncements on graduated tax and market dues to enable Local 
Governments to regain their autonomy and viability. They also asserted that there 
is a need to harmonise the Central Government and Local Governments budgeting 
process. 
To further enhance the viability of Local Governments and thereby promote 
development and service delivery, it is essential that accounting systems be 
improved. This is analysed in the next section of this chapter.  
 
7.6.3. Improvement of Local Government accounting system 
 
Prudent financial management manifested by transparency and accountability, is a 
critical requirement in ensuring that resources are utilised to enhance development. 
It is interesting to note that 59.4 percent of the respondents agreed that 
accountability systems of local governance had improved, while 38.8 percent 
disagreed, and 1.8 percent was neutral. 
Figure 27 Responses to whether accounting systems had improved under a  
                    decentralised system of governance 
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The responses elicited during the FGDs with administrative officials and elected 
leaders at the district level in both Masindi and Sembabule districts did not differ 
from the above. The discussants argued that transparency and accountability had 
improved under a decentralised system of governance since the Central 
Government publicises Local Governments financial information in national 
newspapers and within Local Governments as a condition during the assessment of 
minimum conditions and performance measures. The purpose of publicising this 
information is to provide the public with an opportunity to view and follow up on 
the utilisation of funds.  
 
However, the secretary for Works of Sembabule Local Government lamented as 
follows:  
“Unfortunately, many of the community members do not access 
this information because of inadequate appreciation of its 
importance.102” 
 
The other hindrance is the manner in which the information is disseminated in both 
the way it is packaged and the channel of communication used. As a result the 
public remains largely ignorant of the resources transferred from the Central 
Government to the various Local Governments. 
 
The chairperson of the Local Government Public Accounts Committee (LGPAC) 
for Masindi district argued that:  
“Lack of financial information impedes community capacity to 
demand for services or plan and benefit from economic 
 
102 Statement by Issa Ntumwa on 11.12.2006. 
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opportunities. Informed communities are empowered which makes 
them active participants in society.103” 
 
One UNICEF official in Sembabule district who attended one of the FGDs on 
health argued that the public were not active participants because Local 
Governments council decisions were either not communicated to constituents or 
when communicated, information was scattered and not user friendly. He added 
that communication between the administrative officials and elected leaders 
regarding expenditures was scanty and this undermines transparency. 
 
The FGD with the administrative officials in Masindi revealed that transparency ad 
accountability were reinforced through mechanisms such as the monitoring of 
administrative officials by elected leaders, the presence of the Auditor General’s 
office in every district, the IGG, the RDC and even the police. In addition, they 
argued that the various civil society organisations also mobilised and advocated for 
the interests of local communities in respect of the utilisation of Local Government 
funds. 
 
On the other hand, the RDC of Sembabule district asserted that insufficient 
facilitation, limited independence, lack of follow up by council of the internal audit 
reports and poor networking hamper Local Governments accountability 
mechanisms. He further argued that the LGPACs in most Local Governments had 
not effectively exerted their statutory authority as an institution responsible for 
checking on accountability and transparency. 
 
 
103 Statement by Shaban on 17.11.2006. 
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This is in line with the findings of Saito (2003: 129) who pointed out that the 
LGPAC in Mukono had knowledge and skill limitations that impact negatively on 
their ability to exercise their functions as mandated by legislation. In addition, he 
argued that the LGPAC tended to focus too exclusively on faults rather than 
recommendations to improve accounting systems. 
 
It is imperative that accountability mechanisms are in place and functional to 
promote the effectiveness of service delivery within a decentralised system of 
governance. This will serve to minimise the threat of corruption. 
 
7.6.4. Corruption as a threat to decentralisation 
  
If decentralisation is to enhance development, Local Governments need to be 
characterised by prudent and corrupt free systems of service delivery. The majority 
of administrative officials, elected leaders and service users targeted by the survey 
(83.5%) were of the opinion that corruption constitutes a threat to decentralisation. 
This overwhelming response was manifested even among the elected leaders and 
administrative officials who would benefit the most from corruption.  This is 
graphically illustrated in figure 28 below. 
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Figure 28 Responses to whether corruption constitutes a threat to  
                     decentralisation 
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One service user of Kimengo Sub-County of Masindi, when asked what he 
regarded as the biggest threat to decentralised service delivery stated that: 
“Decentralisation’s biggest enemy is corrupt elected and 
administrative officials. These two connive to disrupt tendering 
processes and even influence recruitment of staff in the district.104” 
 
During an interview with the former chairperson of Karujubu Sub-County in 
Masindi, it was found that during the 2004/05 financial year, the sub-county chief 
and accountant had misappropriated 22 million Uganda shillings collected from 
Kinyara Sugar Works as graduated tax (before it was abolished) for factory 
workers residing in the sub–county. It is encouraging to note, however, that at the 
time this research was conducted, these two officers had been charged in the courts 
of law. 
 
104 Statement by Opio on 17.11.2006. 
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7.7. Conclusion 
 
This chapter analysed the role of elected leaders and fiscal decentralisation in 
enhancing development in Local Governments in Uganda with specific reference 
to the Masindi and Sembabule districts. The research findings with respect to 
elected leaders focused on the electoral process that had been monetised and that 
the elected leaders generally do not consult their constituents on the projects to be 
implemented in their areas. It was also noted that the education levels of the 
elected leaders affected their performance, the elected leaders were not transparent, 
and that their autonomy had been undermined by Central Government 
interventions. 
 
The aspects relating to fiscal decentralisation that received attention included the 
viability of Local Governments, Local Government revenue generation, the 
abolition of graduation tax, the increasing dependence of Local Governments on 
Central Government transfers, as well as the accounting systems and corruption at 
Local Government level. In this respect, it was revealed that both Masindi and 
Semababule could not be regarded as viable Local Governments and this could 
largely be attributed to factors such as: 
• A marked decline in the ability of Local Governments to generate their 
own revenue. 
• The negative impact of abolition of graduated tax on Local Governments 
service delivery. 
• The increased dependence of Local Governments on Central Government 
transfers which are inadequate and arbitrarily determined. 
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It was further pointed out that the Local Governments accounting systems have 
improved although corruption remains a major threat to decentralisation. 
 
In conclusion, it can be argued that Local Governments need adequate 
discretionary funds for the purposes of development and improved service 
provision. This is made possible through granting Local Governments the 
autonomy to raise local revenue and reducing their dependence on conditional 
Central Government transfers. 
 
In order to provide an in-depth assessment of whether decentralisation enhances 
development and to also depict the contradictions manifested in decentralised local 
governance in Uganda, two service sectors, namely Education and Health are used 
as case studies. The next chapter analyses responses on the decentralised delivery 
of the education and health services with specific reference to the Masindi and 
Sembabule districts. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
FINDINGS ON EDUCATION AND HEALTH SERVICE 
SECTORS IN MASINDI AND SEMBABULE DISTRICTS 
 
8 0 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the findings in respect of Education and Health in the 
Masindi and Sembabule districts as case study service sectors whose delivery was 
decentralised in terms of both the Constitution of 1995 and the Local Governments 
Act of 1997. Firstly, the Education sector will be analysed in terms of its 
effectiveness under decentralised local governance and then, secondly, the Health 
sector will receive attention. 
 
This analysis will aim to assess the extent to which decentralised local governance 
is facilitating the delivery of essential services such as Education and Health in two 
selected districts in Uganda and thereby contributing to development and poverty 
reduction. 
 
8.1. Education sector under decentralised local governance 
 
Education is essential to enhance the self-esteem of people as it equips people with 
practical skills such as literacy. In Uganda, education is considered critical to 
overcome pervasive poverty. In addition, the process of education enables people 
to become more aware of a wide range of social and political issues. This raised 
awareness can help people fulfil their potential, not only in the economic sphere, 
but also as human beings. 
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The Government of Uganda has through the various reforms identified six National 
Programme Priority Areas (NPPA) and these include primary education, primary 
health care, water and sanitation, rural roads, agricultural extension and functional 
adult literacy. These priority areas are among the sectors where decentralised 
services are delivered, however, there are contradictions in terms of which these 
decentralisation principles are applied in some of the NPPAs. 
 
8.1.1. Legal status of education service delivery under decentralisation 
 
The policy of primary education emphasises Universal Primary Education (UPE) 
whose aim is to ensure access to education for all irrespective of gender, disability 
and categorisation. Legal issues relating to the Education sector were discussed by 
education service providers such as Education officers, District Executive 
Committee Members, and the District Education Committees during the FGDs. 
 
During these discussions, it was noted that the second schedule, part 2, paragraph 1 
of the LGA, 1997, devolves the responsibility for the provision of Education 
services to the district councils. When asked to list the levels of education that have 
been decentralised the Education Officer of Sembabule district enumerated 
nursery, primary, secondary, trade, special and technical education. She further 
clarified that the Lower Local Government councils were particularly responsible 
for nursery and primary education. 
 
The discussants also outlined the laws that pertain to the Education sector as being 
the Education Act Cap 127 and the Education Service Act, 2002. When the 
discussants at Masindi Education Centre were asked to distinguish between the two 
laws, the DEO of Masindi district stated that: 
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“The Education Act provides for the development and regulation 
of Education, the registration and licensing of teachers in public 
schools. While the Education Service Act sets out the roles and 
responsibilities of the Education Service Commission.105” 
 
The Secretary of Education for Masindi Local Government added that one of the 
functions of the ESC is to monitor and offer technical advice, support and training 
to the District Service Commission (DSC) and to hear grievances from persons 
appointed by the DSC. 
 
Both FGD sessions in the two districts noted the contradiction relating to 
secondary education service delivery. They asserted that although the LGA 
decentralised secondary education, the line Ministry of Education and Sports 
(MoES) has retained the management of secondary Education at the centre. The 
only function that had been decentralised was managing the pay roll. 
 
During a telephone interview with the Permanent Secretary of MoES about this 
contradiction, he argued as follows:  
“The justification for retaining secondary Education at the centre 
is based on the challenges experienced through the 
decentralisation of UPE. Although success has been recorded in 
quantitative terms, reflected through increase in enrolment and 
infrastructure developments, challenges in accountability and the 
quality of Education in general need to be addressed before wholly 
decentralizing secondary Education.”106 
 
105 Statement by Kisembo on 20.11.2006. 
106 Statement made by Mr. Lubanga Francis. 
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The FGDs also discussed the Education sector programmes within the context of 
decentralisation. The sessions noted that the major programmes under the primary 
education sub-sector for which resources and responsibilities for their 
implementation were fully decentralised to Local Governments included: 
• Universal Primary Education (UPE) Capitation Grant Programme, for 
provision to schools of extra instructional materials, promotion of co-
curricular activities, and support to school management and 
administration. 
• The primary schools construction programme under the School Facilities 
Grant (SFG). 
• Recruitment, appointment and remuneration of primary school teachers. 
 
One of the controversial issues that was raised by the discussants related to the 
procurement of instructional materials. It was noted that the MoES was directly 
engaged in the procurement of instructional materials for Local Governments. This 
contravened the second schedule of the LGA, which decentralised the provision of 
Education services to LGs and thereby compromised the autonomy and mandate of 
LGs to procure goods and services for purposes of Education services delivery. 
 
8.1.2. Accessibility of Education services under decentralisation 
 
The survey instrument that was administered to administrative officials, elected 
leaders and service users questioned the respondents about the accessibility of 
Education services under decentralised local governance. This related mainly to the 
availability of and proximity to the service facilities. The purpose of this question 
was to assess perceptions regarding whether schools are more accessible under 
decentralisation. 
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It is interesting to note in figure 29 that the majority of respondents (79.1%) 
believed that schools were more accessible under decentralisation. This was in line 
with the researcher’s (2004: 51) earlier findings when 68.3 percent of service users 
of education in Sembabule responded that education facilities were within a 
distance less than three kilometers from one another. In some instances facilities 
were as close as one kilometer especially in case of denominational founded 
schools like the Roman Catholic schools. 
 
Figure 29 Responses regarding accessibility of Education under 
decentralised local governance in Masindi and Sembabule districts 
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What has to be noted, however, is that although schools may be in close proximity 
to service users, the quality of services provided may be problematic. This was 
addressed during the FGDs in both districts. The discussants were aware of a 
variety of factors that contributed to the deterioration of Educational quality even if 
they were generally positive about UPE. 
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The discussants outlined the following as factors leading to the deterioration of 
education quality:- 
• The increase of pupils had outpaced the increase of newly recruited 
teachers. 
• School materials were far from sufficient. These included text books and 
classrooms. 
The finding was similar to one by Saito (2003: 161) when he found that in Mukono 
district some lessons were held under trees and several other classes were held in 
incomplete or temporary structures. As a result, crowded classrooms with 
inadequate furniture and a poor state of scholastic materials do not facilitate 
effective learning. Subsequently, these inadequate facilities also contribute to 
school dropouts despite the increase in enrolments. 
 
8.1.3. School enrolments 
 
Universal Primary Education (UPE) was intended to provide an opportunity to all 
school going children to attend school. During the FGDs in the two districts, it was 
revealed that school enrolments in both districts had increased since 1997. While in 
Sembabule, school enrolments had risen from 37.500 pupils in 1997 to 67.300 
pupils by 2006, in Masindi it had increased from 103.000 in 1997 to 210.000 
pupils by 2006. This data from official records was in line with the general opinion 
of respondents (87.6%) who expressed their agreement that school enrolments had 
increased under decentralisation. 
 
When some services users were asked why they thought school enrolments had not 
improved, they indicated that the biggest problem was absenteeism and school 
dropouts. In Sembabule, where there is a large Bahiima (cattle keepers) population, 
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many children especially girls had to herd cattle, which is enshrined in the Bahiima 
culture. In both districts, poverty and economic burden are still high for the very 
poor despite UPE subsidies. In order to cope with massive increase of pupils at 
school, parents were often asked to pay various fees in addition to the costs of 
uniforms, stationary and scholastic materials. The various fees include pupils’ 
lunch, teachers’ welfare, and extra lessons. The other reason for poor school 
attendance was the poor status of child nutrition both at home and at school. 
 
During the FGDs, the discussants also cited the dry spell as one of the factors that 
led to pupils deserting schools. This mainly affected the cattle keepers in Lugusulu, 
Lwemiyaga, Lwebitakuli, Ntuusi sub-counties of Sembabule district and the 
Kiryandongo, Kigumba, Kimengo, Karujubu, Bujenje sub – counties of Masindi 
district. During the drought, parents and their children have to shift with their cattle 
to river Katonga and Lake Albert for Sembabule and Masindi respectively. This 
negatively impacts on school attendance in these two districts. 
 
The discussants also identified parental attitudes towards Education as one of the 
factors that lead to school dropouts. One district councillor in Sembabule had this 
to say; 
“Some parents do not fully appreciate the importance of Education 
and this results in their children not being sent to school. This is 
partly because the parents themselves did not receive Education; 
even persuasion by councillors tends to be unsuccessful.”107 
 
 
 
 
107 Argument by Sebugwawo on 24.11.2006. 
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The DEO of Sembabule cited the lack of role models in the community of 
personalities who had excelled through Education as one of the factors 
undermining positive parental attitudes. Although female enrolments had increased 
under UPE, more girls tended to drop out than boys. This finding is in line with 
that of Saito (2003: 171) when he found that in Rakai, female pupils dropped out 
more than boys due to pregnancy, marriage and family responsibilities like looking 
after cattle. 
 
Despite the reasons advanced for pupils dropping out, the survey findings reveal 
that 73.8 percent of the respondents agreed that school dropouts had declined in 
both districts under decentralisation 
 
Figure 30 Responses to whether school dropouts had declined 
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The findings of the FGDs support this since the discussants argued that although 
many pupils dropped out of school, they were far less compared to the period 
before the introduction of UPE. They also asserted that even those pupils who 
  
254
                                                
dropped out due to hazards like drought still went back to school when the climatic 
conditions improved. Besides, the ratio of dropouts was much lower than that of 
those pupils who persisted in school and it is therefore not justified to regard 
school dropouts as constituting a major threat to UPE. 
 
Generally, UPE was highly appreciated by people at the grassroots level and many 
FGD discussants acknowledged that it had reduced the financial burdens of 
schooling. UPE has had a particular impact on disadvantaged children, especially 
girls, orphans and the disabled. As one woman stated; 
“It (UPE) is good because children get educated up to the primary 
seven level. For a widow, government support for children is really 
appreciated.”108 
 
8.1.4. The role of Local Councils in respect of Education 
 
District and urban authorities are by law body corporates with autonomous powers 
to sue and/or to be sued. These Local Governments plan, for development of their 
respective areas of jurisdiction. Each Local Government is required to compile a 
five–year development plan from which annual estimates are drawn. The two 
districts have these five-year development plans in place at both the district and 
sub-county levels. 
 
A scrutiny of the five-year development plans for the Masindi and Sembabule 
districts revealed that the Education sector service delivery was largely financed 
from resources transferred from the Central Government in terms of SFG, UPE 
 
108 Made by Nantongo on 21.11.2006. 
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capitation grants and Local Governments Development Programme (LGDP) 
Grants. 
 
The FGDs revealed that there was still poor facilitation of available local revenue 
on the part of the Education Department because the elected leaders did not regard 
education as a priority. According to the DEO of Sembabule, it was due to this 
poor facilitation that the Assistant Education Officers who were supposed to be 
resident in the counties where they were designated, stayed at the district 
headquarters and only occasionally visited the counties like mere visitors. 
 
The head teachers of Karushoshomezi Primary School in Sembabule district 
attributed the negative attitude of the elected leaders (councillors) to education to 
the fact that the councillors themselves were largely illiterate and hence could not 
support the development of education as a priority. He quoted the example of the 
chairperson of Ntuusi sub-county, where the said school is located, who had not 
attended even primary one education. 
 
A similar argument was advanced by the inspector of schools for Bujenje County 
in Masindi district who asserted that: 
“The LGA should be revised to include a minimum academic 
qualification for LC III chairpersons and LC V councillors. 
 Only then shall we have politicians who value 
Education.109” 
 
At the time this investigation was undertaken, only the office of the district/city 
chairperson had a minimum academic qualification attached to it. The rest of the 
 
109 Statement by Byaruhanga on 22.11.2006. 
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political offices in the Local Councils are open to anyone regardless of educational 
attainment. 
According to the above findings this partly influences the attitude of the elected 
leaders towards education. The survey questioned elected leaders, administrative 
officials and service users on whether Local Councils disregard the education 
programmes. Despite the views of the administrative officials during the FGDs, the 
responses to the questionnaires reflected that 54.8 per cent of respondents 
disagreed with this statement. The implication of this is that most respondents 
believed that Local Councils do not disregard Education programmes. 
 
Figure 31 Responses to whether Local Councils disregard Education  
                     programmes 
          
                     43.8%        Key 
Responses                        Agree 
                 Neutral 
      1.4%             Disagree 
                             
                   54.8% 
 
   20  40  60  80   
 
 
 
Percentages 
 
During an interview with the parents of Kabango Primary School, they were asked 
whether they were satisfied with the contribution of their local leaders to schools. 
One elderly man stated that:  
“In our village, we voted for the LC III chairperson and our parish 
councillor because they brought for us a permanent school. I am 
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69 years old but I studied in a grass – thatched classroom. Now my 
grandchildren study in good buildings.110” 
 
The above quotation indicates that infrastructure improvements in schools have 
taken place under decentralised service delivery and that citizens attribute this to 
good governance by Local Councils. The parish priest of Matete Catholic Mission 
in the Sembabule district concurred with this and argued that:  
“Before decentralisation, most schools in the district were semi-
permanent (meaning mud and wattle), but today children study in 
permanent structure with scholastic materials. There is indeed 
improvement in the service delivery in the Education sector if only 
the quality of teachers could be improved.111” 
 
In contrast to the above, it is interesting to note that the Education Officers who 
were interviewed by the researcher pointed out that local revenue is not allocated 
to Education programmes, while the Central Government transfers are conditional 
grants that cannot be diverted to cover Educational programmes as this is a 
criminal act. 
 
8.1.5. Inspection of schools 
 
The Education sector has four major departments of administration, inspection, 
special needs and sports. The inspectorate is central to Educational quality 
assurance because it monitors the quality of teachers, the levels of absenteeism and 
their adherence to the curriculum. Effective inspection requires that competent 
 
110 Statement by Dramani on 21/11/2006. 
111 Rev. Father Dungu on 24/10/2006. 
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Education Officers are appointed, deployed and facilitated to visit schools, 
formulate appraisal reports, organise refresh courses/workshops where required, 
and recommend confirmation, transfer or disciplining of teachers. 
 
In the survey, respondents were asked to express their level of agreement with 
whether inspection of schools was adequate. The graph below indicates that the 
majority of the respondents (71.3%) were of the opinion that school inspection is 
inadequate. 
Figure 32 Responses to whether inspection of school was adequate 
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When the Education Officers of the two districts were asked to account for the 
reasons why respondents believed that school inspection was inadequate, they 
argued that the Local Governments did not effectively facilitate Education 
programmes like the inspection of schools.  When the County Inspector for 
Mawogola County in Sembabule was asked to explain why inspection was not 
adequate he stated that:  
  “We have no residential facilities at the counties, no transport   
 (vehicles/ motorcycles), no facilitation in terms of allowances   
  
259
                                                
 or imprest, hence, making inspection of schools very difficult.   
 We want to visit schools but we are incapacitated.112” 
 
In-depth probing of some head-teachers and senior teachers also revealed that 
some Education Officers especially in the inspectorate were not aware of their 
duties and responsibilities. According to the chairperson of the Primary Head-
Teachers’ Association in Masindi: 
“The Education Officers recruited to inspect schools are 
inexperienced secondary school teachers who cannot impart 
professional advice on the basics of primary education. Teacher 
educators or graduate teachers but who developed through 
upgrading, would make better inspectors of primary schools.113” 
This implies that inadequate school inspection is not only caused by lack of 
financial resources, but also by deficiencies in the competence of inspectors. 
 
8.1.6. Efficiency and adequacy of school personnel 
 
School personnel include the head-teachers and teachers who run the school 
routinely. The efficiency of school personnel is central in determining the quality 
of education that pupils receive. While he was chairperson of the Education 
Review Commission, Kajubi (1989:3) remarked that:  
“No education system can be better than the quality of its teachers, 
nor can a country be better than the quality of its education.” 
 
 
 
112 Made by Haji Sulait on 24.10.2006. 
113 Statement by Kyemaswa on 21.11.2006. 
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The above quotation underlines the important role of school teachers in 
determining the outcome of education and subsequently the competitiveness of the 
nation. For the school personnel to be adequate, staff have to be well trained, 
experienced and numerically adequate to effectively deliver the education services 
to the benefit of the pupils. 
 
At the time of this investigation, Sembabule had 1588 teachers of whom 55.8 
percent were trained and qualified while 44.2 percent were unqualified. In Masindi 
district, there were 3741 teachers of whom 69.7 percent were qualified, with the 
remaining 30.3 percent being unqualified. On average therefore, the two districts 
had 62.8 percent qualified teachers and 37.2 percent unqualified teachers.  This is 
graphically illustrated in figure: 33 below. 
 
Figure 33 Qualification status of teachers in Sembabule and Masindi  
                     Districts 
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The implication of this finding is that in Sembabule, out of 1588 teachers, 702 
were not qualified while in Masindi out of 3741 teachers, 1134 teachers were 
unqualified. This is indicative of the fact that the DSC and Education Office often 
have to recruit unqualified teachers to fill the gap. For example, in some remote 
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schools that the researcher visited like Karushoshomezi Primary School in Ntuusi 
sub-county in Sembabule district, only three out of nine teachers employed at the 
school were qualified. A similar situation was found in several parts of Masindi, 
especially the remote and inaccessible areas neighbouring the Murchison Falls 
National Park and Kijujubwa. 
 
The shortage of qualified teachers was highlighted by the FGD discussants as one 
of the hindrances to the UPE programme in the two districts. During the sessions, 
the discussants in Sembabule also revealed that out of the “qualified” teachers, 
many were being investigated by the IGG Masaka officer for possessing forged 
documents (certificates) and eight had been interdicted. The implication of this is 
that several of the qualified teachers could actually be unqualified and in 
possession of forged qualification. 
 
Besides forging academic certificates, the study also found that some teachers had 
fraudulently promoted themselves using concocted minutes of the DSC and/or 
some times without any minutes at all. A validation report by the DSC on the 
authenticity of promotion appointment letters of head- teachers and deputies in 
Sembabule district revealed that 56 head-teachers and deputies had forged their 
promotions since they had promotion appointment letters without having attended 
promotion interviews. 
 
These forgeries have serious financial and performance implications. In terms of 
financial resources, it implies that these teachers are earning salaries for which they 
do not qualify while on the performance side; these teachers are performing roles 
of school managers for which they are not competent. In-depth probing revealed 
that district officials in the personnel department, head teachers and some officials 
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from the Ministry of public service are involved in these malpractices. This, 
however, was not found to have happened in Masindi. 
When asked in the survey whether schools had competent head-teachers, 51.8 
percent of the respondents agreed that this was the case, while 47.1 per cent 
disagreed and only 1.1 percent was neutral. Furthermore, during the interview with 
the service users of Education and Health, participants were asked whether they 
were happy with the school services in their areas and 55.6 percent responded in 
the affirmative, while 42.1 percent were negative and only 2.3 percent were 
uncertain. These findings seem to indicate that there is no overwhelming consensus 
among the respondents of whether head-teachers at schools are competent and 
education service delivery is adequate. 
 
Figure 34 Responses to whether schools have competent head-teachers 
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Those respondents who indicated that were not satisfied with education service 
delivery were requested to motivate their view, they indicated the following varied 
reasons:  
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• The head-teachers are frequently absent and as a result even the teachers 
are absent. Those teachers who bothered to attend are not supervised. 
• Contractors build shoddy classrooms, latrines and teachers’ houses. 
• The DSC has appointed incompetent head-teachers. 
• SMC meetings were not being convened and therefore there was no 
accountability for the utilisation of UPE funds. 
• Inadequate supervision by the Education Officers. 
• Parents were aware that some of the teachers were untrained. 
Closely related to the efficiency of schools is the academic performance of the 
schools as measured by their performance in National Examinations. The study 
analysed the academic performance of the two districts for Primary Leaving 
Examinations (PLE) for the academic years 2003 – 2005 and the following was 
revealed 
Table 11 PLE results for Sembabule District (2003 – 2005) 
 
Grade  2003 2004 2005 
 No  % No  % No  % 
Div I 165 9.34 174 9.61 171 9.14 
Div II 418 23.68 441 24.33 411 21.98 
Div III 311 17.63 294 16.23 331 17.70 
Div IV 266 15.07 271 14.95 261 13.96 
U 394 22.33 405 22.35 395 21.13 
X 211 11.95 227 12.53 301 16.09 
Total 1765 100 1812 100 1870 100 
 
Source: Education Office 2006 
 Key - U – Failure      X– Absent 
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The above table reveals that first grades are still very few, as the district never got 
beyond 10 percent of the registered candidates for three consecutive academic 
years. The failure rate (U) is still high since it has never dropped below 20 percent 
for the three years under review. The number of candidates who registered for 
examinations at the beginning of the academic year but who did not persevere up 
to the end to sit for PLE was significant since it was always   beyond 10 percent of 
the registered candidates. This could be construed to be the dropout rate at the 
primary seven stage. 
 
Table 12 PLE results for Masindi District (2003 – 2005) 
 
 
Grade  2003 2004 2005 
 No  % No  % No  % 
Div I 301 11.18 332 11.45 354 12.16 
Div II 742 27.56 761 26.26 797 27.38 
Div III 399 14.83 414 14.28 391 13.45 
Div IV 487 18.09 491 16.94 498 17.12 
U 449 16.68 488 16.94 474 16.28 
X 314 11.66 413 14.24 396 13.61 
Total 2692 100 2899 100 2910 100 
 
Source: Education Office 2006 
                    Key - U – Failure  
        X – Absent  
 
The Masindi scenario is slightly better since the pass rate for the first grades for the 
three years under review was above 10 percent. Given that the district is bigger and 
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older with a better establishment than Sembabule, the academic performance of 
schools in this district was expected to be better. However, the rate of failure (U) at 
an average of 16 percent of the candidates is not a reflection of good performance. 
Furthermore, as with Sembabule, the number of candidates who registered for 
examinations but never sat for examination (X) stands on average at above 12 
percent for the period 2003 – 2005, if this is taken as the dropout rate then it is 
high. 
 
When the DEO of Masindi was asked to explain the high failure and dropout rate, 
he cited a number of reasons, which include the following: 
• Child labour especially in the tobacco production by especially the Alur 
community of Masindi. 
• The nomadic life of the cattle keepers who shift during drought. 
• The influx of internally displaced persons from northern Uganda as a result 
of the Lords Resistance Army (LRA) rebellion. 
• The high number of unqualified teachers. 
• Wide spread poverty amongst the population who can not afford extra 
charges and providing meals to pupils 
• Lack of support from political leadership. 
 
8.1.7. School Management Committees 
 
Decentralised Education service delivery is intended to increase community 
participation in planning and implementation. Community involvement in the 
Education sector is manifested in the constitution and operations of the School 
Management Committees (SMCs). 
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By law, each school is supposed to have an SMC, which represents various interest 
groups/stakeholders like the foundation body if the school is denominational, 
parents, teachers and representatives of government like local councillors. When 
asked in the survey whether all schools have SMCs, a substantial majority of the 
respondents (78.6%) agreed that this was the case. 
 
Figure 35 Responses to whether schools have School Management  
                     Committees 
 
        
                       78.6%    Key 
Responses                        Agree 
                 Neutral 
     0.7%             Disagree 
                             
      20.7% 
 
   20  40  60  80   
 
 
 
Percentages 
 
However, the issue of whether schools have SMCs and whether these committees 
are functioning effectively are two different things. Thus, when the same 
respondents were asked whether the SMCs are effective, 61.7 per cent of the 
respondents disagreed, which implies that they do not believe that SMCs are 
effective. 
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Figure 36 Responses to whether SMCs are effective 
        
                  37%             Key 
Responses                        Agree 
                 Neutral 
     1.3%             Disagree 
                             
                   61.7% 
 
   20  40  60  80   
 
 
 
Percentages 
 
During the FGDs with service users and members of the civil society 
organisations, it was clear that the manner in which these Committees are 
constituted is not democratic, transparent and representative enough. The 
discussants argued that the elected leaders ensured that their political supporters 
were the ones to be appointed on these Committees. Most of the members of FGDs 
expressed ignorance on the constitution of these SMCs claiming that parents were 
not consulted to propose their representatives. 
 
The issue of frequency of meetings by the SMCs also came up during the 
discussions. It was generally asserted that meetings are not regular and SMC work 
had been usurped by the chairpersons of the SMCs and the head- teachers. This 
undermines grassroots participation as a core principle of decentralisation. 
 
The FGD discussants also argued that the SMCs are not effective because they had 
failed to curb corruption in schools especially in terms of the use of UPE funds, 
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shoddy work in the construction of classrooms and inflated enrolment of pupils 
with the purpose of accessing more UPE funds. In addition, the SMCs had failed to 
exercise discipline among head-teachers and teachers who are often absent. 
 
The discussants also cited that although the schools receive UPE funds regularly 
these funds are kept a secret between the SMC chairperson and head teacher. Each 
school is supposed to display on the notice board information regarding financial 
releases for accountability and transparency purposes, but this is not adhered to. 
The regulation regarding UPE funds requires that each school is to have a finance 
committee to manage finances and this was also found to be lacking. 
 
A member of the Kyamabogo Primary School Management Committee in 
Sembabule had this to say about the school finance committee:  
“All we know about the finance committee is that it does not exist. 
If it does at all then, it is composed of the SMC chairman and the 
head teacher. The rest of us are mere observers who are only 
consulted when there is need for raising funds from the parent. 114” 
 
Due to the absence of finance committees in the schools, UPE funds were found to 
have been misappropriated by some head-teachers. At the time this research was 
undertaken, the IGG had recommended for the interdiction and prosecution of the 
head-teacher of Lwembogo Primary School for having misappropriated UPE funds 
for the period 2003 – 2004, similar action was to be taken against the head teachers 
of Kyatula, Kisindi, Kyamabogo, Kasana Primary Schools. All this according to 
FGD discussants was because of the failure on the part of the SMCs to function 
effectively and to follow UPE guidelines. 
 
114 Made by Keishanyo on 21.11.2006. 
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This lack of financial discipline should have been checked by regular visits to 
schools by the auditors who would have ensured adherence to financial 
regulations. When questioned in the survey whether auditors regularly visit 
schools, more than half of the respondents (54.8%) disagreed that this was the 
case, which implies that auditors are not regularly visiting schools. This is clearly 
problematic since auditors are supposed to provide preventive and remedial actions 
that would have guarded against misappropriation of funds. 
 
Figure 37 Responses to whether auditors regularly visit schools 
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8.1.8. General challenges facing Universal Primary Education (UPE) 
 
The general challenges facing UPE were analysed during the FGDs comprising 
Education officials of the two districts and members of CSOs. The following were 
cited as the main challenges confronting decentralised Education service delivery: 
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• Unreliable school data in terms of inflated enrolments. The discussants noted 
that some Local Governments and schools deliberately falsified enrolment 
data in order to access more funding through grants. 
• Poor construction of school facilities in the form of shoddy work under SFG, 
which did not deliver value for money as compared to resources being 
expended. 
• Non–compliance with sector guidelines. It was noted by the FGDs that some 
Local Governments flouted sector guidelines for the implementation of the 
decentralised sector programmes. This had manifested in the fraudulent 
award of SFG tenders, selection of SFG beneficiary schools, construction of 
structures that were inconsistent with standard SFG technical designs, use of 
UPE grants for ineligible school expenditures among others. 
• Diversion of sector grants, UPE and SFG grants were sometimes   diverted 
and utilised for other purposes outside the priority areas identified by the 
sector. The Education advisor of the International Link Community in 
Masindi district reported that there had been cases when SFG funds were 
diverted to procure motorcycles at the expense of construction of badly 
needed school infrastructure. 
• Failure by some Local Governments to account for sector grants satisfactorily 
and timeously. This was cited as having been responsible for delayed or non–
release of sector grants from Central Government for the purposes of 
decentralised Education service delivery. 
• Inadequate supervision and monitoring of decentralised sector services. The 
incapacity of Local Governments to oversee and ensure effective and quality 
delivery of the decentralised services was a major challenge to the UPE. 
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• Failure of some LGs to recruit qualified teachers, which affects the quality of 
education. 
• Inability of the MoES to discipline errant LGs and school officials. Glaring 
cases of mismanagement of sector resources cited yet the MoES had not 
disciplined such officials. 
 
8.2. Health sector under decentralised local governance 
 
As with education, health service delivery is significant in terms of mitigating 
poverty in Uganda. Maintaining effective health service delivery  is a prerequisite 
for overcoming poverty since it enables people to earn an income, as they are able 
to work free of illness and disease. The preventive as well as curative aspects of 
health care are closely related to promoting the general welfare of the poor in 
developing countries like Uganda. In developing countries, non medical concerns 
such as nutrition, safe drinking water, family planning and education levels affect 
the health status of citizens. It was due to the central role that health service 
delivery plays in the economic transformation of society that the function was 
decentralised in Uganda. Therefore, in analysing whether decentralisation 
enhances development it is pertinent to examine how the health services are being 
delivered under a decentralised system of local governance. 
 
8.2.1. Legal status of decentralised health service delivery 
 
The Health Policy in Uganda was amended to align with the Constitution of 1995 
and the Local Governments Act of 1997, which decentralised governance and 
service delivery in certain sectors including Health. In this regard, the FGDs 
comprising Health practioners and Health secretaries in the Sembabule and 
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Masindi districts identified the newly redefined roles of the Central Ministry of 
Health (MoH) as including the following: 
• Policy formulation, setting standards and quality assurance. 
• Resources mobilisation. 
• Capacity development and technical support. 
• Provision of nationally coordinated services like epidemic control. 
• Coordination of health research. 
• Monitoring and evaluation of the overall health sector. 
 
On the other hand, the responsibilities of Local Governments, especially the offices 
of the District Director of Health Services (DDHS) include: 
• Implementation of National Health Policy. 
• Planning and management of district health services. 
• Provision of disease prevention, health promotion, curative and 
rehabilitative services, with the emphasis of the Minimum Health Care 
Packages (MHCP) and other national priorities. 
• Control of other communicable diseases of public health important to 
districts. 
• Vector control. 
• Health Education. 
• Ensuring provision of safe water and environmental sanitation. 
• Health data collection, management interpretation, dissemination and 
utilisation. 
 
When the DDHS of Sembabule was asked to express her opinion on decentralised 
health service delivery she asserted that: 
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“The decentralisation policy has made us autonomous. It has 
improved the planning and management of limited resources for 
running Health facilities. 115” 
This was supported by the Secretary for Health in Masindi district who argued that 
decentralised health service delivery has enabled interactions with service 
recipients through collaboration with the LC system and other stakeholders like 
mission hospitals and NGO Health facilities which would not have been possible 
under a centralised system. 
 
The discussants cited Health Sub-Districts (HSD) as the institutional pillar for 
service delivery under the decentralised system. This is situated in every county 
(LCIV, Equivalent to MP constituency) from where both curative and preventive 
health services are provided to a population of approximately 100.000 in 
collaboration with lower level health facilities. 
The DDHS of Masindi while explaining the significance of the HSD policy to 
Health service delivery argued that the policy has resulted in the following: 
• Integration of curative and preventive services, including Primary Health 
Care (PHC) is sought at the level of actual local service delivery. 
• With the HSD, some functions and responsibilities have been transferred 
away from the DDHS to lower levels where hospitals are actually located. 
• The HSD could be publicly or privately managed. While in the past the 
public medical units and private clinics were operated more or less as 
parallel systems, this new policy attempts to enhance collaboration of public 
and private medical providers thereby enhancing coordination and 
efficiency. 
 
115 Statement by Monica on 22.11.2006. 
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As analysed earlier in the theoretical framework presented in Chapter Three, lower 
local health service delivery centres were established at the levels of the sub-
county (HC III), parish (HCII) and village health committees, which on average 
cater for 1000 people. This system aims to enhance the accessibility of health 
service delivery and facilities. 
 
8.2.2. Accessibility of health services delivery and facilities under 
decentralisation 
As part of the survey, respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they 
agreed that health centres are more accessible under decentralisation. From the 
responses, 74.2 percent of the respondents agreed with the statement, which 
implies that health services are more accessible. This finding was in agreement 
with the views expressed by the FGD discussants who cited that HSD policy had 
decentralised health service delivery and facilities down to the village level, 
thereby making then easily accessible. 
 
Figure 38 Responses to whether health services are accessible 
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During the interview with the health service users, participants were asked whether 
they were happy with the health services in their areas and 65.1 per cent responded 
in the affirmative, while 32.6 percent were negative and only 2.3 percent were 
uncertain. These findings seem to indicate that most of the respondents perceive 
decentralised health service delivery as satisfactory. 
 
Those respondents who indicated that they were not satisfied with health services 
in their area argued that the health centres were understaffed and drugs were 
always in short supply so they had more confidence in private clinics. The MoH is 
mandated to distribute drugs to all health centres in the country through the office 
of DDHS. The service users who were interviewed were required to respond to the 
question on whether the drugs sent to their health centres are properly utilised and 
more than half replied in the negative. 
 
Figure 39 Responses to whether drugs are properly utilised 
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When these respondents were asked to propose what could be done to address the 
problem of drugs not being utilised properly by health centres, the responses were 
varied and included the following:  
• Drugs to be branded so that they are easily distinguished. This would make 
taking such drugs to private clinics risky, as it would be easy to trace them. 
• Arrest and prosecute medical practitioners found guilty of stealing drugs. 
Dismiss health workers who are responsible for the loss of drugs. 
 
• Health centre management committees to become more vigilant in 
monitoring the utilisation of drugs. 
 
The service users were also asked to indicate whether they are informed when 
money is released to the health sector. From the responses, it was clear that the 
majority (67.6%) of the respondents are not notified when financial resources are 
released to the health sector. 
Figure 40 Responses to whether service users are informed when money for 
the health sector is released 
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This lack of transparency results in a situation where service users cannot monitor 
the proper utilisation of financial resources nor can they demand accountability 
from health service providers. This was found to be common to most service 
sectors. One community development worker stated that: 
“The service providers deliberately keep the service beneficiaries 
in information blackout so that they can misappropriate resources 
without public notice”. 
8.2.3. Health Management Committee (HMC) 
 
As with the education sector, the National Health Policy (NHP) requires that every 
health centre must establish a Health Management Committee (HMC) that 
comprises Local Governments representatives, service providers (medical 
practitioners), and service users’ representatives. When asked whether all health 
centres have Health Management Committees, the majority of the respondents 
(72.8%) agreed that this is the case. 
 
Figure 41 Responses to whether health centres have Health Management 
Committees 
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However, in contrast to this, more than half of the respondents (52.3%) were of the 
opinion that these HMCs are not functioning effectively. 
 
Figure 42 Responses to whether HMCs are effective 
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When probed about the lack of effectiveness of HMCs during the FGDs with 
service users and the CSOs, discussants argued that these committees were not 
doing enough to curb irregularities on the part of service providers, theft of drugs, 
and misappropriation of funds. Furthermore, when the service users were asked 
whether the HMCs are representative, 58.7 percent replied that this is not the case. 
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Figure 43 Responses from service users regarding whether HMCs are 
representative 
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When asked why they thought the HMCs were not representative, the respondents 
provided reasons that were not significantly different from those advanced for the 
Education sector including the following:  
• LCs do not consult them on the formation of Health Management 
Committees for health centres. 
• Elected leaders appointed their former campaigners, friends and relatives to 
the HMCs. 
 
The respondents suggested that a participative approach should be instituted by 
which all stakeholders have the opportunity to propose names for the HMCs to 
ensure that they are truly representative. 
 
8.2.4. Health Personnel 
 
The availability and quality of human resources is a central prerequisite in the 
efficient delivery of health services. It is interesting to note in Figure 44 that more 
than half of the respondents (55.9%) are of the opinion that health personnel are 
not adequate in their districts. 
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Figure 44: Responses to whether the health personnel are adequate 
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Furthermore, the service users were asked whether they were satisfied with the 
staffing of the health sector and 65.3 percent indicated that they were not satisfied. 
When they were asked why they were dissatisfied with the staffing of health 
centres, the services users argued that whenever they visited the health centres at 
the parish (HCII) which is the nearest to the community, they either found one 
nurse on duty or the centre was closed.  
 
The general feeling was that the Government had to recruit more personnel in the 
health sector to ensure efficient service delivery.  
 
The above shortcomings notwithstanding, the administrative officials, elected 
leaders and service users largely agreed (72.5%) that disease prevalence had 
declined under a system of decentralised health service delivery.  Thus, despite the 
  
281
inadequacy of health sector personnel, it seems as if decentralised local governance 
has had a positive impact in this regard. 
 
Figure 45 Responses to whether disease prevalence has declined 
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8.2.5. General challenges facing the health sector 
 
During the FGDs, general challenges confronting the health sector under a 
decentralised system of governance were discussed and the discussants indicated 
the following:  
• Poor construction of health centres by contractors due to problems 
associated with the procurement process. 
• Corruption on the part of health service providers. The service users claimed 
that when they went to public health centres they were asked, “Do you have 
a brother?” (i.e. Where “brother” meant money or a bribe). 
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• Lack of community participation as was found to be the case with the 
Education sector. 
• Inadequate financial resources both locally and those transferred from the 
centre. 
• Diversion of health resources to payment of salaries, hence, reducing the 
resources available for drugs. 
• Failure by some LGs to account for health sector funds. 
• Inadequate inspection by drug inspectors, which allowed for 
misappropriation. 
• Failure of some LGs to attract qualified staff, due to lack of incentives. 
 
8.3. Conclusion 
 
The aim of this chapter was to analyse the findings of the survey and Focus Group 
Discussions in respect of Education and Health as service sectors selected for the 
purposes of this study to illustrate whether decentralised service delivery enhances 
development. In doing so, various factors were considered including the 
availability and accessibility of the service facilities, the adequacy of human 
resources, the effectiveness of decentralised management committees, the 
utilisation of financial resources and the eventual impact of the services in terms of 
literacy enhancement, disease prevalence and poverty reduction. 
 
The findings revealed that in Uganda the citizens regard Education and Health as 
being essential in the fight against pervasive poverty. In the delivery of Education 
and Health services, the respondents in this study asserted that decentralisation has 
enabled interactions with service recipients through collaboration with the LC 
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system and other stakeholders, which would not have been possible under a 
centralised system. 
The findings provided an indication that citizens appreciate the services delivered, 
especially as a result of the introduction of Universal Primary Education and 
Health Sub-District programmes for Education and Health respectively. The 
increasing interaction between service providers and users also helps not only in 
building social bonds between stakeholders but also in enhancing the quality of the 
services. 
 
However, the chapter also revealed a number of challenges that have to be 
addressed such as:  
• The need to fully decentralise the management of both Education and Health 
sectors, including procurement. 
• The availability of qualified personnel in both sectors was found to be 
inadequate. 
• The management committees in both sectors were not effective and not 
representative enough. 
• Although school enrolments had risen there was need to address the high 
rate of dropouts. 
• Accountability and transparency are a big threat to the two service sectors 
with corruption still a widespread phenomenon. 
• The quality of the services delivered had to be upgraded so as to enhance 
development and poverty reduction. 
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Some recommendations regarding how these challenges can be effectively 
addressed in the interest of effective decentralised service delivery in the Education 
and Health sectors will be discussed in the final chapter. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
In developing countries decentralisation measures have been attempted in several 
forms to achieve numerous goals ranging from democratisation to economic 
development. In the African context, decentralisation has been considered crucial 
to seek a closer fit between the state and society so that more legitimate relations 
can be constructed between the leaders and the citizens that they serve. 
 
This is exactly what Kafir (1993: 25) means when he argues that:  
“Physical and social conditions in Africa favour it as a pragmatic 
response to the problems of government. The inability of the Central 
Government to reach its citizen effectively suggests that something else is 
necessary. The continuing strength of the democratic norm in the city and 
countryside demonstrates the persistent desire of people to participate in 
the management of their own affairs” 
 
The Local Government system of Uganda is distinguished in post-independent 
Africa as an institution that empasises popular participation. The citizens 
democratically elect their own leaders; the elected Local Councils plan for 
development through resource mobilisation, budgeting, Human Resources 
Management and procurement of goods and services. Therefore, the Local Council 
system is people-centred. 
 
Despite this, as the theme of the study suggests, the decentralisation process in 
Uganda can be regarded as a “double-edged sword” because it presents a 
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combination of significant improvements as well as striking challenges and 
contradictions. Even when improvements have been made, they in turn create new 
challenges. This acute reality in implementing the decentralisation policy served as 
a justification for the necessity of this particular study. 
 
The study comprised two major parts namely: firstly, analysing the relationship 
between decentralisation and development; and secondly, examining the 
contradictions arising from the implementation of the decentralisation policy in 
two selected districts within Uganda. 
 
The investigation commenced in Chapter One with a chronological study of the 
history of local governance in Uganda. The purpose of providing this historic 
overview was to indicate how the contemporary Local Government system in 
Uganda has evolved over time from the pre-colonial period, to the colonial period, 
to the post-colonial era, and up to the current decentralisation policy. This period 
manifested both decentralisation and centralisation depending on the political 
climate of the time; for instance, between 1962-1966, Obote did not see the need to 
centralise power whereas the political events following the 1966/7 abrogation of 
the constitution necessitated the centralisation of power. Further more, the military 
regime of Amin could not have allowed democratic institutions to co-exist, hence, 
Local Councils had to be completely abolished. 
 
Chapter One also highlighted the research problem and objectives of the study 
hence, justifying why it had to be undertaken. The scope of the study was also 
demarcated to include an analysis of whether decentralisation has resulted in 
development, drawing from cases in the Masindi and Sembabule districts, and 
focusing specifically on the Health and Education service sectors. The study 
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covered the period 1993-2006 due to the fact that the decentralisation policy in 
Uganda was launched in the 1992/93 financial year. 
 
Chapter Two analysed the literature relating to decentralisation and development. 
It dealt with salient aspects such as conceptualising relevant terms, providing a 
rationale for the adoption of decentralisation, and analysing the disadvantages 
associated with decentralisation. The linkage between the Education and Health 
sectors and development was also analysed with the purpose of explaining the 
choice of these two service sectors to examine the relationship between 
decentralisation and development. The literature study revealed that research and 
decentralisation in Uganda was generally theoretical and hence required case 
material that could only be acquired through primary empirical data collection that 
this study undertook in the two districts. 
 
The theoretical framework outlined in Chapter Two also revealed that 
decentralisation measures contribute to empowering marginalised groups. 
However, decentralisation is not a panacea and its successful implementation 
depends largely on whether institutional reform enriches social networks for the 
purposes of resolving development problems. 
 
Subsequently, Chapter Three examined the institutional and legal framework that 
was established in Uganda to operationalise the decentralisation policy. 
The chapter explained the relevant legislative attempts that gave rise to the 
establishment of these institutions, as well as providing an analysis of the various 
roles of the relevant stakeholders. The four pillars of decentralisation namely, the 
legal framework, political, fiscal and administrative decentralisation were also 
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considered with specific reference to an analysis of decentralised Education and 
Health service delivery in Uganda. 
 
Chapter Three revealed that decentralisation operates in terms of partnerships 
which assist in reducing disharmony at local levels where interactions between 
various stakeholders were cited to be more frequent. Democracy was also seen to 
be more effectively deepened through decentralised structures and was therefore 
seen as a solution to the monopolisation of coercive forces and the personalised 
exercise of power.  
 
In Uganda, four strategic partnerships were cited. They included the relationship 
between the Central and Local Governments, the relationship between the 
Government and the private sector, between service providers and service 
users/recipients, as well as the associations of local authorities like Uganda Local 
Authorities Association. Partnerships between these various stakeholders were 
deemed to improve service provision that would, in turn contribute to reducing 
poverty and hence enhance development and the legitimacy of the state. 
 
However, it was noted that realising these objectives depended on the manner in 
which decentralisation was implemented since, if it was poorly planned, it would 
end up under the control of the local elite. This would then leave the majority of 
the grassroots citizens poor, legitimacy would be eroded, and decentralisation 
would therefore not lead to development under these circumstances. 
 
Institutional partnerships were found to be reciprocal relations among diverse 
actors to attain common developmental goals, but it was pointed out that, to be 
effective, these partnerships should be based on the equal participation of 
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autonomous organisations. When such partnerships are established, they were 
found to improve efficiency and effectiveness in utilising service resources. It was 
emphasised that stakeholder partnerships ensure that decentralisation endeavours 
constitute more than the sum of the activities undertaken by individual participant 
and thereby serve to enhance development. 
 
In terms of administrative decentralisation, improved Local Government 
management was expected to improve development outcomes since; improved 
service delivery outputs would contribute to poverty reduction in both material and 
non-material terms. More responsive service delivery would also enhance the well 
being of the poor and subsequently reduce their vulnerability. This was considered 
an achievement of decentralisation as it empowered the socially disadvantaged. 
 
Chapter Four focused on providing an explanation of the methodology that was 
used to ensure the quality, reliability and validity of the data could, in turn, warrant 
generalisation. This chapter provided an overview of the research design, study 
population, sample size, methods of sample selection, methods of data collection, 
processing and analysis as well as issues pertaining to data management and 
quality control. 
 
The study population was based on the 2002 Uganda census, out of which a sample 
size of 960 respondents was selected using non-probability sampling whereby the 
respondents were deliberately and purposively selected. The samples included 
elected leaders, administrative officials, and members of statutory boards, service 
users, and representatives of the private sector and NGOs. The data collection 
techniques involved interviews, questionnaires, focus group discussions and the 
use of secondary sources for purposes of the literature survey. Where possible, the 
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findings of the questionnaire and interviews/FGDs were compared for the purposes 
of triangulation. 
 
Chapter Five analysed the general performance of decentralisation in Uganda 
within the districts of Masindi and Sembabule. The findings revealed that Central 
Government Line Ministries interfered with Local Governments operations 
especially with regard to procurement. The Ministry of Water was particularly 
cited for having awarded contracts for the provision of production water in 
Sembabule and Masindi without involving the local leadership.  
 
The findings also revealed that although decentralisation had enhanced 
participatory leadership, there was a lack of coordination among the various 
stakeholders like civil society organisations. The relationship between elected 
leaders and administrative officials was also found to be wanting. 
 
With regards to empowerment of women, the youth, the disabled and the elderly, it 
was interesting to note that, whereas women and disabled felt empowered by 
decentralisation, the youths believed the contrary.  In this chapter it was also 
ascertained that the majority of the service beneficiaries appreciated the quality of 
services decentralisation has provided in their particular districts. Respondents 
alluded to the fact that there has been a reduction in poverty and service delivery 
was more responsive under decentralisation as compared to centralisation.  
 
Chapter Six aimed to analyse Human Resources Management and Procurement in 
Local Governments under decentralised governance. In this respect, LG human 
resources were generally found to be numerically adequate and suitably qualified. 
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In this chapter, it was also noted that DSC’s were not appointed procedurally, but 
generally performed well in spite of this. 
 
Capacity building programmes existed although access to them was discriminative. 
Political influence peddling was cited as the major threat to the smooth running of 
the statutory boards. The recentralisation of CAOs and TCs was appreciated by 
administrative officials, but resented by the elected leaders. A similar response was 
exhibited with respect to the replacement of LGTBs by contracts committees. 
 
Chapter Seven examined the role of elected leaders and fiscal issues in 
decentralised development in the two districts. It was generally cited that the Local 
Government electoral process had been monetised, tribalised and therefore did not 
necessarily produce the best leaders at Local Government levels. The Educational 
levels of elected leaders were also identified as an inhibitor to decentralisation. 
Further more, elected leaders were not found to be transparent and Central 
Government interference reduced their autonomy. 
 
In this chapter, it was found that Local Government revenue had declined overtime 
and Local Governments in both districts were found to be financially unviable. 
Despite this, it was pointed out that Central Government transfers to Local 
Governments were adequate. It was also found that although the accounting 
systems had improved, corruption was still a major threat to decentralisation. 
 
Chapter Eight, discussed the findings pertaining to the decentralisation of 
Education sector, it was found that accessibility to Education facilities had been 
improved by decentralisation. It was also found that school enrolments had 
generally increased, school dropouts had also increased. 
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It was noted that Local Councils do not assign adequate resources to Education, 
which negatively impacted on school inspections and hence the resultant decline in 
academic standards within schools in the two districts. Further more, it was 
revealed that the Education sector had on average 37 per cent unqualified teachers 
and this was also found to detract from the quality of Education in the two districts.  
School Management Committees were found to exist although it was pointed out 
that political influence and peddling undermined their competence. Visits by 
auditors were noted as being irregular at schools and this resulted in an increase in 
misappropriation of funds. 
 
Chapter Eight also analysed the Health sector and, like Education, Health services 
were found to be more accessible under decentralised governance. Furthermore, 
disease prevalence was found to have declined under decentralised governance. 
Although service users were satisfied with decentralised Health services, it was 
pointed out that drugs were not properly utilised. It was also noted that 
accountability was difficult to achieve because the service beneficiaries were not 
informed when money was released to the Health sector and could therefore not 
monitor whether such funds were being properly administered and utilised by the 
service providers. 
 
Contradictions and Challenges associated with Decentralised Local 
Governance in Uganda 
 
The second part of the theme of this study concerned contradictions of local 
governance, as it pertains to decentralisation enhancing development. These 
contradictions emerged as challenges for which remedial measures have to be 
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designed to improve the decentralisation policy so as to enhance its contribution to 
sustainable development. 
 
The challenges could be considered to embrace institutional and fiscal 
arrangements, the legal framework, service delivery and good governance. 
Institutionally, the roles and relationships of key players in decentralised 
governance still have to be clearly defined. There is a need to demarcate the 
relationship between Central Government Line Ministries and decentralised 
organs. There is also a need for decentralisation to be internalised by all key 
stakeholders to enhance their understanding of their respective roles. 
A further challenge relates to the effectiveness of systems and processes since it 
was found that the standards and quality assurance mechanisms were not 
standardised and clearly stipulated. As a result, there is a variance in the manner 
and form of service delivery amongst Local Governments, particularly as it relates 
to the nature and cost of service delivery. Coordination, supervision, monitoring 
and inspection of service delivery on the basis of set policies and quality standards 
were also found to be lacking. This, more than any other factor has led to conflicts 
between elected leaders and administrative officials and therefore remains a crucial 
challenge that needs to be addressed. 
 
A further, institutional challenge is high turnover of both administrative officials 
and elected leaders. The terms and conditions of service in Local Governments are 
still less competitive and therefore attracting and retaining staff in Local 
Governments remains a challenge. Similarly, continuity of service delivery 
remains a problem since there is a high turnover after every election. 
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In respect of the legal pillar underpinning decentralisation, the successful 
implementation of the decentralisation policy hinges on the existence of a strong 
legal framework, which defines, the parameters within which decentralisation 
operates. Although Local Governments have legislative powers, the formulation of 
ordinances and bye-laws to assist in the local enforcement of national laws and 
policies has been minimal. Furthermore, some Central Government Line Ministries 
have gone beyond standards setting and as such, have contravened the LGA. 
 
Subsequently, the Central Government has not provided Local Governments with 
adequate guidance, monitoring and support to ensure effective service delivery. As 
a result, most Local Governments found it difficult to respond to development 
challenges confronting them. Due to legal gaps, the Central Government has also 
continued to provide secondary and tertiary Education despite the fact that these 
are decentralised functions in terms of the legislation. Even the procurement of 
instructional materials has been undertaken by the centre and this constitutes a 
major contradiction of decentralisation. 
 
The fiscal challenges include the fact that Local Governments have inadequate 
revenue for financing decentralised services. Local Governments find it difficult to 
generate adequate local revenue to supplement Central Governments transfers; 
Local Governments are faced with the contradiction of being limited with respect 
to the flexibility in the use of Central Government transfers, since the 
unconditional grants are ever decreasing. The equalisation grant is also inadequate 
since it is spread too thinly across LGs and is often not used for the intended 
purposes of reducing the disparities in service delivery. 
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In terms of good governance, accountability and transparency are still a major 
challenge to the successful implementation of decentralisation in Uganda. 
Democratic accountability is largely lacking and this undermines the 
responsiveness of decentralised governance. Corruption thus continues to be a 
significant threat to decentralisation.  
 
Specifically, the Education and Health service sectors in the selected two districts 
are confronted with the challenges of unreliable school data, non-compliance with 
sector guidelines, diversions of sector grants, failure by LGs to account for sector 
funds, failure to supervise, monitor and recruit qualified teachers and nurses lack 
of community participation inappropriate utilisation of drugs by Health service 
providers. All these inhibit efficiency and effectiveness in terms of decentralised 
service delivery and detract from poverty reduction. 
 
Recommendations 
 
Based on the above discussion of the findings of this study, it is clear that 
decentralisation will not result in sustainable development and poverty reduction 
unless certain measures are put in place to address the challenges and 
contradictions associated with decentralised local governance in Uganda. To this 
effect, the following recommendations are made. 
• There is a need for greater clarity among key stakeholders regarding their 
roles, responsibilities and legal mandates. This is particularly applicable to 
the relationship between Central Government Line Ministries and Local 
Governments, but also with respect to the interaction between elected 
leaders and administrative officials within Local Governments. 
  
296
• The Central Government, both the National Parliament and the Cabinet, 
should appreciate the strategic philosophy of decentralisation by restraining 
their Line Ministries from interfering in the management of decentralised 
services. This will eliminate conflict between the Central Government and 
Local Governments. Sustainable development can only be achieved under a 
stable and cordial centre-periphery relationship. 
• Fiscal decentralisation will only be sustainable if LGs can raise their own 
revenues and thereby reduce their dependency on Central Government 
transfers.  The abolition of Graduated Tax was found to have had a negative 
impact on the financial viability of LGs and alternatives to this source of 
local revenue should be investigated as a matter of urgency. 
• For accountability to be effective there is a need to strengthen the laws on 
corruption in order to enforce compliance. The measures that have been put 
in place to improve transparency and accountability also need to be 
strengthened to ensure that various roleplayers fulfil their roles in an ethical 
and accountable manner. This includes devoting attention to the need for 
regular inspections, stringent financial reporting procedures, and an 
enhanced flow of information to the citizens regarding the funds that have 
been released and utilised for the purposes of service delivery. 
• The characteristics of good governance such as democratic leadership, 
respect, patriotism, accountability and transparency should become an 
integral part of the school curriculum so that the human resources graduating 
from such an Education system are morally upright. This will assist in the 
long run in promoting professionalism and corporate management in LGs. 
• Capacity development initiatives are required to enhance the capacity of 
Local Government politicians and officials to plan, budget, utilise and 
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account for financial resources. This is one of the assurance measures to 
sustainable development. As part of such capacity development 
programmes, each of the stakeholders need to have a better understanding of 
their respective roles so as to reduce role conflict in LGs. 
• The existing law that prevents elected leaders from participating in routine 
work like inspection, execution of policies, procurement, among others 
should be enforced. Some elected leaders who abuse office by interfering in 
the procurement process in LGs should be prosecuted as a means of 
stamping out the bad behaviour so that others learn. 
• The existing law regarding electoral malpractices should be enforced in 
order for the electoral process to enhance the elevation of competent leaders 
into positions of leadership in the LGs. The laws have thus far remained 
dormant. 
• The Parliament of Uganda should revise the LGA with a view to attaching 
an academic qualification to office bearers in LGs especially at LCIII (Sub-
county) up to LC V (District/City). This is due to the fact that the 
management challenges that have been decentralised require leaders who are 
sufficiently educated at least to ordinary level standard. This will enhance 
efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of services and subsequently 
enhance development. 
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NELSON MANDELA METROPOLITAN UNIVERSITY 
(PORT ELIZABETH) 
 
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND GOVERNMENTAL SCIENCES 
 
DECENTRALISATION AND DEVELOPMENT: THE CONTRADICTIONS IN 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN UGANDA 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE TO ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIALS 
 
1. INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW TO COMPLETE THIS QUESTIONNAIRE. 
 
1.1 Read the following carefully before completing the questionnaire. 
 
1.2 Where applicable, the questions should be answered by circling the correct 
option. Do not write in the boxes in the right margin. 
 
1.3 Your own view/opinion (based on your practical experience) will also be 
requested.  In such cases please write the required information in the space 
provided. 
 
SECTION A 
 
2.  BIOGRAPHICAL DETAILS 
 
2.1  District:_________________________________________ 
2.2  Sub County:_____________________________________ 
 
2.3  Gender 
Male 1 
Female 2 
 
2.4  Age 
20 – 29 1 
30 – 39 2 
40 – 49 3 
50 – 59 4 
60 – 69 5 
70+ 6 
 
2.5  Home Language 
English 1 
Kiswahili 2 
Lunyoro 3 
Luganda 4 
Lunyakole 5 
Other 6 
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2.6  Highest Educational Qualification 
Primary 1 
Secondary 2 
Certificate 3 
Diploma 4 
Bachelor’s Degree 5 
Masters 6 
Doctoral Degree 7 
 
2.7   Level of Governance 
District 1 
Sub County 2 
School 3 
Health Centre 4 
 
2.8     Geographical Location 
2.8.1 Area Name:  
2.8.2 Station name:  
 
2.9   Length of Service in Local Government. 
< 5 years 1 
6  - 10 years 2 
11 – 15 years 3 
>  15 years 4 
 
2.10   Post Title 
Chief Administrative Officer 1 
Human Resource Manager 2 
Education Staff 3 
Health Staff 4 
 
SECTION B 
 
3. PERCEPTIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIALS OF DEVELOPMENT 
IN UGANDA WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF A DECENTRALISED SYSTEM 
OF GOVERNANCE 
   
3.1 How do you rate decentralisation performance in your district? 
Below Average 1 Average 2 Above average 3 
 
3.2 In your opinion has decentralisation improved service delivery in your 
district? 
Yes  1 No 2 Uncertain 3 
 
3.2.1 If no, what problems are being experienced? 
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
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3.3 In your opinion, are Central Government transfers adequate for local service 
delivery? 
Yes 1 No 2 Uncertain 3 
 
3.3.1  If no, what should be done to address this? 
 ____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
 
3.4 In your opinion, do Local Government Councillors fulfil their role effectively 
with regard to service delivery? 
Yes 1 No 2 Uncertain 3 
 
3.4.1  If no, what do you perceive to be the cause of this problem? 
 ____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
 ____________________________________________________________ 
 
3.5 In your opinion, do administrative officials enjoy independence in executing 
their roles? 
Yes 1 No 2 Uncertain 3 
 
3.5.1  If no, what do you perceive to be the source of the lack of independence? 
 ____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
 ____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
 
3.6 In your opinion, is the District Service Commission competent enough to 
handle human resources within a decentralised system of governance? 
Yes 1 No 2 Uncertain 3 
 
3.6.1  If no, what should be done to address this? 
____________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________ 
 
3.7 In your opinion, do statutory bodies operate independently?   
Yes 1 No 2 Uncertain 3 
 
3.7.1  If no, why is this the case? 
 ____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
 ____________________________________________________________ 
 
3.8 Do you consider the Local Governments Act 1997/.2001 as a satisfactory 
policy framework for Local Governments in Uganda? 
Yes 1 No 2 Uncertain 3 
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3.8.1  If no, what is lacking? 
 ____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
 ____________________________________________________________ 
 
3.9 In your opinion, is the present structure that makes political leaders 
responsible for monitoring civil servants effective? 
Yes 1 No 2 Uncertain 3 
 
3.9.1 If no, what would be an acceptable alternative? 
 ____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
 ____________________________________________________________ 
 
3.10 In your opinion, do administrative officials feel secure in their career tenure? 
Yes 1 No 2 Uncertain 3 
 
3.10.1 If no, please cite the source of the problem. 
 ____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
 
3.11 Indicate the level to which you agree/disagree with the following statements 
by circling one option for each item:                      
 
1 – strongly disagree    2 - disagree     3 - neutral       4 - agree   5 - strongly agree 
3.11.1 Decentralisation enhances development in 
Uganda 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.2 Administrative officials are accountable 1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.3 Local revenue is currently higher than under a 
centralised system of governance 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.4 Accounting Systems have improved 1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.5 Health personnel are adequate  1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.6 School personnel are adequate 1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.7 School enrolments have increased 1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.8 Local Councils disregard Health programmes 1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.9 Local Councils disregard Education programmes 1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.10 Central Government transfers are regular 1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.11 Health Centres are adequately stocked with 
drugs 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.12 Universal Primary Education funds are 
inadequate 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.13 Schools have competent head teachers 1 2 3 4  5 
3.11.14 Inspection of schools is adequate 1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.15 Auditors regularly visit schools 1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.16 Corruption is a threat to decentralisation 1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.17 Decentralisation encourages tribalism 1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.18 All Health Centres have Management 
Committees 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.19 All schools have Management Committees 1 2 3 4 5 
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3.11.20 Health Centre Management Committees are 
effective 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.21 School Management Committees are effective 1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.22 The relationship between elected and 
administrative officials is good at the district level 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.23 The educational level of Councillors hinders their 
performance 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.24 Administrative officials feel more empowered 
under a decentralised system of governance 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.25 Elected officials experience more autonomy 
under a decentralised system of governance 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.26 Democracy has led to good governance in 
Uganda 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.27 Health centres are more accessible under 
decentralisation 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.28 Schools are more accessible under 
decentralisation 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.29 School drop outs have declined 1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.30 Disease prevalence has declined 1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.31 Women, the youth and disabled are empowered 
to participate in decentralised development 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.32 Graduated tax abolition has impacted positively 
on service delivery 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
4.   Any further comments regarding decentralisation and development: 
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________ 
 
Thank you for your time in completing this questionnaire
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NELSON MANDELA METROPOLITAN UNIVERSITY 
(PORT ELIZABETH) 
 
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND GOVERNMENTAL SCIENCES 
 
DECENTRALISATION AND DEVELOPMENT: THE CONTRADICTIONS IN 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN UGANDA    
 
QUESTIONNAIRE TO ELECTED LEADERS 
 
1. INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW TO COMPLETE THIS QUESTIONNAIRE: 
 
1.1 Read the following carefully before completing the questionnaire. 
 
1.2  Where applicable, the questions should be answered by circling the correct 
option.  Do not write in the boxes in the right margin. 
                                               
1.3 Your own view/opinion (based on your practical experience) will                           
also be requested. In such cases, please write the required information in 
the space provided. 
 
SECTION A 
 
2. BIOGRAPHICAL DETAILS 
 
2.1    District: ___________________________________________________ 
2.2   Sub County: _______________________________________________ 
2.3 Gender 
Male 1 
Female 2 
 
2.4 Age 
20 – 29 1 
30 – 39 2 
40 – 49 3 
50 – 59 4 
60 – 69 5 
70+ 6 
 
2.5   Home Language 
English 1 
Kiswahili 2 
Lunyolo 3 
Luganda 4 
Lunyankole 5 
Other 6 
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2.6   Highest Educational Qualification 
Primary 1 
Secondary 2 
Certificate 3 
Diploma 4 
Bachelor’s Degree 5 
Masters 6 
Doctoral Degree 7 
 
2.7 Level of Governance 
District 1 
Sub County 2 
School 3 
Health Centre 4 
 
2.8  Geographical Location 
2.7.1 Area Name:  
2.7.2 Station Name:  
 
2.9  Post Title 
Chairperson 1 
Member 2 
Councillor 3 
 
SECTION B 
 
3. PERCEPTIONS OF ELECTED LEADERS OF DEVELOPMENT IN 
UGANDA WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF A DECENTRALISED SYSTEM OF 
GOVERNANCE 
 
3.1 How do you rate decentralisation performance in your district? 
Below Average 1 Average 2 Above Average 3 
 
3.2 In your opinion has decentralisation improved service delivery in your 
district? 
Yes 1 No  2 Uncertain  3 
 
3.2.1 If no, what problems are being experienced? 
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
 
3.3 In your opinion, are Central Government transfers adequate for local service 
delivery? 
Yes 1 No  2 Uncertain  3 
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3.3.1 If no, what should be done to address this? 
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________ 
 
3.4 In your opinion, do Local Government Councillors fulfil their role effectively 
with regard to service delivery? 
Yes 1 No  2 Uncertain  3 
 
3.4.1 If no, what do you perceive to be the cause of this problem? 
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________ 
 
3.5 Do you receive appropriate technical advice from Local Government civil 
servants? 
Yes 1 No  2 Uncertain  3 
 
3.5.1 If no, what do you perceive to be the cause of this problem? 
  ___________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________ 
 ___________________________________________________________ 
 
3.6 In your opinion, is the District Service Commission competent enough to 
handle human resources within a decentralised system of governance? 
Yes 1 No  2 Uncertain  3 
 
3.6.1 If no, what should be done to address this? 
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
 
3.7 Are you satisfied with the Contracts Committee replacing tender boards? 
Yes 1 No   2 Uncertain  3 
 
3.7.1 If no, why? 
____________________________________________________________ 
 ____________________________________________________________ 
3.8 Do you consider the Local Governments Act 1997/2001 as a satisfactory 
policy framework for local governments in Uganda? 
Yes 1 No   2 Uncertain  3 
 
3.8.1 If no, what is lacking? 
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
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3.9 In your opinion is the present structure that makes political leaders 
responsible for monitoring civil servants effective? 
Yes 1 No   2 Uncertain  3 
 
3.9.1 If no, what is the problem? 
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
 
3.10 In your opinion, is the recentralisation of Chief Administrative Officers and 
Town Clerks a positive development? 
Yes 1 No   2 Uncertain  3 
 
3.10.1If no, what do you propose as an alternative? 
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
 
3.11 Indicate the level to which you agree/disagree with the following statements 
by circling one option for each item. 
 
1 – strongly disagree    2 – disagree    3 – neutral     4 – agree      5 – strongly agree  
3.11.1 Decentralisation enhances development in 
Uganda 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.2 Administrative officials are accountable 1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.3 Local revenue is currently higher than a 
centralized system of governance 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.4 Accounting Systems have improved 1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.5 Health personnel are adequate  1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.6 School personnel are adequate 1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.7 School enrolments have increased  1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.8 Local Councils disregard Education 
programmes 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.9 Local Councils disregard Health programmes 1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.10 Central Government transfers are regular 1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.11 Health Centres are adequately stocked with 
drugs 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.12 Universal Primary Education funds are 
adequate 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.13 Schools have competent head teachers 1 2 3 4  5 
3.11.14 Inspection of schools is adequate 1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.15 Auditors regularly visit schools 1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.16 Corruption is a threat to decentralisation 1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.17 Decentralisation encourages tribalism 1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.18 All Health Centres have Management 
Committees 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.19 All schools have Management Committees 1 2 3 4 5 
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3.11.20 Health Centre Management Committees are 
effective 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.21 School Management Committees are effective 1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.22 The relationship between elected and 
administrative officials is good at the district 
level 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.23 The educational level of Councillors hinders 
their performance 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.24 Administrative officials feel more empowered 
under a decentralised system of governance 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.25 Elected officials experience more autonomy 
under a decentralised system of governance 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.26 Democracy has led to good governance in 
Uganda 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.27 Health centres are more accessible under 
decentralisation 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.28 Schools are more accessible under 
decentralisation 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.29 School drop outs have declined 1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.30 Disease prevalence has declined 1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.31 Women, the youth and disabled are 
empowered to participate in decentralised 
development 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.32 Graduated tax abolition has impacted positively 
on service delivery 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
4.   Any further comments regarding decentralisation and development: 
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________ 
 
Thank you for your time in completing this questionnaire. 
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NELSON MANDELA METROPOLITAN UNIVERSITY 
 (PORT ELIZABETH)  
 
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND GOVERNMENTAL SCIENCES 
 
DECENTRALISATION AND DEVELOPMENT: THE CONTRADICTIONS   
IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN UGANDA   
 
QUESTIONNAIRE TO THE SERVICE USERS OF HEALTH AND EDUCATION 
SECTORS 
 
1. INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW TO COMPLETE THIS QUESTIONNAIRE: 
 
1.1 Read the following carefully before completing the questionnaire. 
 
1.2 Where applicable, the questions should be answered by circling the correct 
option. Do not write in the boxes in the right margin. 
 
1.2 Your own view/opinion (based on your practical experience) will also be 
requested.  In such cases, please write the required information in the 
space provided. 
 
SECTION A 
 
 2.     BIOGRAPHICAL DETAILS: 
 
2.1 District:  
2.2 Sub County:    
                                                      
2.3 Gender 
Male 1 
Female 2 
 
2.4 Age 
20 – 29 1 
30 – 39 2 
40 – 49 3 
50 – 59 4 
60 – 69 5 
70+ 6 
 
2.5    Highest Educational Qualification 
Less than P7 1 
O’ Level 2 
A’ Level 3 
Diploma 4 
BA/BSc (Hon) 5 
Masters 6 
Doctoral Degree 7 
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2.6      Occupation 
Peasant 1 
Business 2 
Civil Servant 3 
NGO 4 
 
2.7  Home  Language 
English 1 
Kiswahili 2 
Lunyolo 3 
Luganda 4 
Lunyankole 5 
Other  
 
SECTION B 
 
3. PERCEPTIONS OF SERVICE USERS OF DEVELOPMENT IN UGANDA 
WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF A DECENTRALISED SYSTEM OF 
GOVERNANCE 
 
3.1 How do you rate decentralisation performance in your district? 
Below Average 1 Average 2 Above average 3 
 
3.2 In your opinion, has decentralisation improved service delivery in your 
district? 
Yes  1 No 2 Uncertain 3 
 
3.2.1 If no, what problems are being experienced? 
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
 
3.3. In your opinion, are Central Government transfers adequate for local service 
delivery? 
Yes  1 No 2 Uncertain 3 
 
3.3.1 If no, what should be done to address this? 
___________________________________________________________ 
 ___________________________________________________________ 
 
3.4 In your opinion, do Local Government civil servants fulfil their role effectively 
with regard to service delivery? 
Yes  1 No 2 Uncertain 3 
 
3.4.1 If no, what do you perceive to be the cause of this problem? 
____________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
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3.5 Do you receive appropriate technical advice from Local Government civil 
servants? 
Yes  1 No 2 Uncertain 3 
 
3.5.1 If no, what do you perceive to be the cause of this problem? 
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
 
3.6 In your opinion, is the District Service Commission competent enough to 
handle human resources within a decentralised system of governance? 
Yes  1 No 2 Uncertain 3 
 
3.6.1 If no, what should be done to address this? 
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
 
3.7 Are you satisfied with the Contracts Committee replacing tender boards? 
Yes 1 No 2 Uncertain 3 
 
3.7.1 If no, why? 
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
 
3.8 Do you consider the Local Governments Act 1997/2001 as a satisfactory 
policy framework for Local Governments in Uganda? 
Yes 1 No 2 Uncertain 3 
 
3.8.1 If no, what is lacking? 
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
 
3.9 In your opinion, is the present structure that makes political leaders 
responsible for monitoring civil servants effective? 
Yes  1 No 2 Uncertain 3 
 
3.9.1 If no what is the problem? 
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
 
3.10 In your opinion, is the recentralisation of Chief Administrative Officers and 
Town Clerks a positive development? 
Yes  1 No 2 Uncertain 3 
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3.10.1If no, what do you propose as an alternative? 
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________ 
 
3.11 Indicate the level to which you agree/disagree with the following statements 
by circling one option for each item. 
 
1 – strongly disagree    2 - disagree     3 - neutral       4 - agree   5 - strongly agree 
3.11.1 Decentralisation enhances development in 
Uganda 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.2 Administrative officials are accountable 1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.3 Local revenue is currently higher than under a 
centralised system of governance 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.4 Accounting Systems have improved 1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.5 Health personnel are adequate  1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.6 School personnel are adequate 1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.7 School enrolments have increased 1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.8 Local Councils disregard the Education 
programmes 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.9 Local Councils disregard the Health 
programmes 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.10 Central Government transfers are regular 1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.11 Health Centres are adequately stocked with 
drugs 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.12 Universal Primary Education funds are 
inadequate 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.13 Schools have competent head teachers 1 2 3 4  5 
3.11.14 Inspection of schools is adequate 1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.15 Auditors regularly visit schools 1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.16 Corruption is a threat to decentralisation 1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.17 Decentralisation encourages tribalism 1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.18 All Health Centres have Management 
Committees 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.19 All schools have Management Committees 1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.20 Health Centre Management Committees are 
effective 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.21 School Management Committees are effective 1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.22 The relationship between elected and 
administrative officials is good at the district 
level 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.23 The education level of Councillors hinders their 
performance 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.24 Administrative officials feel more empowered 
under a decentralised system of governance 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.25 Elected officials experience more autonomy 
under a decentralised system of governance 
1 2 3 4 5 
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3.11.26 Democracy has led to good governance in 
Uganda 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.27 Health centres are more accessible under 
decentralisation 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.28 Schools are more accessible under 
decentralisation 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.29 School drop outs have declined 1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.30 Disease prevalence has declined 1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.31 Women, the youth and disabled are 
empowered to participate in decentralised 
development 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.11.32 Graduated tax abolition has impacted positively 
on service delivery 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
4.   Any further comments regarding decentralisation and development: 
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________ 
   
Thank you for your time in completing this questionnaire. 
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NELSON MANDELA METROPOLITAN UNIVERSITY 
(PORT ELIZABETH) 
 
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND GOVERNMENTAL SCIENCES 
 
DECENTRALISATION AND DEVELOPMENT: THE CONTRADICTIONS IN 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN UGANDA   
 
FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS – GUIDE 
 
This study will convene twenty focus group discussions evenly distributed in the 
two districts to cover a number of salient topics as indicated below: 
 
NOTE: 
This is merely an indicative guideline since sufficient opportunity will be accorded 
to participants who want to discuss an issue in more depth to do so. 
 
The discussion will begin with: 
 
a) Introduction of the facilitator/researcher. 
b) Explanation of the purpose of the meeting. 
c) Agreeing on procedure of the meeting. 
d) Open discussion on topics relating to decentralisation and development. 
 
Discussion will cover the following topics: 
 
a) Decentralisation – definitions, merits, demerits. 
b) Development – definitions, indicators, realities. 
c) Decentralisation and poverty reduction. 
d) Local Government structures and systems. 
e) Staffing in Local Governments. 
f) Statutory bodies like District Service Commission, Contracts Committee, 
Local Governments Public Accounts Committee. 
g) Role and functions of the Ministry of Local Government. 
h) Sector performance – Primary Education and Health Sector. 
i) Fiscal decentralisation – unconditional, conditional, Equalisation funds – 
challenges like abolition of graduated tax. 
j) Empowerment under decentralisation, democratisation, and equity related 
issues such as empowerment of women, the youth and disabled. 
k) Integrity and transparency issues. 
l) Good governance issues in general. 
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NELSON MANDELA METROPOLITAN UNIVERSITY 
(PORT ELIZABETH) 
 
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND GOVERNMENTAL SCIENCES 
 
DECENTRALISATION AND DEVELOPMENT: THE CONTRADICTIONS IN 
LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN UGANDA 
 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE GUIDE FOR SERVICE USERS 
 
SECTION A 
 
1. BIOGRAPHICAL DETAILS 
 
1.1 District: __________________________________________ 
 
1.2 Sub County: ______________________________________ 
 
1.3 Village: __________________________________________ 
 
1.4 Gender    
Male 1 
Female 2 
 
1.5 Age 
20 – 29 1 
30 – 39 2 
40 – 49 3 
50 – 59 4 
60 – 69 5 
70+ 6 
 
1.6 Occupation 
Farmer 1 
Business 2 
Community Development 3 
Unemployed 4 
Other 5 
 
1.7 Highest Educational Qualification 
Less than P.7 1 
O’ Level 2 
A’ Level 3 
Diploma 4 
BA (Hon) 5 
Masters 6 
Doctoral Degree 7 
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1.8 Religion 
Catholic 1 
Protestant 2 
Muslim 3 
Traditional 4 
Other (specify): 5 
 
1.9   Ethnic Group/Tribe: __________________________________________ 
 
SECTION B 
 
2. PERCEPTIONS OF SERVICE USERS OF DEVELOPMENT IN UGANDA 
WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF A DECENTRALISED SYSTEM OF 
GOVERNANCE 
 
2.1 Are you satisfied with the way the Local Council system as a whole     
operates?             
 Yes              1 No           2 Uncertain          3 
 
2.1.1 If no, what is the problem? 
 ___________________________________________________________ 
 ___________________________________________________________ 
 ___________________________________________________________ 
 
2.2  Do you feel empowered by decentralisation? 
 Yes              1 No           2 Uncertain          3 
 
2.2.1 If no, what is lacking? 
 ___________________________________________________________ 
 ___________________________________________________________ 
 ___________________________________________________________ 
 
2.3 Do your Councillors consult you on the projects implemented in your area? 
Yes                      1 No           2 Uncertain          3 
 
2.3.1 If no, what do you perceive to be the cause of this lack of consultation? 
        ____________________________________________________________    
 ____________________________________________________________ 
 ____________________________________________________________ 
 
2.4 How has decentralisation changed your area? 
 ____________________________________________________________ 
 ____________________________________________________________ 
 ____________________________________________________________ 
2.5   Do you feel satisfied with the health services provided at your health centre? 
Yes                      1 No           2 Uncertain          3 
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2.5.1 If no, what should be done to address this? 
           ___________________________________________________________ 
 ___________________________________________________________ 
 ___________________________________________________________ 
 
  Are you happy with school services in your area? 
Yes                     1 No           2 Uncertain          3 
 
2.6.1 If no, why? 
  __________________________________________________________ 
  __________________________________________________________ 
 __________________________________________________________ 
 
 Are you satisfied with the work of statutory bodies like the District Service     
Commission? 
Yes                      1 No          2 Uncertain          3 
    
2.7.1 If no, what do you perceive to be the problem? 
           ___________________________________________________________ 
 ___________________________________________________________ 
 ___________________________________________________________ 
 
 What is your opinion about the competence and independence of these 
 statutory bodies? 
____________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________ 
 
2.9 Do you consider civil servants to be transparent? 
Yes                      1 No           2 Uncertain          3 
 
2.9.1 If no, what do you perceive to be the cause of the problem? 
 ____________________________________________________________ 
 ____________________________________________________________ 
             
2.10   Do you consider elected leaders to be transparent? 
Yes                      1 No           2 Uncertain          3 
 
2.10.1 If no, what do you perceive to be the cause of the problem? 
  ___________________________________________________________ 
  ___________________________________________________________ 
  ___________________________________________________________ 
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2.11 Are you informed when money for education and health is released to these      
        sectors? 
Yes                      1 No           2 Uncertain          3 
 
2.11.1If no, what should be done to address this? 
         __________________________________________________________ 
  __________________________________________________________ 
  __________________________________________________________ 
 
2.12 Do you think the drugs sent to your health centre are properly utilised? 
Yes                      1 No           2 Uncertain          3 
 
2.12.1 If no, what should be done to address this? 
   __________________________________________________________ 
  __________________________________________________________ 
  __________________________________________________________ 
           
2.13   Are you satisfied with the staffing of the health and education sector? 
Yes                      1 No           2 Uncertain          3 
 
2.13.1 If no, what do you propose as the solution? 
________________________________________________________ 
 __________________________________________________________ 
 _________________________________________________________ 
2.14 Are the Management Committees for schools and health centres 
representative? 
Yes                      1 No           2 Uncertain          3 
 
2.14.1 If no, what should be done to address this? 
    __________________________________________________________ 
  __________________________________________________________ 
  __________________________________________________________ 
 
2.15 Do you think the youth, women, and disabled should continue being in 
positions of leadership/governance? 
Yes                     1 No           2 Uncertain          3 
 
2.15.1 If no, what do you propose as an alternative? 
  _________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________ 
  __________________________________________________________ 
2.16  Has decentralisation empowered the categories mentioned in 2.15 above?  
Yes                      1 No           2 Uncertain          3 
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2.16.1 If no, what is the problem? 
__________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________ 
             
2.17 Do you consider the abolition of graduated tax to have negatively affected 
service delivery? 
Yes                     1 No           2 Uncertain          3 
 
2.17.1 If yes, what do you propose as a solution? 
__________________________________________________________ 
 __________________________________________________________ 
 __________________________________________________________ 
 
2.18 Do you consider decentralisation to be a better system of governance than 
centralisation? 
Yes              1 No           2 Uncertain          3 
 
2.18.1 If no, what do you propose as the alternative? 
__________________________________________________________ 
  __________________________________________________________ 
  __________________________________________________________ 
            
2.19 What would you like to be improved in the decentralisation policy? 
__________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________ 
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Medium term expenditure framework FY 2005/06-2006/07 
(Excluding Arrears and Non VAT Taxes) 
 
SECTOR/VOTE 2005/06 PROJECTIONS
        (In billions) 
2006/07 PROJECTIONS 
        (In billions) 
SECURITY          385.07           399.64 
ROADS & WORKS          439.20           504.38 
AGRICULTURE          129.57           136.16 
EDUCATION          611.57           631.28 
HEALTH          391.11           414.07 
WATER            88.55             88.19 
JUSTICE & ORDER          165.01           168.72 
 
Source:        Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, Approved estimates 
of Revenue and Expenditure (Recurrent and Development) 2005/06 
 
NOTE:    The projections include wage, non-wage recurrent, development, 
and donor funding. 
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Ministry of Local Government organogramme of present 
situation 
 
 
  
Permanent Secretary
Minister of State
Office of the Minister
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  The study on the Institutional Development Strategy 
(MoLG/Arcadis, 2002). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*LGDP-II / PCU
Financial & 
Administration 
 
(Under 
secretary) 
Assistant 
Commissioner 
Policy &  
Planning  
Division  
Directorate Local Governments 
Administration and Inspection 
Department 
Urban and 
Rural LG 
Administration 
 
(Commissioner) 
Department 
Local Councils 
Development  
 
(Commissioner) 
Department 
Local 
Government 
Inspection  
 
(Commissioner) 
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Local government line of operation and inter-relations 
 
 
 
Centre  
 
 
Sector 
Ministries 
Chair 
LoGROC 
MoFPED
MoLG   
&  
 
 
 
Quarterly  
 
 
 
 
 
    Quarterly 
 
   Monthly/Quarterly  
 
 
  Quarterly    Monthly 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LCIV or LCV 
   Quarterly  
  
 
 
 
 
           Quarterly  
   Quarterly  
LC III 
      
       Monthly           Quarterly  
 
         Quarterly  
 
           Monthly        Monthly      
 
Service Units 
 LGFC
 
LCV/IV 
Council  
 
 
 
LCV/IV 
Standing 
LCV/IV 
Executive  
Committees Committee 
 
CAO/TC   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sub county 
/Division Chiefs  
LCV/IV Financed 
Service Provider   
Management 
Committees 
Beneficiaries 
Public Notices 
LCIII Sector Heads 
LCIII Financed Service 
Providers  
Sub-Prog /Project at 
LCIV/V
CFO/TT   LCV/IV Heads 
of Departments   
LCIII Council  
LCIII Exec  
Sub Accountant
Source: JARD 2004:33
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District Macro Structure: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Revenue          - Administration      - P.H.C           - Agriculture/      - Civil  - H.R.M/D - Probation & - Forest       - DTB 
- Budgeting       - Inspection            - Health               Crop       - Roads - County   Social   - Wetlands      - DSC 
- Expenditure    - Sports           - Education  - Statistics        - Veterinary        - Bridges    Admin  Welfare  - Environment     - DLB 
- Accounting     - Special           - Health  - Population      - Fisheries        - Buildings - Information - Social  - Land environment    - PAC  
            Education           Visitation  - Projects           - Vermin         - Monuments     Office  Rehabilitation  - Surveying  
            - Health  - Development     Control         - Water    Support  - Community  - Physical planning  
              Inspection       Planning        - Entomology      - Mechanical     Services   Development - Evaluation  
            - Disease  - MIS            - Commercial        Engineering    -Registration  - Gender  - Registration  
CAO 
FINANCE  EDUCATION  HEALTH  
PLANNING
PROD & MKG WORKS ADMIN  COM BASED 
SERVS
NAT. RES STATUTORY 
BODIES  
INTERNAL 
AUDIT   
D/CAO 
RESOURCE 
CENTRE   
DISTRICT COUNCIL 
              Control - Operational  services         - Electrical    of Births,  - Children & - Administration  
             Curative      Planning            Engineering     Marriages    Youth 
             Services - Coordination        & Deaths  - Disability &  
             Environmental    of plans of        - Assets &   Elderly 
             Sanitation         lower local        Facilities  - Culture  
             Maternity &        governments         Management - Labour  
            Child Health        - Police  
             Vector Control        - Prisons 
            Medical supplies        - Records Management 
            
Source: Government of Uganda, Ministry of Public Service 2004
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Administrative structure for council statutory bodies: 
 
LCV COUNCIL  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Support Staff 
DISTRICT SERVICE 
COMMISSION 
DISTRICT LAND BOARDDISTRICT CONTRACTS 
COMMITTEE 
PRINC. PERSONAL 
OFF. DSC 
(1) U2 
SEC. CONTRACTS 
COMMITTEE 
 U3 (1) 
PERSONNEL 
OFFICER –U5b-4 
(1) 
ASST. RECORDS 
OFFICER –U5c  
(1) 
CLERK TO 
COUNCIL–U3  
(1) 
COMMITTEE CLERK 
– U5b-4 
(1)
SEC. DISTRICT 
LAND BOARD -
U3 (1)  
Office Attendant 2 
 
Source: Government of Uganda, Ministry of Public Service 2004 
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Typical local council structure at District level. 
 
Political wing of the Council 
 
    
      
   Political Supervision and Control 
 
 
    Political Supervision and Control 
 
   
                     Political Interactions 
 
 
 
Political supervision and administrative Subordination 
 
 
 
 
 
Adminisyrative Wing of the Council 
 
 
Council of elected leaders
(Legislature) 
Chairperson 
Executive Committee (cabinet) 
Finance and  Production and        Education     Health and   Works And 
Administration  Extension Services     and Sports    Environment  Technical Services 
Committee Committee        Committee    Committee  Committee 
 
 
 
 
 
Administrative Supervision and Control 
 
  
 
 
 
Administrative wing of the Council
Administrative  Administrative   Administrative    Administrative        Administrative 
Department I Department 2   Department 3    Department 4           Department 5 
CFO  DEC    DEO     DDHS         D. ENG 
Chief Administrative Officer 
                   Source: Modified Structure from F. Saito 2003:57 
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District structure for the Education Sector 
 
Education Department (District 
Head of Education (DHE)-UI) (1)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Administration Section (Senior 
Education Officer –U3) (1)  
Inspectorate Section (Senior 
Education Officer –U3) (1)  
 
Education Officer 
– U5a-3 (1)  
 
Sports Unit (Sports 
Officer –U5b-4 (1)  
Special Needs Education 
Unit (Education Officer 
–U5a-3) (1)  
PRIMARY SCHOOLS IN DISTRICT / CITY UNDER SCHOOL MANAGEMENT COMMITTEES 
General Inspection 
Unit (Education 
Officer –U5a-3) (3) 
 
Source: MoES (2005). 
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District structure for Health Care delivery. 
     
 
 Chairperson, Sec. Health, DHC 
ADMINISTRATIVE AND HEALTH POLITICAL POPULATION  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                 Source: Government of Uganda, Ministry of Health 2004. 
 
District Council Chief Administrative 
Officer (CAO) 
DDHS & DHMT 
HC IV/Hospital (HSD) 
HC III 
HC II 
Village Health Committee 
LC IV County
LC III Sub-County 
LCII Parish 
LC I Village 
District 100,000 
County 100,000
Sun-County/ 
Town Council
Parish 5,000 
Village 1,000 
Family and Individual County members
KEY 
CAO: Chief Administrative Officer 
DDHS: Director of District Health Services 
DHMT: District Health Management Team  
DHC: District Health Committee  
HSD: Health Sub-County 
HC: Health Care 
LC: Local Council  
